Problems of COMMUNISM

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The CPSU Since Stalin

MERLE FAINSOD

Eastern Europe--Economic Liability ?

VICTOR WINSTON

Five Reports on Literature

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Whither Tito?

By Immanuel Birnbaum

THERE IS LITTLE QUESTION that Yugoslavia's refusal to adhere to the joint political declaration produced by the November gathering of Communist leaders in Moscow marked a significant and painful hitch in the Soviet's leaders' carefully laid plans to make the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the Russian Revolution the occasion of a spectacular demonstration of the solidarity and strength of the world Communist movement.

The government and party chiefs of all the Communist bloc countries, as well as Communist Party leaders from countries outside the bloc, had been invited to the Moscow festivities. Conferences were to take place on the sidelines of the anniversary celebrations, achieving their climax and chief substantive result in the adoption of a joint declaration combining an ideological evaluation of the world situation with a common program, binding upon all adherents of Lenin's teachings, for achieving the ultimate global victory of communism.

Almost on the eve of the Moscow gathering, Soviet hopes for it were somewhat dimmed by Belgrade's sudden announcement that Tito, because of a slight rheumatic indisposition, would be unable to attend in person as previously expected, and that Edvard Kardelj and Alexander Rankovic, both vice-presidents of the Yugoslav Executive Council, would attend as Tito's deputies. Nevertheless, except for this, the Moscow proceedings got off to an impressive start and appeared to be unfolding according to plan. The joint appearance of Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung before the Supreme Soviet dramatically underlined the solidarity of the two major Communist powers. Shortly thereafter, the delegates of the various Communist Parties assembled in conference between November 14 and 16 to draw up and approve the projected joint declaration.

When the text of this document was released on November 21, however, the Yugoslav Communist League was conspicuously missing from the announced list of twelve adhering Communist Parties, all from the Communist bloc proper (including North Vietnam, North Korea, and the Mongolian People's Republic). That none of the Western CP leaders present adhered was of no great significance: they did not take part in the final action on the declaration and it is not clear that they were ever asked to do so at any stage of the conference. The non-participation of the Yugoslav Communists, who had held ruling power for twelve years, was quite a different matter. The Soviet leaders unquestionably had counted upon Yugoslav adherence as an essential part of the great demonstration of Communist unity, but Tito's deputies, after examining the text of the declaration, refused to sign it. Their action, because it was taken on a gala occasion of such

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great symbolic importance, brought even more forcefully to world attention the continuing schism in the Communist movement.

The significance of this development was not appreciably lessened by the fact that the Yugoslav delegates did adhere to a second declaration that emanated from the conference. This was a general declaration for peace and the reduction of international tensions and was so cautiously formulated that all those taking part in the conference, including the party delegates from countries of the Western bloc, were able to sign it without hesitation.

"Shifts to the Left"?

The Yugoslav action with regard to the key declaration of Communist ideological unity was the more significant in that it followed a fairly extended period of developments in the direction of gradually closer Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement. In fact, there had been a number of widely-publicized Yugoslav actions and policy decisions within the past year which looked like outright acquiescence in the Moscow line. This was true, in particular, of Yugoslav actions in the proceedings of international organizations, especially the UN deliberations concerning Hungary, in which Tito's representatives largely, though not entirely, supported the position of the Kadar regime. This, of course, placed them repeatedly on the same side as the Soviet delegates.

In the sphere of Yugoslav domestic policy, too, the trial and condemnation of Milovan Djilas because of his book, **The New Class**, was widely represented as indicating a "shift to the left"—that is, toward greater limitations on political freedom of opinion and stricter insistence upon Communist orthodoxy—bringing Yugoslav internal policy into closer harmony with Moscow's. This interpretation, in the author's view, is exaggerated. Djilas, in spite of his close past associations with Tito, had already been punished for demanding reduced party control of the state and a rapid transition to cooperative socialism without political compulsion. Now, in **The New Class**, he condemned communism as nothing less than a new form of class oppression and expressly included the Titoist version in his condemnation, making free use of strong expressions and innuendo in the typical rhetorical manner of the Montenegrin orator. Obviously, if Djilas' earlier views had been objectionable, his new outburst was much more distasteful and dangerous to the Belgrade regime. His chastisement therefore signified no change in regime policy: it was not Tito's attitude which had changed, but that of Djilas.

After Hungary, however, there was a further, highly critical international issue on which Belgrade, of its own accord, definitely shifted toward closer alignment with Moscow policy—the question of Germany. Even before the shift began in mid-1957, Tito had on several occasions intimated that, after all, the two Germanies had developed side by side, and that neither could be conjured out of existence by resorting to juridical fictions. Nevertheless, Yugoslavia had legally recognized and established diplomatic relations solely with the West German Federal Republic, while with East Germany it maintained only economic relations regulated by trade delegations without diplomatic status. It had adhered to this policy despite the fact that, whenever Moscow reprimanded Tito for his sins, the slighting of the East German satellite regime figured prominently among them.

How then did Belgrade finally come, last fall, to alter its course and extend diplomatic recognition to the East German "Democratic Republic"? The answer is not yet entirely clear, but from conversations on the spot this author got the impression that, for one thing, the responsible political leaders in Belgrade had not fully realized the consequences that this action would have either for Yugoslav relations with the Bonn government or for Tito's whole position vis-à-vis Moscow.

The German Question

With regard to Bonn, the Belgrade leaders evidently were no longer inclined to take in full seriousness the old warning of the Adenauer government that it would unhesitatingly break off relations with any country that ceased to recognize it as the sole legal government representing Germany. Had not Bonn subsequently established relations with Moscow, which not only recognized East Germany but was, in fact, its creator and protector? To be sure, Bonn contended that this action was dictated by special reasons, namely Soviet responsibility under international law for collaborating in the reestablishment of a unified Germany. But Belgrade had learned that Bonn was now seriously considering similar steps to establish relations with some of the satellite states having ties with East Germany. This being the case, the Yugoslav leaders understandably minimized the possibility that Bonn would carry out its earlier threat if Belgrade entered into diplomatic relations with East Germany.

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Another factor that may have contributed to this misjudgment was the sympathetic attitude of Karl Georg Pfleiderer, then German ambassador to Belgrade. Pfleiderer, who had been a parliamentary critic of Adenauer's foreign policy, seemed to be working in the direction of an understanding whereby Bonn would give special consideration to Yugoslavia's difficult position in the event this position caused Belgrade to adopt a compromise course in the German question. Pfleiderer died during the crisis precipitated by Yugoslav recognition of East Germany. His views, however, were undoubtedly one of the reasons why the Yugoslav leaders were taken aback by Bonn's sharp answer to the recognition move—the severance of diplomatic relations.

Belgrade's decision to recognize the East German satellite regime was not, of course, brought about solely by misjudgment of Bonn's reaction. The Yugoslav leaders evidently were convinced that a number of countries belonging neither to the Soviet bloc nor to the Western alliance were also contemplating recognition of both Germanies in the near future—**i.e.**, Egypt and a few other Arab states; some South Asian countries, principally India; and finally, certain of the Latin American republics. They consequently were tempted by the thought that, if Yugoslavia acted in advance of these other "neutrals," she might reap a political advantage and avoid having to make other concessions to the Soviet Union of a more painful and compromising nature. Were recognition to be delayed until later, it was feared, Belgrade might receive no special thanks for it.

Whatever the Yugoslav leaders' calculations—or miscalculations—were, the recognition move brought about a critical situation for Tito's diplomacy. In addition to Bonn's action breaking off relations, no other "neutral" state followed Yugoslavia's lead, leaving her the only non-bloc country legally recognizing the East German satellite regime. So far as the major Western powers were concerned, Belgrade had sounded them out in advance and had been given to understand that, while they did not approve Yugoslav recognition, they were not contemplating positive action against it. There was, in fact, only one repercussion of real consequence to Yugoslavia from the Western powers—the announcement by the United States that it would have to re-examine the question of continuing aid to Yugoslavia in the light of the new situation.

This by itself, however, was enough to indicate that the most vital aspect of Yugoslav cooperation with the West was again in jeopardy as a result of Belgrade's action. As an Austrian magazine commented, Tito seemed to have stretched his strategy of balancing between East and West to the utmost limit that it could bear; one step more and he would inevitably fall into total dependence upon the Soviet Union. But what sort of role could a completely dependent Tito, deprived of Western backing, expect to play in Moscow? Clearly, there would be the danger of Yugoslavia's becoming just one among many dependent satellites, and in view of the country's still very modest economic development, Tito might find himself eclipsed in importance by someone like Gomulka, whose country is after all more populous and occupies a more vital military and geographic position. He might even be outshone by such lesser satellite leaders as Czechoslovakia's Novotny and East Germany's Ulbricht since their countries are at least industrially productive.

Since the Yugoslav leaders must certainly have foreseen the danger of such a decline in their position, one naturally wonders why they went so far toward aligning themselves with Moscow. Miscalculations in appraising the consequences of Belgrade's new German policy do not adequately explain it. Reasons of domestic policy, which some commentators have advanced as the underlying motivation, had even less to do with it, for Yugoslav collaboration with the West had never given rise to any serious internal difficulties affecting the preservation of the Communist regime; on the contrary, it had even strengthened the regime's position at times by easing domestic economic difficulties and thus discouraging latent anti-Communist opposition in the country. The reasons for the renewed, half-way rapprochement with Moscow must therefore be sought mainly in external political considerations.

New Tactics—New Expectations

One such motivating factor undoubtedly was Belgrade's appraisal of the political changes that have taken place in the Soviet Union since the death of Stalin. In the light of many statements in the Yugoslav press, of public pronouncements by Tito himself, and of the personal opinions repeatedly expressed to the author by Yugoslav political functionaries in the course of the past year, it is perfectly clear that Belgrade looked upon Khrushchev and his close associates as the easiest people, among all the Soviet Communists, to cooperate with. The Soviet party secretary did everything possible to create and strengthen this impression in Tito. His visit of reconciliation to Belgrade and his later consultations with Tito at Brioni, in the Crimea, and on the Rumanian

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coast flattered the self-esteem of the Yugoslav leaders. More than that, the latter were given the impression that Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Kirichenko (Ukrainian member of the party Presidium) and the influential Mme. Furtseva (wife of the acting Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade) were all largely sympathetic toward Yugoslav methods of economic and administrative decentralization and that they also favored a relaxation of controls within the Soviet bloc as well as cautious efforts toward a **detente** between East and West.

Khrushchev's elimination of Molotov and Malenkov must likewise have been pleasing to Belgrade in view of the role they had played in Stalin's feud against Tito. On the other hand, the Yugoslav leaders repeatedly heard that Khrushchev still had to contend with inner party opposition and therefore needed outside support. They were aware, too, that the Foreign Bureau of the CPSU was still headed by Mikhail Suslov, long disliked in Belgrade because of his leading role in the organization of the Cominform and in the Stalin-Tito conflict. If Khrushchev's efforts toward a Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement should fail to achieve some appreciable measure of success, would not the influence of men like Suslov increase again, possibly leading to the abandonment by Moscow of the whole idea of easing tension with Tito?

What Price Non-Alignment?

Such considerations were reinforced by another line of reasoning of a different sort. During the most intense phase of the cold war between East and West, Yugoslavia had unquestionably profited from the situation to a substantial degree, obtaining support from the United States and other Western powers, in the form of economic credits and arms deliveries. On the debit side, however, the tension on Yugoslavia's borders shouldered the country with an oppressive burden of military expenditures in addition to the considerable economic difficulties resulting from the commercial blockade applied by the East bloc. This experience left the political leaders in Belgrade with the general feeling that a relaxation of tensions was basically preferable to continuation of the cold war. The big four "summit" parley in Geneva, moreover, led to expectations that the leading powers themselves would abandon the cold war in the foreseeable future. Under these circumstances, Tito felt that it would be a dangerous mistake to stick to a policy predicated entirely upon the continuation of international tension. He is generally ascribed a strong, even exaggerated sense of political self-reliance, but at the same time he has enough sense of proportion to realize that Yugoslavia's possibilities depend to a considerable degree on the interplay of forces between the great powers. With his country bordering directly on four states belonging to the East bloc, Tito never wanted to become the watchdog of the West in the Balkans, nor to bring Yugoslavia into sharper opposition to the East bloc than was absolutely necessary. He now feared that, unless he played a careful, prescient game, he might wake up one morning to find that the United States and the Soviet Union had moved decisively near to an understanding which would leave him behind in an outmoded battle position, and perhaps even sacrifice Yugoslavia's interests to the cause of peace between the great powers. To be sure, Tito has never explicitly admitted to any such apprehension, but it is plainly discernible between the lines of many of his foreign policy statements, as well as in his diplomatic actions.

Co-operation without Capitulation

Both these motives—the desire to support Khrushchev, and the desire to keep constantly one step ahead of a Soviet-American **detente**—impelled Belgrade to adopt a policy of flexible accommodation toward Moscow, but not a policy of capitulation. After his diplomatic maneuver in recognizing East Germany had carried the policy of accommodation to its outermost limit, Tito immediately shifted to the opposite tack and began once more to dissociate himself from the Soviet Union in favor of a middle course between Moscow and Washington. He had always been careful to keep the door open for such disengaging action even while moving toward closer understanding with the East bloc. His new shift of tack manifested itself principally in the attitude taken by Yugoslavia toward the proposed reestablishment of a Communist International, perhaps still more plainly in Belgrade's handling of the various possibilities of Balkan alliances, and again in the caution with which Tito approached the problem of securing military aid from abroad. Finally, this new tendency toward aloofness from Moscow reached its climax with Yugoslavia's refusal to adhere to the joint declaration of the East bloc Communist Parties last November.

Let us examine these developments briefly. During the past year leaders in Moscow and other Communist capitals have been busily en-

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gaged in formulating plans for the re-establishment of a Communist International, which would embrace not just the European parties which belonged to the former Cominform but all Communist Parties throughout the world as in the time of Lenin. In Prague, no secret was made of the fact that the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia would like to play a leading organizational role in this undertaking. In Moscow, when Lenin's old co-worker from Finland, Otto Kuusinen, was elected to the CPSU Presidium, an express reference was made to his meritorious services in building the old Communist International, finally dissolved during World War II. Kuusinen, a longtime and highly esteemed friend of Tito's, accompanied Khrushchev to one of the latter's last meetings with Tito, and it probably was Kuusinen's mission to broach the idea of a new International to the Yugoslav leaders.

Undoubtedly constitutional guarantees were proposed to ensure that the new organization would not become, like the old, a unilateral power instrument in the hands of Moscow, and that the equality of all the member parties would be preserved. However, Tito has never had any illusions about the practical efficacy of such paper guarantees, especially in a situation where the smaller Communist states are unilaterally dependent upon the Soviet Union in the military, economic and diplomatic spheres. Up to 1956 the Yugoslavs had still looked to the Chinese Communists with a certain amount of hope, also shared by some Polish party leaders: they thought that a fairly even balance of power between Moscow and Peking might help to assure the smaller Communist centers of a greater voice in affairs. But when the Chinese party press expressly criticized some of the ideological positions taken by the Yugoslav leadership and when Mao and Chou En-lai repeatedly called for the subordination of the whole Communist movement to the direction of the Kremlin, these hopes vanished completely, and any inclination on the part of the Yugoslavs to join in a new international organization dropped to the zero point.

After that, Belgrade met all suggestions for Yugoslav participation with the standard reply that while it desired to cooperate with other Communist Parties, it regarded incorporation in a joint organization as quite another matter, of questionable wisdom. The reasons advanced to justify this stand were various: for example, the Belgrade press warned against the danger of blocking contacts with democratic socialist parties, which would never fit into a Communist International. The advantages of elastic, bilateral cooperation were praised; misgivings were expressed that a universal form of organization could not do justice to the quite different situations of individual parties in different parts of the world. Underlying all these varying reasons however was simply Belgrade's aversion to the idea of a new Comintern. Khrushchev finally bowed before Yugoslav adamance and acknowledged, at the end of 1957, that the establishment of a new International was not yet a timely issue.

New Flesh on Old Skeletons

In the Balkan question Moscow tried to win over Tito by proposing one of his own pet ideas couched in a new form. Rumania was put forward as the bearer of this proposal, which called for a new Balkan pact embracing three Soviet bloc states, namely Albania, Bulgaria, and Rumania; two NATO members, namely Greece and Turkey; and finally Yugoslavia as the sixth member. This seemed to revive Tito's old dream of a Balkan regional pact. To be sure, what he had sought to create shortly after the end of World War II had been a purely Communist Balkan alliance; he had succeeded at that time in winning over the Bulgarian Communist leader Dimitroff and hoped also to enlist Albanian and Rumanian support. He had further contemplated getting Greece to join after an anticipated Communist victory in the civil war then going on. Even before the situation changed in Greece, however, the whole plan was scotched by the opposition of Stalin, who was suspicious of any separate banding together of satellite states.

It has been asserted that the new Rumanian plan was formulated with the advance knowledge of Tito. In fact, he does appear to have seen it before its official presentation, and it is possible that some of the details of the final formulation in the Rumanian notes took into account Tito's views as expressed in this advance consultation. The overall conception, however, clearly originated in Moscow, and its purpose was to lure Tito, who remained outside the East bloc as a whole, at least into a Balkan subsidiary of the bloc.

That Turkey, then smarting under strong pressure from the Soviet Union, would reject the scheme, was a foregone conclusion. The "no" from Ankara was echoed in milder form by Athens, and thereupon Belgrade, too, let it be known that it no longer considered the whole proposal practicable. But Tito did not drop the matter there. After the collapse of the Rumanian plan he sent Vice-President Kardelj to Athens to reinforce Yugoslav-Greek cooperation, which had already become increasingly close during the last

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few years. During the period of hostility between Belgrade and Moscow, Yugoslavia had, of course, joined the Western-aligned Balkan pact to which the Turks and Greeks belonged. But since this alliance was no longer effective on account of the Greek-Turkish conflict over Cyprus, Belgrade and Athens now joined hands in bilateral agreements. Thus the final result of the Moscow-conceived Rumanian demarché was a renewed commitment by Belgrade to cooperate with anti-Communist Athens. It was not accidental that this demonstrative action followed shortly after the crisis in Yugoslavia's relations with the West brought about by Belgrade's recognition of East Germany.

It should also be mentioned that at about this same time Tito clearly sidestepped new Soviet offers of cooperation in providing better weapons and equipment for his army. The present condition of Yugoslav national defense is admittedly far from satisfactory with respect to armaments, the best of which have come from relatively recent American deliveries. The proffer of Soviet arms is understood to have been among the subjects discussed on the occasion of Marshal Zhukov's October visit to Yugoslavia, but as far as is known the exchange produced no concrete results whatever.

The Vicissitudes of Independence

Thus, Yugoslav policy was in a phase of renewed assertion of independence from Moscow when the November gathering of world Communist leaders took place in the Soviet capital. But what was it, specifically, that gave the final impulsion to the refusal of the Yugoslav delegates to adhere to the joint Moscow declaration of Communist solidarity? The answer must be that Belgrade could not agree to the two basic theses put forward in the declaration, namely that the entire blame for the continuation of international tension rests on the shoulders of the West, and that the only way to prevent a world catastrophe is for all countries under Communist rule to stand solidly united in support of Moscow policy and leadership.

The Yugoslav inability to accept these contentions is rooted in various considerations. They no longer believe the Marxist theory with regard to the natural progression from capitalism to imperialism, for they have not remained blind to the fact that this preconceived pattern has been refuted by the actual experience of Britain's withdrawal from India, that of the Dutch from Indonesia, the French from Indo-China, and the United States from the Philippines. They have also learned from their own harsh experience during the existence of the Cominform that subordination of the whole Communist movement to the will of the dominant Communist power does not contribute to the relaxation of international tensions, but rather tends to increase it.

As long as Khrushchev was pursuing a policy of relaxing restrictions at home and easing tensions abroad, the Yugoslav leaders were inclined to support him. But the Moscow declaration struck them as a backward step in both areas, domestic and international. They regard the new tack as pointing in the direction of a renewed hardening of the opposing bloc formations and of out-and-out reliance on power politics in future international dealings. Yugoslavia remains just as Communist as she has always been since 1945, but Belgrade—given the present Soviet policy—wants to place greater emphasis on independence from Moscow and on solidarity with the "neutrals" from Sweden down to India and Burma, feeling that this is the only way to preserve its influence in international affairs.

SINCE THE MOSCOW PARLEY of Communist leaders, the reservations made by Kardelj and Rankovic with regard to the joint declaration have been retroactively confirmed by the Yugoslav party leadership, thus underlining Belgrade's intention to dissociate itself from the policy of the Soviet bloc both now and in the foreseeable future. But on the other hand, Tito does not propose to swing the balance too far in the other direction. Foreign commentaries which attributed Yugoslav rejection of the Moscow declaration to Tito's desire for continued American aid provoked unconcealed resentment in Belgrade. To prove the falsity of this impression, Tito promptly decided upon a further move, this time directed at the West: he declared that Yugoslavia would forego further U.S. military aid because it was beneath the dignity of his government to be required to prove its political reliability every time the next installment of the aid program came up for approval. Henceforth, he indicated, Belgrade would obtain such weapons as it had to get from outside by regular commercial purchase, even if this required long-term credits. Tito further announced that Yugoslavia would seek to place its orders in such countries of both blocs as possessed highly-advanced weapons industries, thus strictly preserving the principle of balance between East and West.

In the age of intercontinental missiles and the

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hydrogen bomb, the military importance of Yugoslavia is doubtless much less than it was eight or even six years ago. But the political importance of Tito's state in the framework of the existing international balance of forces is still considerable. It is important that, at a time when Moscow is seeking once more to tighten its reins over the other segments of the Communist world, at least one country professing to be a disciple of Lenin refuses to submit. If Khrushchev tolerates Tito's stubborn insistence upon independence from Moscow, it is because he can do nothing else. The two men, whatever their personal feelings toward each other, are separated not by mere differences of tactical conception but by a genuine schism of political belief.

Tito's balancing act has undoubtedly been one of the most difficult experiments in international diplomacy of the postwar period. He is continuing to carry it but under increasingly difficult conditions, but with an undiminished determination to guard Yugoslavia's national independence.

THE SOVIET UNION

The Party in the Post-Stalin Era

By Merle Fainsod

EDITORS' NOTE: One of the essential features distinguishing a totalitarian society from other forms of despotic or authoritarian regimes is the position of its ruling party—as the repository of ideological "truth" and as the exclusive, unchallenged force guiding all of the society's economic, social and cultural activities. In no country has this been more true than in the Soviet Union, where the very term "anti-party" has come to stand for every type of asocial attitudes ranging from mild "deviationism" to outright treason—this despite the fact that under Stalin the party was in actuality a mere tool in the hands of an omnipotent dictator. In the article below, Mr. Fainsod traces the development of Khrushchev's campaign to assert the primacy of the party in Soviet society in fact as well as in theory. He thus demonstrates that the totalitarian nature of Soviet communism has remained essentially intact, even though basic social and economic pressures seem to favor the ascendancy of the technician as versus the party *apparatchik*—that is, the man actually enmeshed in the technicalities of managing a complex and rapidly expanding industrial system as against the man directing it from above by virtue of his political authority and reliability. The importance of Mr. Fainsod's article, therefore, lies in the fact that it points both to the long-range implications of change in the USSR, as well as to the grim efforts being exerted by the ruling party to resist them—thus far successfully.

IN THE PERIOD since Stalin's death, pressures for the loosening of party controls have again become visible on the Soviet scene. This restiveness has been many-sided. In the intellectual realm it has expressed itself in a demand for "creative freedom" and liberation from bureaucratic party direction.[1] In the military sphere—if the charges against Marshal Zhukov are true—resistance to party controls has taken the form of "curtailing the work of party organizations,

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political organs and military councils" and "of abolishing the leadership and control of the party, its Central Committee and Government over the Army and the Navy."[2] In the economic sector, as the recent public discussion of industrial reorganization made clear, there is widespread insistence by factory directors and enterprise managers on the need for greater autonomy in conducting their operations.[3]

These symptoms of dissatisfaction over restrictive party controls may be viewed as part of a larger pattern of pluralistic forces which are seeking expression in Soviet society. Rapid industrialization, educational advances, and the growth of professionalism in different walks of Soviet life have operated in varying degrees to create points of resistance to monolithic party control. Indeed, these developments have led some to contend that there is an inevitable conflict between the imperatives of an industrial society and the functions traditionally assigned to the party in Soviet society, and that the party is destined to become obsolete as the pressures for democratization and freedom spawned by education and industrialization come into ascendancy. Arguing the conflict thesis more cautiously, Barrington Moore Jr. concluded in 1954 that the forces which have been set in motion by industrialization will compel the party men to give ground to the engineer-administrator and that "if peace should continue for a decade or more, the rationalist or the traditionalist forces in Soviet society, or some unstable combination of the two, may do their work of erosion upon the Soviet totalitarian edifice."[4]

Meanwhile, a half decade of history has unfolded since Stalin's death. How has the party apparatus responded to challenges to its authority? Is there any evidence that its power has been undermined? Have there been any perceptible changes in the role of the party, and if so, how can those changes be defined?

The Party Machine

One lesson of the last five years would appear by now to be undeniable. Control of the party apparatus remains the key to supreme power in the Soviet system. The step-by-step ascent of Khrushchev to a position of undisputed leadership represents a striking recapitulation of the Stalinist experience. Starting, like Stalin before him, from a position of relative weakness in the Presidium, Khrushchev has used the powers of the secretarial office to install his friends in key posts in the party and governmental apparatus, to pack the Central Committee with his supporters, and to transform his preponderance in the Central Committee into domination of the Presidium.

The present composition of the Presidium dramatizes the ascendancy of the party Secretariat. Of the fifteen full members, no less than ten—Khrushchev, Aristov, Beliaev, Brezhnev, Kuusinen, Furtseva, Suslov, Mukhitdinov, N. G. Ignatov, and Kirichenko—also serve as secretaries of the Central Committee. One other, F. R. Kozlov, occupies the important post of First Secretary of the Leningrad organization. The four remaining members of the Presidium—Bulganin, Mikoyan, Voroshilov, and Shvernik—represent holders from the old Stalinist Politburo whose power has been effectively neutralized by the new arrivals. Of the eight alternate members of the Presidium, one, Pospelov, is a secretary of the Central Committee and four others serve as first secretaries in the republic and regional party apparatus—Kalnbernin in Latvia, Mazurov in Belorussia, Mzhavanadze in Georgia, and Kirilenko in Sverdlovsk. Of the three remaining alternates, Korotchenko, a former party **apparatchik,** occupies the post of Chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, while only two, Pervukhin and Kosygin, hold ministerial positions and can be classified as managerial or technical in their primary orientation.

When the compositon of the present-day Presidium is compared with the Politburo under Stalin, or even with the enlarged Presidium which came into being after the Nineteenth Party Congress in October 1952, some interesting contrasts are evident. Stalin's high command contained representatives of the police in the persons of Beria and later S. D. Ignatiev; at present there are no representatives of the police ministries in the top structure of party authority. While Stalin's inner circle included no professional army officers (unless Voroshilov is so regarded), Khrushchev for a brief period enlisted the services of Marshal Zhukov, only to cast him aside when he loomed as a potential competitor for supreme power. Stalin's Presidium included some of the Soviet Union's outstanding economic administrators; Khrushchev has demoted them to a lower order of influence and status in the party hierarchy. Under Khrushchev, more than ever before, the Presidium has become the inner sanctum of the party functionaries. For those who looked to the "managerial revolution" to make its influence felt in the highest reaches of the Soviet power structure, there can be little comfort in these developments.

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An analysis of the composition of the Central Committee elected at the Twentieth Party Congress reveals a similar pattern of domination by the party secretariat. While the Central Committee includes a substantial group of ministers and a sprinkling of army officers, diplomats, and party ideologists, the party functionaries are clearly the most numerous group. Well over half of the membership consists of Central Committee secretaries and members of the Central Committee apparatus, secretaries of the republic party organizations, and first secretaries of the regional party committees. To the extent that this apparatus operates as a disciplined phalanx responsive to Khrushchev's leadership, it enables him to impose his will on all the leading party organs.

The Spreading Tentacles

Khrushchev's authority is not confined to party circles alone. As part of his drive for power, a well-planned campaign was successfully executed to place his supporters in strategic posts in the governmental apparatus. While many examples could be cited, a few must suffice. The head of the political police (KGB), General I. A. Serov, was an associate of Khrushchev's in the Ukraine and his rise to prominence has paralleled Khrushchev's. The Procurator-General since June 1953 has been R. A. Rudenko, a former subordinate of Khrushchev's in the Ukraine. On February 1, 1956, S. N. Kruglov was replaced as Minister of Internal Affairs by N. P. Dudorov, who was also a Khrushchev subordinate in the Ukraine and was later brought to Moscow as chief of the construction section of the Central Committee Secretariat. The head of Gosplan and first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, I. I. Kuzmin, headed the machine-building section of the Central Committee apparatus until he was lifted by Khrushchev to his new pinnacle. While the projection of party functionaries into key administrative posts was primarily designed to consolidate Khrushchev's grip on the governing machinery, its effect was also to underline the central importance of the party apparatus in Khrushchev's formula of governance.

The rise of Khrushchev has been accompanied by a renewed emphasis on the leading role of the party in Soviet society. On July 6, 1956, **Pravda** proclaimed:

> **As for our country, the Communist Party was, is, and will be the only ruler of thought, the inspirer of ideas and aspirations, the leader and organizer of the people in the entire course of their struggle for communism...**

This militant reiteration of the vanguard role of the party has been accompanied by an effort to pour new vitality into party life. On the ideological front, it has expressed itself in a drive to recapture revolutionary momentum and elan by stressing the triumphs of the regime at home and abroad. But it has proved no easy matter to recreate the evangelical fervor and messianic dedication of the early revolutionary years, and the shrill demands of the party press for ideological commitment reveal undertones of concern at the lack of ardor and militancy in party ranks.[5]

With a view to securing greater mass support, the party has altered its recruitment policy to at-

THE PARTY AND THE PEOPLE

The Official Myth

What are the world-historical successes of socialism in our country if not the best proof of the vitality of the Leninist principles on the relations between the party and the masses? The fundamental source of them is precisely the fact that our party, faithful to the principles of Marxism-Leninism, has forged unshatterable bonds with the masses, and has perfected the correct methods of readying and leading the masses into battle.

By its selfless devotion to the working class, by its devotion to the interests of the working class that coincide with the basic interests of the whole people, the party has won the unlimited and unanimous trust of the toiling masses.

The Soviet people, having built, under the leadership of the Communist Party, a new socialist life, recognizes the CPSU as its only leader and teacher. This recognition has found its expression in the constitution of the U. S. S. R.; the constitution confirmed the situation—brought about by history and determined by the class structure of a socialist society—whereby the CPSU constitutes the leading nucleus of all organizations of the working people, public as well as state.

—*From the editorial, "The Communist Party—The Leading Force of Soviet Society,"* **Kommunist,** *No. 16, November, 1947.*

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tract more collective farmers and production workers into its ranks. Under the recruitment directives now in force, the party seeks to enlist "the best people" in every occupational group.[6] While the party remains basically an association of the directing cadres of the Soviet Union, its stress on the recruitment of "outstanding" **kolkhozniks** and factory workers is designed to sink firmer roots into the lower reaches of Soviet society and to prevent the estrangement of the masses from the top party stratum.

BEFORE THE MEETING

—I finally decided to speak with the masses, and these blunderheads haven't even prepared the text...

—*From* Krokodil *(Moscow), September 30, 1957.*

Reforms From Above

The campaign to breathe new life into the party has also been attended by a so-called "democratization" drive. The professed objectives have included wider participation of party members in party activities and discussions, secret elections of party bureaus and secretaries, punctilious observance of party rules in calling meetings and conferences, and broader scope for initiative at the grass roots. While scattered reports of local party meetings make clear that some highly embarrassing and challenging questions were put in the wake of Khrushchev's "secret" attack on Stalin at the Twentieth CPSU Congress, nothing that has happened thus far indicates any real impairment of central control over the party rank and file. With a few minor exceptions, "elections" below continue to ratify the nominations of higher party organs, and discussions have followed the traditional course of "unanimously" approving central resolutions. Power has remained safely in the hands of the central party functionaries.

Under pressure from the center, the number of paid functionaries has been reduced, and the party apparatus itself has been reorganized to secure greater efficiency and more adequate control. As an accompaniment to the agricultural reforms initiated in the fall of 1953, the party embarked on a drastic reorganization of its rural organization with the objective of bringing the leadership closer to the grass roots.[7] The fulcrum of intensive control was shifted from the **raion,** or district center, to the MTS (machine-tractor stations). Each **raion** was divided into zones—one for each MTS station—and a district party secretary was assigned to each zone with headquarters at the MTS. Party instructors were transferred from the **raion** centers to the MTS, with each instructor responsible for one or at most two collective farms.

Since then a number of other steps have been taken to simplify the party structure. The political departments **(politotdels)** at Machine-Tractor Stations have been abolished, and the system of special Central Committee organizers in important industrial enterprises has also been liquidated. There has been a contraction in the number of paid secretaries in primary **(i.e.,** the lowest-level) party organizations. At the republic and **oblast** level, sections of the party apparatus have been combined, and at the **raion,** or district, level there has been some tendency to replace sectional organization of the secretariat by a pool of party instructors, each of whom is assigned to one or more primary organizations with responsibility for all aspects of their work.[8]

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THE MAJOR THRUST of the Khrushchev reforms has been to reinforce the authority of the party apparatus in every direction. Beginning with the reassertion of party controls in the MVD after the arrest of Beria, all efforts to weaken party controls in any sector of Soviet life have been sternly rebuffed. The rebuke administered early in 1954 to party officials in the Ministry of Construction who violated the party decree prohibiting the acceptance of payments or bonuses from economic organizations furnished a striking example.[9] **Pravda** seized the occasion to re-emphasize the independence of the party hierarchy and to indicate that party officials who allowed themselves to become "tools in the hands of administrative organizations" would be severely punished. The tendency under Khrushchev has been to stress the party's economic responsibilities and to gear agitational and propaganda activities much more directly to production objectives. As Khrushchev put it at the Twentieth Congress:

> **Economic development is one of the most important facets of our party work. The work of a party official should be judged primarily by those results attained in development of the economy for which he is responsible... Unfortunately, many party organizations draw an absurd distinction between party political work and economic activity. One still meets so-called party "officials" who consider party work one thing and economic work and state administration another. One can even hear complaints from such functionaries that they are being diverted from so-called "pure party work" and compelled to study economics, technology, farming and production. Such a conception of the tasks of party work is fundamentally wrong and harmful. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is the ruling party and everything that happens on our Soviet soil is of vital interest to the party as a whole and to each Communist. A Communist has no right to be a detached bystander. This is why the party demands that party cadres not separate party work from economic work and that they supervise the economy in a concrete and competent manner...**[10]

The Politics of Economics

The curious history of Khrushchev's role in the recent struggle over industrial reorganization may serve to illustrate his determination to centralize control of the economy in the hands of the party apparatus. At the Central Committee plenum in December, 1956, a decision was approved to broaden the powers of the Economic Commission and to install Pervukhin and other leading economic administrators in controlling posts within it. The effect of this move was to strengthen the authority of elements in the Presidium identified with the state rather than the party machine. Against the background of later developments, it now appears clear that the scheme was not palatable to Khrushchev. Departing from his usual custom, he delivered no report to the Plenum not did he associate himself with the plan. Perhaps reluctant to do battle so soon after the Hungarian and Polish debacles, he apparently acceded to the demands of his rivals in the Presidium to fortify the power of the Economic Commission and even allowed the Supreme Soviet to ratify the reorganization scheme on February 12, 1957.

Yet the very next day a specially summoned session of the Central Committee convened to hear a report by Khrushchev, which proposed a radically different approach to the managerial problem. Apparently now assured of overwhelming support in the Central Committee, Khrushchev counterattacked with a plan designed to emasculate the Economic Commission and to place control of the economy securely in the hands of the party apparatus.

The resolution approved by the Central Committee was cautiously worded. It spoke merely of "reorganizing the work of the State Economic Commission" and "of the need to increase the role of the State Planning Commission (Gosplan) in planning and managing the country's national economy."[11] It called for a reduction of the central apparatus of the ministries and for a transfer of personnel and functions to new regional organs of administration which would be closer to production and provide for integrated development of economic areas. But its political thrust lay elsewhere. By weakening the power of the central governmental bureaucracy and initiating a major reorganization of the central planning organs, it cleared the way for a purge of Khrushchev's opponents in the ministries and the installation of his friends in key posts. By pitting local and regional managerial personnel against the central ministries, it permitted Khrushchev to enlist new support on a country-wide scale. Above all, by dispersing ministerial authority in the localities, it left the field free for the party apparatus as the primary integrating and centralizing force.

The subsequent unfolding of the plans for industrial reorganization made all this unmistakably clear. The law approved by the Supreme Soviet on May 10, 1957, abolished the Economic Commission and established Gosplan as the dominant economic planning agency.[12] By a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet a week earlier, I. I. Kuzmin, one of Khrushchev's subordinates in the Central Committee apparatus, had already been installed as chairman of Gosplan

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and first vice-chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.[13] The process of tightening Khrushchev's grip on the central government machinery was completed when, as a follow-up on the purge of the "anti-party group" in the last week of June 1957, Kaganovich, Molotov, Pervukhin, and Saburov were removed as first vice-chairmen of the USSR Council of Ministers and Malenkov was dismissed as a deputy chairman.

With the emphasis on administrative decentralization in the economic sphere, the integrating role of the party apparatus bulked larger than ever before. Of this Khrushchev showed himself fully aware. Noting in his speech to the Supreme Soviet on May 7, 1957 that "under the new structure of management, where local agencies are granted extensive rights, there may arise tendencies toward autarchy..." and temptations to satisfy "local needs" at the expense of the interests of the state as a whole, he made clear that the party, as well as other agencies subordinate to it, would have as one of its main missions the "struggle against such harmful... tendencies."[14] In the words of the Central Committee resolution, one of the effects of the reorganization would be "to enhance the role of local party and Soviet organizations... in economic development."[15] The party hierarchy was counted on to remain a binding force.

THE MOST RECENT vindication of the doctrine of party supremacy is to be found in the Zhukov affair. While the purge of the popular World War II hero may be interpreted as primarily an assertion of Khrushchev's undisputed ascendancy, Soviet press commentary makes clear that the issue was precipitated by friction between the party's political apparatus in the armed forces and the more professionally-oriented officers who followed Marshal Zhukov in subordinating political indoctrination to combat-training and military control. The Central Committee resolution on the improvement of party and political work in the Soviet Army and Navy charged that Marshal Zhukov had "pursued a policy" of underestimating and curtailing party leadership of the Army and Navy. Noting "serious shortcomings in practical party and political work" in the armed forces, the resolution reminded the military command:

> **The chief well-spring of the might of our Army and Navy lies in the fact that the Communist Party —the guiding and directing force of Soviet society —is their organizer, leader and instructor. We must always remember V. I. Lenin's directive that the "policy of the military establishment, as of all other establishments and institutions, is pursued in strict accordance with the general directives given to the party through its Central Committee and under its direct control.**[16]

This reaffirmation of party hegemony epitomizes the road which Khrushchev has traveled during the last five years. Embodying himself in the party and proclaiming its right to unchallenged leadership, he has raised his entourage of party functionaries to heights of power which they could hardly have dreamed of a half-decade ago. The victory of Khrushchev represents the triumph of the **apparatchiki** in its purest and most unadulterated form.[17]

A Pyrrhic Victory?

How secure is the victory and what role can we envisage for the party in the years ahead? Stalin became General Secretary of the party at the age of 43. Khrushchev begins his reign at 63. In the eyes of the more ambitious members of the younger generation of **apparatchiki,** his must appear a transitional regime, destined before not very long to give way to a different set of governing arrangements, and replete with all the temptations to maneuver and intrigue which any short-term **modus vivendi** accentuates. Moreover, the very terms of settlement by which the succession struggle has been resolved, the reinforcement of the prerogatives and status of the party apparatus, has undoubtedly left a legacy of bruised feelings and unfulfilled aspirations in other quarters. To intellectuals who welcomed the de-stalinization campaign as promising a new charter of liberties, the tightening of party bonds has come as a rude awakening. To officers in the armed forces who saw the rise of Marshal Zhukov as a symbol of military independence, his demotion signalizes a renewed effort to subordinate the military forces to party control. To factory managers throughout the Union the autonomy promised by regionalization was no doubt more than welcome, but the injunction to reinvigorate party controls at the enterprise level may well be interpreted as withdrawing with one hand what had been granted by the other. To magnify the powers of the party apparatus is to run the risk of estrangement from other groups who see their interests threatened by excessive party tutelage.

It may turn out that the consolidation of the **apparatchiki** under Khrushchev has only served to arrest long-term trends which will eventually operate to undermine party controls. But there is danger in being excessively sanguine on this score, at least over the short-run. The imper-

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atives of industrialization impose their own patterns of rationalized management in any society which sets maximum productivity as a primary goal, but they do not abolish the distinction between technical men and political men. Those who run the factories do not necessarily aspire to run the state, and their interests may be accommodated within a framework of totalitarian party control without yielding them political power. There is no iron law which dictates incompatibility between one-party rule and a highly-developed industrial society.

Nor is the domination of the party apparatus inevitably destined to give way to military rule. Bonapartism will always remain a threat as long as the armed forces bulk so important on the Soviet scene, but a military **coup d'etat** requires a degree of conspirational secrecy and an **esprit de corps** in officer ranks which the whole pattern of party controls in the armed forces is calculated to discourage and prevent. Soviet educational progress has produced striking technological and scientific achievements, but we must not forget that it is associated with a system of political indoctrination which instills subservience to party commands. Heartening as it has been to note signs of ferment and criticism among Soviet students and intellectuals in recent years, these remain somewhat marginal phenomena, and it may be a long time before they build up into the insistent and organized demand for political liberty which would represent a real danger to the regime.

YET CHANGE THERE IS, and change there will continue to be. The party apparatus under Khrushchev is not what it was when Stalin seized power, and it may well be different tomorrow from what it is today. Better-educated than their Stalinist predecessors, more technically-oriented in their training and experience, the present-day party functionaries have had to learn to balance zealotry with the pragmatic skills required to manage a complex industrial society. They confront a nation which has been to school, which has mastered the technical arts of an industrial civilization, which is dissatisfied with its living standard, and which faces the future with sharpened expectations, the more urgent because they have been so long postponed. How the party apparatus responds to these aspirations may well determine its ability to survive.

The brute weapons of Stalinist mass terror are no longer readily at hand, and, even if available, are unlikely to be mobilized, except as an act of desperation. The problems which today's party leadership must resolve call for a subtler policy of accommodation, in which social forces already set in motion are manipulated by incentives and persuasion, rather than the cruder forms of repression. But however skillfully the present apparatus channels the social currents which are flowing, it must live with the knowledge that its authority rests on a precarious equilibrium created by a dictator who is no longer young. Even if Khrushchev's apparatus copes successfully with the difficult domestic and international problems which loom before it, it cannot for long postpone its own appointment with destiny. The test of its power will come with the next succession crisis—that periodic **malaise** of the totalitarian party state for which no therapy of legitimacy has yet been devised.

NOTES

1. See, *e.g.*, Khrushchev's speech in *Pravda*, August 28, 1957 (and the section in Soviet literary developments in this issue—Ed.)
2. *Pravda*, November 2, 1957.
3. See "The Soviet Industrial Reorganization," by Alec Nove, in *Problems of Communism*, No. 6, November-December 1957).
4. Barrington Moore, Jr., *Terror and Progress USSR*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1954, pp. 31, 231.
5. Thus *Pravda* noted on February 22, 1957, "... we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that in Soviet society, too, there are still people poisoned by petty-bourgeois survivals, who take at face value the profusion of bourgeois propaganda about the 'delights' of bourgeois democracy and the bourgeois way of life."
6. For an excellent treatment of recent changes in recruitment policy, see T. H. Rigby, "Social Orientation of Recruitment and Distribution of Membership in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," *The American Slavic and East European Review*, New York. October 1957, pp. 275-90
7. *Pravda*, September 13 and 15, 1953; March 6 and 21, 1954.
8. See T. Uldzhabaev, "Sovershenstvuem rabotu partiinovo apparata" (We Improve the work of the party apparatus), *Partiinaia Zhizn*, No. 14 (July 1957), pp. 20-27.
9. See *Partiinaia Zhizn*, No. 3 (May 1954), pp. 47-50.
10. *Pravda*, February 15, 1956.
11. *Pravda*, February 16, 1957.
12. *Pravda*, May 11, 1957.
13. *Ibid.*
14. *Pravda*, May 8, 1957.
15. *Pravda*, February 18, 1957.
16. *Pravda*, November 2, 1957.
17. Khrushchev's determination to increase the authority of the party apparatus has also been manifested in a new policy on the arts, marked by a tightening of party controls, a reaffirmation of the principle of *partiinost* ("party-mindedness"), purges of the editorial boards of literary and scholarly journals which allowed themselves to become mouthpieces for "unhealthy sentiments and tendencies," *etc.* (See articles by George Gibian and Victor Erlich this issue—Ed.)

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The Soviet Satellites -- Economic Liability?

By Victor Winston

EDITORS' NOTE: It is common knowledge that for years the Soviet Union had subjected its East European satellites to a most vicious and predatory form of economic exploitation—either through the formation of so-called "joint-stock companies," or through compulsory purchases of raw material and produce at prices lower than those prevailing on world markets, or through outright seizures of plants and equipment under the guise of "war booty" and "reparations." But what about the present? Does the USSR still derive the same economic benefits after the strains and stresses of Stalinist policy *vis-a-vis* Eastern Europe have become so dramatically conspicuous to the rest of the world—after the East Berlin uprising, after Pilsen, Budapest, and Warsaw? It is Mr. Winston's thesis that Soviet economic exploitation of these countries has now reached a point of diminishing returns, and that the entire area—for reasons adduced below—has become more of a liability than an asset to the Kremlin rulers. It need hardly be pointed out that this thesis is of considerable importance in any assessment not only of the economic, but also of the political future of Russia's East European neighbors and the Soviet Union itself.

ALTHOUGH TWELVE YEARS of Soviet domination in Eastern Europe have revealed clearly the techniques of the USSR's economic exploitation of the satellite states, the long-term consequences of Soviet economic relations in the area have remained obscure. Communist spokesmen, relying upon an elaborately constructed pattern of unequal trade relations, have steadfastly denied past exploitation or a current crisis in Soviet-satellite economic relations. On the other hand, certain outside observers have been inclined to overlook the fact that Eastern Europe has ceased to be a lucrative field for exorbitant Soviet profit-taking.

A realistic approach to the problem would suggest, rather, that the Polish and Hungarian events of October 1956 constituted a turning point in the overall balance of economic relations between the USSR and the European members of the Soviet bloc. There is little doubt that the net flow of economic contributions moved from the satellite states to the Soviet Union and farther east to Communist Asia during the first postwar decade. However, the economic developments which followed the two revolutions appear to have reduced over-all Soviet gains and even to have reversed the balance with certain of these states and with the satellite area as a whole.

Mr. Winston, a former staff economist of Radio Free Europe, is the author of several books and articles on the economy of the Soviet orbit. This article has benefited from the research files and writings of Messrs. Roman Bernaut of the Free Europe Press and Leon Herman of Washington, D.C.

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The Pre-October Balance

Were an economic ledger containing a genuine account of Soviet transactions with Eastern Europe opened for audit, it would show a number of weighty credit entries indicating tangible satellite contributions. Some of these would be identifiable as transfers of goods and services which accrued to the USSR as a direct result of Soviet participation in the Allied defeat of Hitlerite Germany. Others would be directly attributable to the USSR's postwar establishment of patterns of industrial subordination and control and to its imposition of various exploitative trade schemes upon the satellites.

War-connected transfers or contributions to the Soviet Union were made through dismantlement and removal to the Soviet Union of industrial plant equipment, Soviet confiscation of German and Italian assets in Eastern Europe, and the flow of reparations payments to the USSR, as well as satellite financial contributions toward the maintenance of Soviet occupation troops.

East Germany and Poland's Western Territories fell victim to the largest removals of capital goods and industrial materials. Under the guise of "war booty," the Soviet government dismantled and transferred captured plant and equipment to the east in a manner not authorized by the Potsdam protocol or other agreements. Similarly, Moscow appropriated most German and Italian properties and external assets. Even though the Soviet Union "returned" part of these assets to some of its European satellites in the form of "investment contributions" to joint stock companies, the seizures appeared in many cases to violate the original ownership rights of Hungary and Rumania, and reduced the authorized transfer of German assets to Poland.[1]

The volume of satellite reparations payments to the Soviet Union has been calculated as follows (in millions of US dollars):[2]

	1938 Prices	Current Prices
East Germany	6,195	15,488
Rumania	226	570
Hungary	160	400

Since 1950, the USSR has reported a 50 per cent reduction of East Germany's obligations.[3] But the flow of payments during 1951-53 appeared to exceed the ostensibly reduced levels by more than a billion rubles a year.[4] In addition, East Germany bore the direct financial burden of garrisoning over 20 Soviet divisions within her territories prior to July 1956. Likewise, most other European satellites participated in the maintenance of an average of two Soviet divisions per country.[5]

Control and Trade Schemes

Industrial Subordination. Soviet profits from industrial subordination and control of satellite Europe derived partly from the exploitation of joint stock companies[6] and from their calculated dissolution. Equally important may have been gains arising from the promotion of certain new industrial projects, from the flow of Soviet technological "assistance" and from unrestricted Soviet utilization of Eastern Europe's transportation facilities.

Since uranium mining and Danubian shipping were two of the major objects of the joint company type of exploitation, the bulk of these revenues came from East Germany, Hungary and Rumania. A calculated dissolution of some of these companies during 1954-55 augmented Soviet gains. Not only were Soviet shares relinquished to the satellites on highly unfavorable financial terms, but insidious currency manipulations contributed further to Soviet profits. In one spectacular case, the sudden, and presumably Soviet-imposed, devaluation of the Rumanian **lei** in February, 1954,[7] doubled the ruble price—from 1.43 to 2.86 billion—for the sale of Soviet rights in Rumanian Sovroms in September of that same year.

The patterning of new satellite industries after the Soviet model shifted some permanent profits to Soviet suppliers and contractors. The steel mills at Nowa Huta in Poland and Sztalinvaros in Hungary typify the kinds of revenue sources which accrued to the Soviet government as a result of imposed industrialization. Soviet technological "assistance" in the development of these and similar projects involved satellite payments of license fees, patent royalties, research and planning charges, and the salaries of Soviet experts and advisors.[8]

Soviet exploitation of transportation facilities took the form of large scale freight rebates, low transit rates, and free or low-cost use of satellite harbor facilities, merchant fleets and inland waterways. These practices reduced expenditures and indirectly yielded significant profits.

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Imposed trade patterns. Soviet gains from imposed trade patterns were effected through the mechanism of bilateral trade agreements, blocked trade accounts, resale operations, "political exports,"[9] and trade flows to Communist Asia.

The structure of bilateral trade agreements led to a series of unequal trade relations in which the Soviet Union was invariably the winning partner. Prices paid by Moscow for satellite imports tended to be lower than prices prevailing on the world markets, while the average prices of Soviet exports to Eastern Europe were frequently higher. The USSR's bargaining power, which could operate fully through the mechanism of the bilateral agreements, manifested itself also in Moscow's frequent role as a trade debtor within the orbit. This imposed upon the satellites the additional burden of carrying short-term commercial credits free of interest.

Soviet profits from these agreements, moreover, tended to mount with the increasing volume of its trade with the bloc. This volume increased from 3.1 billion rubles in 1946 to 10.5 billion in 1950, 20.7 billion in 1955, and 22.1 billion in 1956. Eastern Europe's share in the 1956 volume amounted to 15-16 billion rubles, or more than half of the USSR's total foreign trade turnover.[10] Soviet revenues from imposed price levels, which involved undervaluing satellite and overvaluing Soviet commodities, and from commercial "discounts" may be traced to the main trade flows shown in the chart on this page.[11]

SOVIET TRADE WITH EASTERN EUROPE

(Main Items of Exchange)

COMMODITY	SOVIET EXPORTS TO:							SOVIET IMPORTS FROM:						
	Poland	Czech.	E. Ger.	Rum.	Hung.	Bulg.	Alb.	Poland	Czech.	E. Ger.	Rum.	Hung.	Bulg.	Alb.
Uranium								x	x	x	x	x	x	
Coal								x						
Coke			x	x	x									
Oil and Oil products	x	x				x					x			x
Iron Ore	x	x		x	x									
Other ores	x	x										x	x	x
Pig iron and steel				x	x		x							
Metals	x	x	x	x	x		x	x					x	
Fully equipped plants	x	x		x	x	x	x		x	x				
Heavy Machinery	x	x		x	x	x		x	x	x		x		
Ships								x	x	x		x		
Vehicles & RR carriers								x	x		x	x		
Chemicals								x		x	x	x		
Textiles								x	x	x	x	x	x	
Footwear									x					
Cotton	x	x	x	x	x	x								
Timber		x			x						x			x
Tobacco													x	
Grain	x	x	x		x		x							
Other Food products		x	x					x	x		x	x	x	x

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No less significant was the fact of Soviet control of the surplus balances of bilateral trade flows to the USSR and of satellite exchanges with Finland. Moscow used this power to block outstanding accounts and to apply them toward Soviet-imposed trade debts and other lucrative transactions. Resale operations, as of Polish coal to Finland, Bulgarian tobacco to Hungary or Hungarian ships to Egypt, offered still another opportunity for the Soviet Union to capitalize on imposed price levels. Most satellite states and even Austria fell victim to this form of exploitation.

Polish coal deliveries to the USSR in "exchange" for Soviet shipments of German reparations to Poland constituted the most prominent example of what may be called political exports—that is, exchange of economic considerations for political favors or advantages. In this case, Poland's prices to the Soviet Union were generally 90 percent below world market rates.[12]

Beyond the direct measures of exploitation already outlined, Moscow derived direct and indirect benefits from shifting part of the burden of financing the industrial development and military potential of China, North Korea and North Vietnam to the more industrialized European satellites through imposed trade flows to Communist Asia. The Soviet Union profited directly from freight transit charges and from repurchases from the satellites of excessive and frequently useless quantities of Asiatic products. Such commodities as soya beans and hog bristles had limited value in the markets of Warsaw or Prague. Hence, their resale in transit to the Soviet Union at bargain prices at least reduced satellite transportation and storage costs.

Economic Trump Cards

In addition to the flow of tangible revenues, which may be treated as dividends to the Soviet asset-holder, the USSR gained a number of economic trump cards reserved for ideological and possibly strategic considerations. The years of expensive quasi-autarkic planning, which Moscow inspired in Eastern Europe, created an increasing dependence of many over-expanded industries, notably metallurgy, on Soviet raw material deliveries and markets.

Nowa Huta and Sztalinvaros, with their increasingly prominent shares in Poland's and Hungary's industrial production, investment outlays and employment, represented two typical dependent industrial vulnerabilities. These over-expanded industrial giants were geared to Soviet technological levels and became reliant on Soviet supplies and ore deliveries. It is hardly likely that they could maintain their roles as rational contributors to their countries' economies in the event of a sudden removal of these economies from the Soviet sphere. Hence, for some satellites the prospect of release or escape from the Soviet economic orbit gradually began to bear with it the threat of industrial stagnation and such possible consequences as depression and unemployment.

Paradoxically, the Soviet-inspired integration of the satellite economies, which tended to reverse some of the effects of autarkic development, seemed destined to increase the cost of economic interdependence to the satellite economies. Although this pattern suffered a severe setback after the revolutions of October 1956, it could well have increased the potential cost of **individual** separation or liberation from the orbit.

The Soviet-imposed curtailment of economic exchanges with Western Europe, moreover, weakened the historically western-oriented pattern of Eastern Europe's foreign trade. The resulting evaporation of many of Eastern Europe's traditional markets and sources of supply tended to reduce the potential commercial profits which might have been earned from the West, had independence been achieved.

Soviet Debits

The **debit** side of the Soviet-satellite economic ledger was also considerable. According to Soviet sources, long term credit grants to the orbit during 1945-55 amounted to 21 billion rubles,[13] of which Eastern Europe seems to have accounted for about 13 billion rubles.[14] Costs mounted rapidly during the Korean conflict when the Soviet Union, seeking to strengthen satellite military potential, stepped up armaments shipments to Eastern Europe. And when ominous symptoms of economic bankruptcy developed roughly two years prior to the events of October 1956, Moscow ceded or lost a number of revenues to Poland, Hungary and East Germany. Moreover, the Soviet Union was compelled to relax the pace of its industrial exploitation of satellite Europe and to permit a considerable reduction of war-connected transfer revenues. It would appear that the political upheavals of October did not cause but merely hastened an inevitable curtailment and eventual loss of economic dividends accruing to the USSR from the satellite system. Neverthe-

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less, the net balances of Soviet-satellite pre-October relations appears to have favored the Soviet Union to the extent of several billion rubles per annum.[15]

October's Aftermath

The October 1956 upheavals in Hungary and Poland accelerated the transformation of the satellite system into an economic liability to the Soviet Union. Thereafter, the net flow of economic contributions began to move from the Soviet Union to the non-affected as well as to the affected countries. During the first half of 1957, the Soviet Union was compelled to contribute over seven billion rubles to its European satellites.[16] Poland's Gomulka managed to obtain cancellation of a 2.1 billion ruble debt and a credit grant of 1.1 billion rubles.[17] East Germany's annual contribution for the upkeep of Soviet military garrisons was reduced by 1.44 billion rubles.[18] Battered Hungary received over a billion rubles; and reduced obligations and credit grants to Albania, Rumania and Bulgaria totalled another billion.

The cost of maintaining military forces in Hungary and the evaporation of gains from Polish and Hungarian exports as well as the general dislocation resulting from material shortages and the disruption of satellite production schedules have tended to increase the immediate cost of maintaining the satellite system. Moreover, the drastic fuel and grain shortage, which has necessitated Soviet emergency supply deliveries to the satellites, may well develop into a serious long-range drain on the Soviet economy.

While the overall balance of Soviet-satellite economic relations may have shifted to the debit side of the Soviet ledger, a generalized treatment of the seven European captive states as a unit creates a distorted picture. Soviet economic exploitation is still strongly evident in three of these states. They remain net assets to the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the entire satellite system continues victim to a number of "pre-October" forms of exploitation. The following thumbnail sketches place Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Bulgaria in the group of net contributors to the USSR's economic strength, and East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Albania in the group of net liability regions.

Net Asset Regions

Czechoslovakia strengthens the credit side of the Soviet ledger with her underpriced shipments of machinery and uranium to the USSR. Ships, locomotives, footwear and textiles lead as other objects of continued, though modified, Soviet trade exploitation. Moreover, Czechoslovakia continues to aid Communist Asia and may still sustain considerable losses from trade accounts blocked in Moscow. While intensified uranium prices in February 1957,[19] and the general improvement of trade terms have reduced Soviet profits, Czechoslovakia appears to represent an important economic asset to her Soviet neighbor.

Rumania contributes heavily to the Soviet economy in oil products, timber, uranium and foodstuffs. Profits derived from Soviet use of Rumanian vessels are also significant. However, the flow of war-connected revenues and the gains from calculated dissolution of the joint stock companies are no longer prominent. The Soviet Union, moreover, was forced to cancel the 4.3 billion **lei** debt for the transfer of Soviet joint company shares to Rumania and to advance over 270 million rubles for the development of Rumania's chemical industry.[20] The economic advantages of "dealing" with Rumania appear to have declined, but the net balance may continue to benefit the USSR.

Bulgaria is a minor economic asset due to her limited economic potential. On the debit side of the recent Soviet ledger are a 300 million ruble advance, made in February 1956, and a 200 million ruble credit grant, extended a year later.[21] Bulgarian uranium deliveries have become somewhat less remunerative to the Soviet Union. But the flow of uranium, lead and zinc concentrates, and truck produce, as well as revenues derived from tobacco deals and Soviet technological "assistance" appear to tip the scale in favor of the USSR.

Net Liability Regions

Hungary appears to be the outstanding example of a liability region to the Soviet Union. Already stagnated in 1954 because of the disproportionate emphasis on heavy industry, a fuel crisis and an agricultural decline, Hungary's economy reached a virtual state of bankruptcy after the tragic events of October. The level of recent Soviet support probably exceeds 1.3 billion rubles, while the additional cost of maintaining military forces and compensating for the loss of Hungarian machinery and bauxite exports may be as high as 2 or 3 billion rubles.[22] Revenues derived from Hungarian uranium are relatively negligible and the continued benefits from Danubian shpiping are also small. For the foreseeable future, Hungary

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will thus remain a severe economic liability to the Soviet Union.

East Germany also tends to assume the role of a major liability satellite. Separated from normal markets and sources of supply, her truncated economy has been heavily burdened by war-connected transfers and by Soviet exploitation of joint stock companies. In July 1956, the Soviet Union was compelled to halve East Germany's contribution to the upkeep of Soviet military forces and to allow an increase in uranium prices. During the following January, the USSR granted the country a 680 million ruble loan in order to facilitate East German purchases of coke and grain[23] and to save the region's fuel economy—crippled by the cessation of Polish coal deliveries—from a state of collapse. The cancellation of contracted deliveries of East German equipment to Communist Asia added to the Soviet burden. Notwithstanding a significant flow of revenues from the Wismut A. G. (a uranium joint-stock company) and from machinery, heavy equipment and chemicals deliveries, the net effect of the Soviet hold over East Germany has been economic loss.

Poland likewise has ceased to be an economic asset to the USSR. Sweeping economic concessions granted to Premier Gomulka eliminated the bulk of Soviet revenue and secured Poland a relatively free economic ride for the immediate future. The loss of vital coal shipments, the upward revision of commercial transit fee through Polish territory, and, particularly, the loosening of Polish economic ties with the Soviet orbit may have been no less painful to the Soviet economic ledger than Soviet cancellation of Polish debits (2.1 billion rubles), new credit loans and emergency grain deliveries.

Even so, Poland's economic potential is sufficiently large to raise the possibility that it will not be a permanent or long-range drain on the Soviet economy. Soviet concessions, prompted by the events of October, helped to stave off economic bankruptcy and improved Poland's prospects for checking a damaging inflation. Should Poland's economy recuperate, it could again be forced to assume part of the USSR's obligations toward Communist Asia or toward the more devastated satellite economies. The country has already (February 1957) extended a four-year credit grant of 40 million rubles to Hungary,[24] and is known to have made a later commitment to North Vietnam. Moreover, a number of Polish industries, notably uranium, continue to yield dividends to the Soviet Union. And consideration must be given to profits derived from excessively priced deliveries of Soviet cotton and continued Soviet exploitation of the Polish commercial fleet. Thus, even though Poland is currently an economic liability to the USSR, it constitutes in the long range an important potential asset to that country.

Albania represents a small but perpetual drain on the Soviet Union's account with her satellites. The costs of financing the industrial development of an almost primitive economy have been inflated by a recent loan commitment of 348 million rubles and by Soviet cancellation of a 74 million ruble debt.[25] Soviet exploitation of Albanian oil and chromium constitutes a relatively insignificant asset.

Concluding Notes

In examining the balance of Soviet-satellite economic relations over the past dozen years, the absence of exhaustive data compels the observer to draw inferences from a limited set of facts and to rely upon the process of deductive reasoning. Even on this basis, however, it is possible to construct a very crude balance sheet which would indicate that the net pre-October annual balance amounted to about five billion rubles in favor of the Soviet Union. The evidence further suggests that the unfavorable balance of the captive countries taken together has tended to diminish since 1953 or 1954.[26] Although the precise moment when this balance became unfavorable to the USSR cannot be pinpointed, a comparison between the average pre- and post-October annual balances argues convincingly that Eastern Europe has become an economic liability to the Soviet Union.

This is the sum of an economic change which is demonstrably connected with recent political events in some of the satellite countries. The latter developments have provided confirmation that the satellite system, which the Soviet Union intended as a source of economic power, has turned into a liability region which requires economic support. The traceable cost to the USSR of Communist setbacks in Poland and Hungary appears to exceed seven billion rubles, and there are strong indications that this drain on the economy will continue to strain the fabric of the Soviet empire. To date, Moscow's planners have had to set aside and yield to the satellites something over one per cent of their 600 billion ruble investments, scheduled under the recently discarded Sixth Five-Year Plan.

From a long range viewpoint, continued Soviet support of satellite liability regions would tend to reduce basic industrial outputs, presumably metallurgical, and to enlarge real costs because of increased transfers of resources to the satel-

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lites. In addition, such support would probably diminish meager liquid capital resources, strain the vulnerable transportation system, and reduce reserves of certain industrial and agricultural raw materials, mainly coal and grain. There is no doubt that the Soviet economy is capable of meeting and sustaining such losses. Nor is there any reason to anticipate a drastic reduction of her economic potential as a result of her new economic status **vis-a-vis** the satellites. But the added burden of supporting a weakened satellite system constitutes a significant irritant and strain.

The years of insidious Soviet economic exploitation contributed to the weakening of the satellite economies. The pre-October crisis in the more industrialized captive states disclosed the fallacy and the danger of pursuing a pattern of quasi-colonial economic relations. Unrest in Germany, the events at Poznan, and the two October revolutions may be traced, in part at least, to the growing state of economic bankruptcy which prevailed in the affected countries. And October in turn may have increased the cost of confining satellite economic activity to the Soviet orbit. The Soviet Union was not the only loser, although its greater wealth and potential placed the heaviest burden upon it. The captive states and the Soviet Union, individually and collectively, have suffered serious economic losses and a reduction of their economic potential.

It is therefore reasonable to assume that emphatic continuation or resumption of Soviet economic exploitation may boomerang in the form of repeated and possibly greater losses. This reality may compel the Soviet Union to recognize the necessity of limiting and eventually abandoning its economic exploitation. In the light of past experience, it may thus reduce the level of its economic meddling in satellite affairs and consider instead a steady flow of tangible economic assistance to the satellites as a form of dividend for the prestige of continued political control.

NOTES

1. Nicholas Spulber, *The Economics of Communist Eastern Europe* (Massachusetts Institute of Technology & John Wiley & Sons, Cambridge-New York, 1957), pp. 35-40. It is worth noting that the Soviet Union made additional profits on German foreign trade accounts by compelling Hungary and Rumania to sign waivers of their claims on Germany from September 1939 to May 1945.
2. Calculations of the economist Leon Herman, based on extensive research. The conversion factor into US dollars is based on *Monthly Bulletin of the Bank of Finland* (Helsinki, December 1952).
3. G. Gertsovich, *Razvitie mirnoi ekonomiki v Germanskoi Demokraticheskoi Respubliki* (The Development of a Peaceful Economy in the German Democratic Republic), Moscow, 1954, pp. 151-53.
4. *Die Wirtschaftliche und Sociale Entwicklung in Ostberlin und der Sowjetischen Besazungsone* (The Economic and Social Development in East Berlin and the Soviet Occupation Zone), No. 10, Berlin, 1955, p. 12. The reported 1951-53 total of 3,738 million East German marks may be expressed as 6,729 million rubles. The Russians have provided for a reduction of payments to the level of c. 850 million rubles per annum (Gertsovich, *loc. cit.*) which places the excess of East German reparations payments in 1951-53 at c. 3,180 million rubles.
5. United Nations, *Economic Survey of Europe in* 1956 (Geneva, 1957) p. 19; *The Times* (London), January 29, 1957.
6. The joint stock companies were a special device set up in several satellite states, in which Moscow nominally had an equal share with the government in question. In reality, satellite participation was limited to rubber-stamping Soviet decisions and to supplying cheap labor and other input factors. The revenues were channelled into the Soviet economy.
7. *Scanteia* (Bucharest), January 31, 1954.
8. See statement by Yugoslav official in the *New York Times*, November 15, 1952.
9. The term "political exports" is most frequently identified with the flow of underpriced satellite goods to the Soviet Union in exchange for tangible or intangible concessions of a political nature.
10. *Novoe Vremia* (Moscow), No. 41, October 10, 1957, p. 29.
11. Chart calculations are based on N. Spulber, "East-West Trade and Economic Trends" in *The Fate of East Central Europe* (Notre Dame, Ind., 1956), p. 413; also Files of Free Europe Committee, Inc., New York.
12. V. Winston, "The Polish Bituminous Coal-Mining Industry," *The American Slavic and East European Review* (New York), Vol. XV, February, 1956, pp. 55-56.
13. *Partiinaia Zhizn* (Moscow), September 1956.
14. *Pravda* (Moscow), February 15, 1956.
15. The crudest form of balancing the most prominent credits and debits would suggest the use of reparations payments versus the volume of long-term credit grants. Disregarding other flows and records of contributions on both sides of the ledger, this would give a figure of roughly one billion US dollars (at current prices) per annum in favor of the Soviet Union.
16. According to *Pravda* (July 7, 1957), the 1956-57 total of Soviet credits to the orbit amounted to 7 billion rubles. Eastern Europe was to account for 4.3 billion. The addition of Polish gains would raise the European satellite total above the 7 billion ruble level.
17. *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), November 29, 1956.
18. United Nations, *loc. cit.*
19. *Rude Pravo* (Prague), February 16, 1957.
20. *Scanteia* (Bucharest), December 9, 1956.
21. *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia), January 31, 1957.
22. *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest), January 22, February 16, 1957; files of Free Europe Committee, Inc., New York.
23. United Nations, *loc. cit.*
24. *Ibid.*
25. Radio Tirana, April 17, 1957
26. With an allowance for fluctuation and a significant margin of error.

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The Literary "Front"

EDITORS' NOTE: Of the five articles below, the first three deal with the recently turbulent, frequently dispirited, but always interesting literary scene in the USSR. Continuing this journal's series of reports on literary developments since Stalin's death, Mr. Gibian describes the various works that appeared in the wake of Khrushchev's iconoclastic speech at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, the attempts of writers to hold their ground in the face of mounting official pressure for conformity, and finally the party's reimposition of quasi-Stalinist controls over literature and art. Mr. Scriven's article deals specifically with the aims and aspirations of the writers who have fought so courageously (if not successfully) for a more artistic literature. The third, by Mr. Erlich, offers a brief history of the vicissitudes of Soviet literary criticism, from the relatively free and unfettered days of Lenin and Trotsky, through the Stalinist period, when criticism became a mere form of party propaganda, to the present "thaw," which allows critics a measure of free expression within the bounds of political orthodoxy.

"The Writer Under Mao" traces the attempts of the Chinese CP to control and direct the literary output of writers, playwrights, and poets; Mr. Chan discusses some of the more important works published in China, and ends with an analysis of the recent abortive experiment with a more liberal cultural policy. The final article, by Paul Landy, depicts some of the highlights of the reign of terror that the Kadar regime has unleashed on intellectuals in postrevolutionary Hungary.

Ferment and Reaction: 1956-57

By George Gibian

THE TWENTIETH CONGRESS of the Soviet Communist Party, held in February 1956, marked one of the most dramatic milestone of post-Stalinist development in the USSR. For the spheres of Soviet cultural activity, no less than for other sectors of Soviet life, the Congress seemed to portend an acceleration of the trend toward the abandonment of restrictive Stalinist policies and influences. Within just two years, however, that trend has been decisively reversed; today the literary and arts world is once again beset by the pressures of a repressive party policy, the keynotes of which are conformity, ortho-

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doxy, "partymindedness." While this latest phase of political interference in the arts by no means represents a return to the excesses of Stalinism, the principle of party direction and control over cultural development has been authoritatively reaffirmed. The collective factors and events which impelled the party's new "hard line" tactics are worth examination as a clue to the present-day intellectual climate in the Soviet Union.

Post-Congress Optimism

Among his many statements at the Twentieth Congress Khrushchev directed a special message to Soviet writers and artists:

> **Our country's arts and literature can and must seek to become the best in the world, not only in richness of content, but also in artistic power and skill. We cannot be reconciled, as are some comrades in art agencies, editorial offices and publishing houses, to dull and hasty works.[1]**

Khrushchev's attitude, echoed in other Congress statements, encouraged many of the cultural intelligentsia to believe that the "thaw" was on in earnest, that the way was open to greater creative and intellectual freedom without bureaucratic interference. At the same time his more dynamic pronouncements on the "cult of personality" and his attack on Stalin (when it became known) both encouraged appraisals of what had been "wrong" with Soviet society and lessened the fear that honest answers would bring terroristic reprisal.

The expansive spirit of optimism which infected the cultural intelligentsia in the aftermath of the Congress manifested itself in various ways. Editors started publishing translations of foreign authors as well as the works of a number of emigre Russian and Soviet writers, formerly tabooed by the censors. Ivan Bunin enjoyed a moderate boom in Russia. William Saroyan was published. Others among the rehabilitated included Isaac Babel, Boris Pilnyak, Vsevolod Meyerhold. A host of new literary periodicals were started up, among them: **Neva, Moskva, Literaturnaia Moskva,** the almanac **Nash Sovremennik** (Our Contemporary), **Inostrannaia Literatura** (Foreign Literature—a journal devoted to translations and critical discussions of foreign works, particularly exhilarating to Soviet readers). Another sign of the new spirit was a rash of critical articles demanding greater truthfulness, objectivity and "sincerity" from Soviet writers, and sometimes even voicing the plea for freedom from direct supervision of literature by the party.

The change in climate was reflected perhaps most clearly in the tenor and content of new creative output—the plays, novels, poems, and stories published in the summer and fall of 1956. Dozens of works expressed novel and provocative attitudes. A notable example was Z. Paperny's **Genya and Senya,** a brief dramatic sketch parodying the typical Soviet play based on the precepts of "socialist realism." In a spirit of boisterous humor the playlet dared to satirize the stereotyped anti-capitalistic propaganda expected of Soviet playwrights and poked fun at the favorite themes of Soviet drama—industrial inventions, collective farm life, **etc.**[2]

S. Aleshin's play **Alone** caused a stir because of its sympathetic treatment of the individual's personal needs and desires in a situation of moral conflict—in this case a love triangle raising the problem of divorce. The dramatist's chief concern was with the consequences of divorce for the individuals concerned—the wife, husband, the younger woman loved by him, the daughter—not with what the party or society might think of the situation. A party man attempts to persuade the husband not to leave his wife, but the husband insists firmly on his personal rights, using the argument: "The party needs me to be honest. To have me work honestly. To have a marriage of love."[3]

Moods and Messages

Three works published in **Novy Mir** in the fall of 1956 became the rallying points of the advocates of a new literature, as well as objects of attacks by the hard-line party spokesmen. Daniel Granin's short story "Personal Convictions," in the August issue, centered around a simple plot: Minaev, an engineer, head of a research laboratory and editor of a scientific journal, refuses to publish an article submitted by a young man named Olkhovsky, attacking a motor designed by a prominent Academician. The story deals with Olkhovsky's efforts to have his article published and Minaev's reactions to his own role in the situation. Minaev views Olkhovsky sympathetically; he sees in him his own younger self. He had always thought of himself as a courageous rebel, but in actual practice, he now realizes, he has long since "played safe" in the face of opposition. In an initial effort to speak the truth as a young man, he had been reprimanded by the head of his section: "It is too early for you to be drawing yourself up so high. Where are you pushing. . . . What are you? A foreman. Those they swallow without chewing." And a production engineer had warned, "If you come in here

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one more time with such nonsense I'll kick you out of the plant. Scram." Minaev became a yes-man, while waiting to acquire enough rank to speak his mind. At the end of the story he realizes that the moment of power and courage will never come, no matter how high he rises in the Soviet technological bureaucracy. The system has broken him. The story is melancholy in its mood, pessimistic in its view of Soviet social organization and its effects on human character.

The September issue of the magazine contained a long poem by Semion Kirsanov, "The Seven Days of the Week." In this poetical fantasy, the hero invents a new heart with which to replace the "petrified" hearts of Soviet citizens. The poem pillories the inhuman, unfeeling life of the people, as well as the indifference and callousness of the bureaucracy in its efforts to control human feelings.

Three issues of **Novy Mir,** August through October, brought out Vladimir Dudintsev's notable **Not By Bread Alone.** The novel became the focal point of most literary discussions not because it contributed something new, but rather for the opposite reason: it is a nexus of revolutionary attitudes already—though usually less intensively—expressed by other writers. Dudintsev took one of the party's favorite subjects, the technological novel concerning an inventor's struggles, and perverted it against the party's desires, breaking many of the canons of "socialist realism" in the process. He shows the inventor as a lonely figure, facing numerous enemies; his hero has an affair with the wife of his antagonist; the villains of the novel are bureaucrats, men successful in the Soviet system and many in number; they are still in power at the end of the book. In more detail than Granin, Dudintsev depicts the damage done to the integrity of Soviet citizens by the country's social system.

Selections without Censorship

A large anthology entitled **The Day of Poetry** appeared late in 1956, containing poems by over one hundred poets of all generations, as well as several provocative critical articles on poetic problems. Some of the poems are so subjective, purely lyrical, or modernistic, that a few months earlier—or a few months later—they would have been condemned as "formalistic" monstrosities. They included poems by the late Marina Tsvetaeva, with an introduction admitting she "did not understand and did not accept the October Revolution," although omitting the fact that after her return to the USSR she committed suicide; satirical verses by Z. Paperny; translations of two poems by Perets Markish, a Yiddish poet who perished during Soviet anti-Semitic persecutions; and works by Margarita Aliger and other poets who have been in disfavor either before or since the volume's publications. Several of the critical essays included in the anthology defended the poet's right to be individual, lyrical, and free in his writing. Discernible throughout the book is the enthusiasm of the period: the poet's "heart believes that we are on the eve of a new and perhaps unprecedented flowering of Soviet poetry."

Even more dramatic was the content of the second volume of the anthology **Literaturnaia Moskva** (Literary Moscow). The first volume, which appeared in the summer of 1956, included two works by the poetess Anna Akhmatova, a particular victim of Zhdanov's 1946 purge, as well as works by the notorious "formalists" Boris Pasternak* and Viktor Shklovsky; otherwise, however, it contained little that could disturb the party's watchdogs. The second volume was very different. It literally abounded in materials of such import as to make it a landmark in the history of Russian literature. The most important essay in the volume was dramatist A. Kron's "Notes of a Writer," who candidly analyzed the consequences of Stalinism as follows:

> **Where cult is present, scientific thought must give way to blind faith, creativity to dogma, public opinion to caprice. The cult gives birth to a hierarchy of servants of the cult—the deity must have worshippers and obsequiousness. The cult is incompatible with criticism; the healthiest criticism is easily twisted into a heresy. . . . Where the taste of one man becomes incontrovertible, a leveling down and a crude interference in the artistic process . . . are inevitable. Under those conditions, not to be understood meant to be condemned. Where one man owns the truth uncontrolled, artists are relegated to the modest role of illustrators and singers of odes.**

A short story in the anthology, Nikolai Zhda-

*Boris Pasternak is recognized as one of the most talented Soviet writers and poets. Now in his middle sixties, he had refused, during the worst years of Stalinist repression, to publish party-line doggerel, and instead occupied himself almost exclusively with translating Shakespeare's works into Russian. In 1956, he disclosed that he had written a major novel, *Dr. Zhivago,* and arrangements were made to publish it simultaneously in the USSR and in Italy. In the summer of 1957, having suddenly discovered ideological "distortions" in the novel, Soviet authorities decided that it should be "revised", and its publication postponed. Despite Soviet pressure, however, the original version was published in Italy in November 1957, and British and American translations are due to come out in the Spring of 1958. It will be reviewed in the next issue of *Problems of Communism.*—ED.

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nov's "The Return Home," deals with the contrast between a Communist leader's view of life from his office and the conditions he actually finds on a collective farm. Alexander Yashin's "Levers" is an equally negative picture of country life. The author completely undermines the standing myths: his party knows little about the collective farmers' lives; it abuses and bosses them, treats them coldly and impersonally.

Other notable pieces in the anthology are a novel by Venyamin Kaverin, **Searches and Hopes,** presenting a critical view of Soviet biology and health institutes; two stories by Yuri Nagibin; and a satirical fable by Sergei Mikhalkov.

The Build-up Toward Counterattack

Looking only at the works described thus far, the landmarks of the post-Congress march towards literary freedom, one might be justified in thinking that the pre-Congress "thaw" was turning into a full-scale literary revolt against party precepts. However, throughout this period there was plenty of vocal opposition from the spokesmen for an "orthodox" literature, who sharply attacked the new literary works and urged tighter controls, a more optimistic depiction of Soviet life, and closer adherence to the party line. In the course of most of 1956, these demands appeared to be a rear-guard action by outnumbered Stalinists. The Polish and Hungarian revolts, however, rallied the forces of repression and boosted the defense of orthodoxy into a powerful counterattack. The gradual shift in the critical balance of power can be seen by comparing literary discussions of October and November 1956 with later writers' meetings in March, May, and June 1957.

On October 22, 1956, a number of noted critics and writers joined in at a Conference of Inventors, Rationalizers, and Production Innovators, to debate **Not By Bread Alone**—a unique event in literary history. The literary people seem to have done more talking on this occasion than the technologists who were specialists in the subject matter of the novel. While Dudintsev was roundly attacked, he also found staunch supporters who fired broadsides at Stalinism. One defender declared, for example:

> **It is necessary to give portraits of the big bureaucrats, to depict all their machinations, to show how they poison talented people. A struggle is in progress and it should be reflected in literature.**

Author Konstantin Simonov, notably adept at supporting the predominant party view at a given moment (although his timing has sometimes been bad) was among those who attacked Dudintsev. He complained (quite rightly) that the novel appeared to criticize the entire party and state bureaucracy instead of depicting the "bad" bureaucrat, Drozdov, as an isolated type whom all the healthy forces of Soviet Russia were combatting. Others deplored the "terrible individualism and . . . hopelessness" of the novel. Yet on the whole the vigorous defense which Dudintsev enjoyed made this October meeting a demonstration of the literary "thaw."[4]

In November, a meeting of the Moscow Union of Writers debated conditions in drama. Many comments were highly critical of "Stalinist" plays. One speaker "considered one of the major troubles of drama to be that the dramatic hero has been made less active and less independent; playwrights must show a man who thinks independently." Another declared:

> **The cult of the individual was seriously harmful to Soviet art and especially to drama. The notorious no-conflict theory, which has caused us much damage, was a direct consequence of the cult of the individual. The atmosphere created in art and literature in past years also caused serious errors. . . . Because criticism of a play or a performance was not always well-founded, we have often drawn hasty organizational conclusions; a play has been withdrawn from the repertory, its production has been made difficult.**

Recriminations and Resistance

The most radical suggestion made at this meeting was put forward by V. Gubarev, who advocated not merely broadening or redefining, but abolishing socialist realism, the shibboleth of Soviet literature since the early 1930's. While Gubarev was attacked by many critics and writers for his remarks, his viewpoint was at least reported and debated in the Soviet press.[5]

After the turn of the year, the tenor of literary discussions changed. The report of the Moscow Writers' Union on the November drama discussion was condemned in January for suggesting that "negative" works such as Zorin's **Guests,** which had been censured some years before, should perhaps be reconsidered. Such rehabilitations were now rejected. Zorin was again charged with distorting reality, with making the high-ranking bureaucrat represent evil in an exaggerated form, as if it were rooted in the Soviet way of life. "This play was written from mistaken positions, the revival of which would be very damaging to our literature," one party-line critic maintained.[6]

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At a meeting of the Board of the Moscow Writers' Union in March 1957, the greater liveliness of literature in 1956 was noted with satisfaction, but the praise was accompanied by "sharp criticism of work that gave a one-sided picture of the life and activity of our Soviet people." According to **Izvestia,** many speakers devoted comments to the "shortcomings" of Dudintsev's novel and of the short stories and poetry published in the second volume of **Literaturnaia Moskva.**[7] A plenary session of the Moscow Writers' Union later that month was an occasion for a good deal of further debating. Kirsanov, Aliger, Kaverin, and Dudintsev all spoke in defense of their works and against the official report delivered by D. Yeremin. Konstantin Simonov gave a speech which steered a conciliatory middle of the road line between Dudintsev and his attackers; several other speakers urged calmness in judging the literary output of 1956; and some very sharp attacks were made on the writers who had offended against literary orthodoxy.

In the weeks following the March meeting, the vigor and volume of press attacks on Yeshin, Granin, Dudintsev, and Kron increased steadily. By the time of the May meeting of the Board of the Moscow Writers' Union, the editors of **Literaturnaia Moskva** were the particular butts of attack. The timing of the publication of the second volume of their anthology had been unfortunate. The material had been collected before October 1, but printing was not completed until after the Hungarian revolt. Works which stretched to the utmost the relative ideological laxity of the summer of 1956 were now being judged by party officials frightened by the Polish and Hungarian demonstration that writers granted an inch would seek a far greater measure of freedom. The recalcitrant writers and editors were accused of helping the West. They were urged to recant. Their refusal to do so was called a misguided attempt at the "heroism of silence."

Regime Intervention and Reprisals

On May 13, Khrushchev himself addressed the writers, aligning himself with the critics of the rebels. Six days later he delivered a second speech, which evoked a spate of "hard-line" articles in **Pravda** and **Izvestia.** Errant writers who were party members came in for particular attack. On June 6, it was reported:

> **A meeting of the Communist writers of Moscow [has] fully approved the resolution of the [May] plenary session of the Writers' Union and in turn condemned the factionalism of the editorial board of** Literaturnaia Moskva, **a factionalism of which, unfortunately, the Communist writers E. Kazakevich, V. Tendryakov, and V. Rudny [all on the editorial staff of the anthology] are also guilty. The meeting of Communists approved the decision of the party committee of the Moscow writers' organization to expel V. Rudny from the party committee and instructed the party committee to take up the matter of the behavior of the Communist members of the editorial board of** Literaturnaia Moskva.[8]

The writers and editors under attack apparently put up a last ditch fight, however. According to a report in **Literaturnaia Gazeta,** also on June 6:

> **[Kaverin] spoke extremely one-sidedly about the work of the edtiorial board of** Literaturnaia Moskva. **He defended works published in the second volume. . . . In a speech of E. Kazakevich there was no sign of a wish to admit honestly the errors committed. . . . [A. Yashin] acted as if even by this time he could not be certain what was wrong with "The Levers."**

Literaturnaia Gazeta went on to accuse the recalcitrant writers and editors of secretly upholding a political platform "not in agreement with the policy of the party in the area of literature."

At a general meeting of Moscow writers on June 11, Kazakevich, Aliger, and Bek surrendered, recanting in person or by letter. Margarita Aliger's letter apparently was not fully satisfactory, however, since she continued to be attacked. Through the following weeks, writers' meetings were held in many cities, all claiming and at the same time stressing the need for an "atmosphere of unanimity". Even then boycotts took place: in Leningrad, it was reported, "many important writers simply did not honor our meeting with their presence."[9]

The Central Committee's meeting (June 22-29) which followed the Molotov-Malenkov group's effort to wrest power from Khrushchev momentarily interrupted the drive to tighten literary controls. But as soon as the political struggle was over, Khrushchev found time to return to the subject of literature. In his third speech to the writers, delivered in early July, Khrushchev emphasized the primacy of party guidance, rephrased the commonplaces of socialist realism, and personally attacked Dudintsev and Margarita Aliger for daring to defend works "in which ideas alien to us are surreptitiously introduced."

Khrushchev's three literary speeches were published in abridged form at the end of August. Since then they have become a classic of Soviet literary orthodoxy. Numerous endorsements of his thesis and promises to obey his exhortations have been published in newspapers and maga-

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zines; rehashes of the speeches and editorials emphasizing their importance are still coming out.

The Mood of Reaction

Organizational changes are also being made. A new unit of the Writers' Union is being set up for the Russian Republic, (RSFSR) as a whole, with trusted personnel in powerful positions on the Organizing Committee; apparently the intention is to provide a counterpoise to the Moscow Writers' Union, which was the center of the liberal trend.[10] The rebellious writers, moreover, have been linked with the "anti-party group" of statesmen, to whom the blame has fallen for the precarious literary situation. Shepilov has been accused of an "unprincipled conciliatory attitude towards clearly unhealthy phenomena," Kaganovich of "demagogically accusing good Ukrainian poets of nationalism," Malenkov of "vulgarizing statements about the typical."[11]

More recently, even the Soviet successes with ballistic missiles and satellites have been enlisted in attacking "negative" writers. A contributor to **Neva**, for example, argued in reference to Dudintsev's hero Lopatkin:

> **If he, with his simple invention, because of conditions allegedly existing in our country, could do nothing to place it in the service of the people, then who placed the ballistic rocket recently into the service of our country, perhaps of all mankind?**[12]

In October the party organization of Moscow writers convened in a joint meeting with the board of the USSR Union of Writers. The keynote address by Valentin Kataev was reported under the press headline, "We are grateful to the party," aptly describing the attitude which the meeting was supposed to encourage. Leonid Sobolev and Anatoly Sofronov, writers faithful to the party line, spoke smugly, almost gloatingly about the need for publications like **Novy Mir, Moskva,** and **Literaturnaia Moskva** to avoid their past errors. A complete contrast to their remarks was the humble, even debasing, personal recantation of Margarita Aliger, delivered on the same occasion:

> **I committed a number of gross mistakes in my public work. . . . It is my peculiarity at times to substitute morally-ethical categories for political categories. . . . Obviously I must now be much more exacting with myself, liberate myself from a certain speculativeness. . . . All the work of a Soviet writer is political work, and to accomplish it honorably is possible only when one follows firmly the party line and party discipline.**[13]

Caption above: There are still writers who in their works exaggerate individual shortcomings, turning them into ugly generalizations (from the newspapers).

Caption below: Oh! There's a character I'll make into a hero of my novel.

—*From* Krokodil *(Moscow) October 10, 1957.*

Embers in the Fire

Complete conformity has not been entirely restored, however. Occasional critical and daring essays still appear. Ilya Ehrenburg, for instance, in an article on "The Lessons of Stendhal", stirred up a furor among Soviet critics by using a subtle discussion of the French novelist to cast aspersions at Soviet efforts to guide literature along narrow political paths. His essay contained long passages which, while ostensibly concerned with early nineteenth century France, obviously alluded to Russia under Khrushchev:

> **Important is not the personality of the tyrant, but the essence of the tyranny. . . . The experience of Stendhal not only refutes the errors of**

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the remote past; it also dispels many present-day illusions which occasionally are put forward as immutable truths.[14]

Works of fiction much like those now condemned still appear. Galina Nikolaeva's long novel **A Battle on the Way** brilliantly exposes bureaucracy and inefficiency on collective farms and in factories, delves into issues of personal love, refers to political and anti-Semitic persecutions, and is at the same time, in some sections, one of the greatest artistic achievements of any Soviet novelist in recent time.[15] Nikolai Gorbunov's "The Mistake (A Professor's Monologue)" rivals Granin's "Personal Convictions" in its melancholy picture of an institution on which Soviet Russia prides itself—organized scholarship. A prominent geographer analyzes his life and finds his personal achievements as well as the entire academic field of geography to be failures, despite all appearances of success by Soviet standards.[16]

At present Soviet literature on the whole is under a cloud. Moves to rehabilitate certain writers have been slowed down or halted (affecting, among others, Tsvetaeva, Akhmatova and Pasternak). Critical articles reiterate and elaborate Khrushchev's keynote: "The party carries on a merciless struggle against the penetration into literature and art of the influences of alien ideology, against hostile attacks on socialistic culture." The bulk of literary production again deals in a conventional way with the favorite subjects of "socialist realism"—the problems of industry and collective farm life. Yet the picture is not hopeless. Despite an effective denigration of the works of Dudintsev, Yashin, Granin, Aliger and their colleagues, other new works, provocative and daring, still continue to be published, even if more rarely and with more muted accents than in the summer and fall of 1956.

NOTES

1. *Pravda*, February 15, 1956.
2. *Teatr*, No. 8, 1956.
3. *Ibid.*
4. *Literaturnaia Gazeta*, October 27, 1956.
5. *Sovetskaia Kultura* and *Literaturnaia Gazeta*, both on November 17, 1956.
6. *Komsomolskaia Pravda*, January 25, 1957.
7. *Izvestia*, March 7, 1957.
8. *Vechernaia Moskva*, June 6, 1957.
9. *Literaturnaia Gazeta*, June 15, 1957.
10. *Ibid.*, September 7, 1957.
11. *Ibid.*, July 23, 1957.
12. Nikolai Shudik, "The Writer is Responsible to the People," *Neva*, No. 10, 1957.
13. *Literaturnaia Gazeta*, October 8, 1957.
14. *Inostrannaia Literatura*, No. 6, 1957.
15. *Oktyabr*, Nos. 3-7, 1957.
16. *Nash Sovremennik*, No. 2, 1957.

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The "Literary Opposition"

By Tom Scriven

IN JUNE 1957 Khrushchev, after a long struggle, succeeded in expelling from the Soviet inner leadership a group of rivals whom some foreign commentators have chosen to call "Stalinists". Even while the struggle was reaching its climax he found time to attack a very different "opposition": the writers who have recently ignored or interpreted in their own way the party's demands on literature. He took advantage of his victory over the anti-party group to silence once and for all the "literary opposition," whose members had been the most enthusiastic supporters of destalinization.

Many a Soviet reader must have learned with a twinge of grim amusement that the anti-party group had encouraged "revisionism" and ideological indiscipline. Did Kaganovich, then, who had done as much as any man alive to create the Soviet industrial system, accept Dudintsev's devastating strictures in **Not By Bread Alone?** Had Nikolai Zhdanov's parable about town and country, peasant and bureaucrat, drawn a **mea culpa** from agriculture's former overlord, Malenkov? The meaning of the charge was of course quite different. It no doubt contained an element of truth. We can easily imagine, for instance, that Molotov, when he was in charge of cultural affairs last autumn, "took no practical measures" against ideological disarray, but was content to wag his head self-righteously at Khrushchev, and suggest that only a radical modification of the latter's policies could restore order.

Moreover, the very existence of divisions within the Presidium—and the Soviet intelligentsia never doubted their seriousness—encouraged indiscipline. Some writers may have hoped that the expositions of the party line on the arts, which began to appear in the middle of 1956, were a tactical concession to the "reactionaries" rather than an expression of Khrushchev's own views. Others, more realistic, must have calculated that Khrushchev, while the struggle lasted, would do nothing which his opponents could represent as an admission of error or a proof of inconsistency. Khrushchev was determined that nobody should draw the wrong conclusions from his victory, that the "revisionists" should take no comfort from the defeat of the "dogmatists". And so he coolly blamed his rivals for the previous disarray.

The emergence of a new, courageous, realistic and humanitarian trend in Soviet literature was one of the most heartening results of the Twentieth CPSU Congress. It has now been suppressed, and, with one or two notable exceptions, the leading figures of the literary establishment have joined in condemning it. The party has reaffirmed the general validity of the Zhdanov decrees on literature. Khrushchev's own prescriptions for writers and artists have appeared in the form of an article conflated from three of his speeches.[1] It would seem that this is a suitable moment to try and decide what the dissident writers wanted to do, and why they angered the party.

The term "literary opposition" is used above. It originated in Western accounts of the writers' meetings of March and May 1957, at which Dudintsev and a group of contributors to the periodical anthology **Literaturnaia Moskva** (Literary Moscow) resisted the demands of their senior colleagues, who were clearly backed by the authority of the party, that they humble themselves and recant, and chose instead the "heroism of silence." Some commentators see political sig-

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nificance in their action, and in fact use "literary opposition" in the sense of "political opposition on the part of writers." It is important to decide whether there is any justification for this equation.

IN ITS MOST LITERAL sense the term "literary opposition" is a true and useful description of the silent heroes, along with others who shared some of their ideas. They opposed in the first place the false values of Stalinist literature and the stultifying controls set up to enforce them. The yearning for creative freedom had, of course, shown itself long before the Twentieth CPSU Congress. Yet the Congress seemed to offer the long awaited assurance that the party would look tolerantly on bolder writers, provided that their general loyalty to the purposes of the regime was not in doubt. Moreover, the laureate hacks who for so many years had ruled over Soviet literature were discredited and their authority impaired by Khrushchev's revelations about the master whom they had so slavishly extolled. Many young writers, and even some who had borne the burden without a murmur under Stalin, felt free to refuse the strain of circumspection and the tedium of forced complacency. They were united in one thing: their determination to write spontaneously and honestly. Beyond this, there was no real unity of mood and aspirations. Writers very different in outlook and intentions were later forced together into a defensive alliance. We must not be misled into regarding them as a homogeneous school.

True, all of them reflected thoughts and feelings aroused in the Soviet intelligentsia by the Twentieth Congress. But reactions to this event, and especially to Khrushchev's secret speech, varied widely. Some intellectuals felt only disgust and despair, sharpened sometimes by a sense of personal guilt. In others, revulsion against the past brought about a rebirth of primitive socialist enthusiasm. While some were confirmed in their dislike of the party and all its works, others identified themselves with what they believed to be the purposes of the dominant group at the Twentieth Congress.

The party, however, was less concerned with intentions than with effects, and the literary opposition at large, in spite of differences between its members, expressed and encouraged undesirable political attitudes among the intelligentsia. In particular, it stimulated a critical reexamination of the Soviet past and present, proceeding not from political and economic formulae, but from direct social observation.

THE PARTY ITSELF had raised the question: what is wrong with Soviet society? And had answered: nothing that the "cult of the individual" does not explain, or that the elimination of the cult cannot cure. It is remarkable how little attention the literary opposition paid to the concept of the cult. Recent literary work unmistakably expresses the awareness of the more politically conscious that these pat codewords conceal the true nature of the disease and are of little help in treating it. The writers chose to ignore the history of the disease, and to offer instead a realistic description of certain symptoms, with a few hints as to where a cure should be sought.

They noted especially a hardening of the arteries, a failure of civic consciousness and social courage, a cowardly or complacent avoidance of awkward problems. This theme is treated symbolically in Semion Kirsanov's "Seven Days of the Week"[2],—a bizarre poem about the poet's efforts to produce a new heart to save a dying friend. The need for a change of heart, for a spiritual reawakening is a frequently recurring motif. In several works we meet ordinary, decent people who have come to terms with Soviet society by suppressing the promptings of conscience and common sense: Dudintsev's military judge who comfortably assumes that the inventor Lopatkin would never have been sent to trial if his work were of any use[3]; Nikolai Zhdanov's bureaucrat who feels a brief uneasiness about the plight of the peasantry while on a belated visit to his native village but relapses into complacency upon his departure[4], Alexander Yashin's **kolkhoz** officials, who solemnly enact the empty bureaucratic ritual which they know to be meaningless;[5] and many others.

Sometimes callousness and indifference are frankly shown to be the results of official terrorism, as in the case of Yuri Nagibin's escapist, who had been "frightened once and for all" and had ever since averted his eyes from the present.[6] The return from prison camps of many thousands of innocent victims of the purges stirred the conscience of the Soviet intelligentsia, and sharpened their awareness that only a rebirth of social courage could guarantee that such crimes would never happen again. Margarita Aliger, one of the editors of **Literaturnaia Moskva,** in her poem "The Most Important Thing", bitterly accuses "Soviet man" of moral cowardice. He had tempered steel, hewn stone, planted gardens in the steppes, built houses, spanned broad rivers with straight bridges, written countless books, fought the Fascists and built the communist world "but suddenly he sounded a false note, lied without cause, self-consciously tried to extricate himself and

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slandered his friend. The flicker of fright in his eye showed that he would hide in stormy weather."[7] She herself does not deny the indictment. Her poem "The Real Truth" is an anguished admission of guilt:

> **The enemies cunningly concealed themselves behind dictatorial orders and pompous phraseology. . . . We said: there must be something in all that; we raised our hands and voted for their calumny. We should have known. . . . But, oh bitter shame, I did not try to defend him. I thought: Perhaps I did not really understand him? Perhaps I failed to notice something.[8]**

COMMON TO MOST members of the literary opposition is the realization that an oppressive society corrupts its citizens. With it goes the knowledge that those who win and hold high places in such a society are especially liable to deformations of character; and conversely that it is frighteningly easy for the unscrupulous to manipulate the system in their own interests. The party had mentioned "bureaucratic distortions" as an evil consequence of the "personality cult." The writers offered an anatomy of bureaucracy which suggested that the fault was in the system itself, and that it could not be corrected by the mere act of pious self-dissociation from Stalin's excesses.

The most important contribution was certainly Dudintsev's novel. Most of the officials and scientific administrators who throng its pages live to "occupy a comfortable chair" and to enjoy the material benefits of success. Dudintsev depicts with fascinated horror their materialism, snobbery, servility to authority, arbitrary use of power, habits of intrigue, and above all their remoteness from the ideals which, in theory, they exist to serve. His most memorable creation is Drozdov, whose name became for the Soviet intelligentsia a common noun connoting all that is most detestable in an over-powerful, over-privileged bureaucracy. He has something of the old fictional commissar about him—his proletarian origin, his roughness, his defiantly simple outlook. But the virtue has gone out of him. Instead of single-minded concentration on the achievement of an ideal he is capable only of narrow-minded devotion to routine. He is obsessed to the point of mania with his belief in the system, that "planners' fallacy" which thrives in closed societies. But his beliefs have long ago fused with his personal ambitions and taken on their color. He has only contempt for original ideas and creative individuals. To the inventor Lopatkin he says:

> **You are a truly tragic figure. You personify an age which has vanished never to return. . . . We can do without your invention, even if it is an important one. And we shall lose nothing because strict planning and calculation ensure steady progress. . . . If your invention is one of genius our collective will none the less solve the same problem when it becomes necessary. We are builder ants and necessary. You are a solitary genius, and not needed, with your giant idea on feeble legs.**

THE BUREAUCRATS in **Not by Bread Alone** have their own ideology—a set of convenient rationalizations to justify claims to authority and prosperity. Drozdov defends his rejection of fine ideas about the higher nature of things with the statement: "I belong to the producers of material values. I am strengthening the basis of society." His wife objects to his vulgarization of the Marxist concept of the basis. "Well", says Drozdov, "I am producing the things which will enable people to enter into social relationships. Once the things are there anybody can enter into social relationships—there'll be no difficulty about that." The **nouveau riche** snobbery of the Soviet bourgeoisie is strong in him. When his wife asks why only bigwigs are invited to their parties, he says that "ordinary people would identify us with the things that surround us [their luxurious home] and would envy us." He is adept in the use of political clichés" (the "basis", the "collective", "interests of state", etc.) to serve his own purpose, but his political consciousness goes no farther than awareness of what will please his superiors and awe his subordinates.

Dudintsev shows that narrow authoritarian routineers of the Drozdov type are not even efficient, that they retard rather than accelerate material progress. But it is their lack of scruple, their readiness to slander and destroy anyone who challenges them, which particularly horrifies him. The story of the plot against Lopatkin, and his condemnation, more powerfully than anything else in Soviet literature, reveals the terrible helplessness of the private citizen against a monopolistic bureaucracy.

OTHER WRITERS JOINED in the indictment of the bureaucrats. Kaverin, for instance, whom few would regard as a member of the literary opposition, in a curious story about Soviet attempts to produce penicillin, further develops Dudintsev's proposition that an oppressive, intrigue-ridden bureaucracy hinders technical progress.[9] His positive characters speak of their bureaucratic enemies with a violence which is foreign to Dudintsev. "I listen, and feel with horror that I want to kill this man, with his politeness... and his profound, barbarian indifference to everything

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that does not effect his brilliant career." This of a deputy minister. Of another successful and unscrupulous careerist:

> **He is a thief. He stole all this—his money, luxurious apartment, carpets, furniture and connections. Why has he all these things? What has he ever done? There are hundreds like him—no, thousands. They stick together. They fear and hate each other, but all the same how they stick together, how they cover for each other!**

Two other contributors to **Literaturnaia Moskva** dealt with the bureaucrat more gently. Nagibin, in "Light in the Window," and Zhdanov, in "Journey Home," showed the bureaucrat as alien to the people and unresponsive to their needs; but he is himself a victim of the system, and unable to change his ways. Both are slight stories, hardly more than anecdotes, but richly symbolic.

In the first a small official, the guardian of exorbitant bureaucratic privileges and the helpless executor of senseless orders, prevents the staff and patients of a sanatorium from using a room which, year in and year out, is kept ready for a great official who never arrives. In Zhdanov's story the symbolism is starker. The bureaucrat Varygin leaves his office routine, his discontented wife and overfed children, to attend his mother's funeral in the backward **kolkhoz** village of his birth. He had not seen his mother for a long time and feels uneasily that he had neglected her. How had she managed? Not too badly, the village watchman tells him. "Sometimes she even ate white bread and indulged in factory tea. Why, last year they brought us sugar ever so many times, and she got some."

In conversation with local people he learns something of the miseries and frustrations of collective life. One woman tells him how petty officials had compelled the peasants to get the wheat in, although it was urgently necessary to harvest the flax and the wheat could have waited. The peasants, through no fault of their own, missed the flax harvest, and while their record for grain production was among the best of the local farms, they got no bread for themselves because their overall performance was unsatisfactory. "Did they do right by us?," the woman asks. Varygin can only mumble garbled political cliches: "It is a political question. We must always put the state above everything else. Everything depends on the level of consciousness of the masses." The poor woman is pathetically pleased. "You've put it well! There's not enough consciousness in the masses."

Oppressed by the bareness of his mother's hut and the evidences of misery and dissatisfaction all around him, Varygin carries away the picture of a sad, forgotten and neglected world. In his imagination he sees the rough wooden crosses against the sky, the house which had been warm and comfortable in his childhood, the old samovar in the corner. His mother sits behind the planed table, and asks him, with hope and expectation: "Did they do right by us or not?" But when his car leaves the stark country road for the smooth highway to the railroad station, he gradually begins to return to his habitual even mood, and thinks with pleasure that tomorrow he will go into his warm, well-appointed office and take his seat in the armchair at his desk.

In Kirsanov's poem we find a more savage attack on the bureaucrats. They are not mere routineers, cliché-mongers, evaders of awkward questions, but vicious self-seekers. When the hero of this fantasy (narrated in the first person) puts his "new hearts" on display, the bureaucrats force their way to the head of the inspection queue: "Who are entitled to new hearts? Not those who are too tired. Not those who have never reached the upper ranks. Not those who cannot be called persons." The "smaller fry" are pushed aside and "somebody's favorites" placed in the queue—"the double-dealers, the turn-coats, the slanderers, the traitors, all had permits for new hearts...." Yet in the end the bureaucrats declare: "These hearts are not needed.... We need useful hearts, like iron locks"—hearts that will do whatever they are told. (See excerpt at the end of this article—Ed.)

THE ABOVE DISCUSSION offers no more than a glance at a few of the works which most clearly reveal why the literary "opposition" excited the admiration of the critical intelligentsia and the anger of the party. These references are enough to show the truth of one of the gravest charges of the official criticism levelled against the opposition writers. They did indeed dwell almost exclusively on the dark side of Soviet reality. But, in the view of many thousands of Soviet intellectuals, the dark side needed attention: the masters of Stalinist chiaroscura had for years past toned it down almost to invisibility.

Many intellectuals also felt that the dominant group at the 20th Congress had recognized the need for a regeneration of Soviet society. Clearly the essential preliminary was honesty about the past and the present. Yet the party, in spite of Khrushchev's secret speech, was slow to particularize in a public statement about those crimes ("infringements of socialist legality") and abuses ("bureaucratic distortions") which on its own ad-

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mission had characterized the period of the personality cult. The writers insisted that the task should not be shirked. A. Kron summarized their attitude in his brilliant essay, "A Writer's Remarks":

> **It is usual to say that the personality cult did our society incalculable harm. Incalculable, immeasurable, unbounded, unprecedented, unlimited—these words, used in large quantities, have an unpleasant flavor of irrationality, and it is no accident that they were very much in fashion a few years back. . . . No, however great the harm done by the personality cult, it is calculable and must be calculated. At the same time we must soberly estimate our strength and our possibilities, and we shall see that they more than suffice to overcome thoroughly and decisively the consequences of the cult....**[10]

CERTAINLY IT SHOULD NOT be assumed that there was any subversive intention in the action of the literary opposition. After all, the party itself had called for frank, unvarnished accounts of "Soviet reality" and fearless satire of bureaucratic abuses. Indeed, the first authoritative reviews of Dudintsev's book praised it as a work in the true Bolshevik literary tradition. It was only when the deeper implications of the new bold literature—implications which the writers themselves did not always realize—became clear from the reactions of critical intellectuals, and particularly of turbulent university students, that Dudintsev, for instance, could be accused of "blackening all that the Soviet people has created."[11]

There were certain inescapable conclusions which any free-thinking Soviet intellectual was bound to draw from writings such as those described above. One was that if the literary opposition gave a true picture of Soviet reality—and there were even complaints that it had not been frank enough (that Dudintsev's half-happy ending, for instance, was an optimistic falsification)—then there was a need for a radical reform or Soviet institutions to prevent the recurrence of such abuses. Another, that although the chief culprit was dead, many others were alive, and entrenched in positions of power, enjoying authority and prosperity which they had won by crimes against the people. Should they not be exposed and called to account?

In many ways Dudintsev and some of his fellows reminded their admirers of the opposition literature of Tsarist times. It was almost as though they had deliberately revived some of the strongest traditional themes of Russian literature. Here, once again, were the two Russias: official Russia and the Russia of the people—the one oppressive, corrupt, inhuman, the other exploited, innocent and helpless. Here too was the traditional hatred of the intelligentsia for the Philistine, the **"meshchane"**—identified now with the luxury-loving, complacent pompous bureaucratic class. For there is no denying that the work of the literary opposition is full of hatred and contempt for the false ideals and political emptiness of bureaucrats as a social species, not just of particular bad bureaucrats.

THE CRITICAL INTELLIGENTSIA drew positive as well as negative conclusions from the new

THE DIVERSITY OF SOCIALIST REALISM



—Get hold of yourself, be a hero: I've led you through almost all the genres... (Books, left to right are labeled "short story," "novel," "play," "film scenario," "libretto"; all have the same title, "Love and the Machine Screw.')

—From Krokodil *(Moscow), November 30, 1955.*

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literature. Dudintsev, again, supplied the text for the lessons which the literary opposition as a whole seemed to teach. The most important such lesson is that the health of society depends not on unconditional loyalty to some collective (which, says one of Dudintsev's characters, often means in practice a monopoly), not on unquestioning acceptance of political clichés such as "the interests of the state", (always enquire whose interests are really at stake," wrote Dudintsev), but on the courage and initiative of ordinary citizens. It seemed to readers of **Not by Bread Alone** enormously significant that the party as such plays no role in the story, for good or ill. In the conventional Soviet novel on the same theme the party would certainly have intervened like a **deus ex machina,** to vindicate the hero and punish his persecutors. The only party official in Dudintsev's book is one who clownishly abases himself before Drozdov.

It may very well be that Dudintsev's silence about the party was tactful, not malicious. But his heroes, Lopatkin and Galitsky, the vehicles of a pure and primitive Communist faith, are pitted against enemies who are in the party for careerest reasons, who have influence with important party organs, yet who have no sincere political creed, who at best believe in what Lopatkin calls "petty bourgeois communism". The inference is clear: that grace resides in individuals, not in organizations.

Some elements of the critical intelligentsia, particularly student groups at Moscow and other universities, saw in the work of the literary opposition support for certain demands which they began to voice widely in the autumn of 1956—demands for the freer exercise of public opinion; for the right to criticize, within the bounds of loyalty, the Soviet past and present; and for the establishment of genuine popular controls to expose and check abuses in high places. Not one of the opposition writers formulated any sort of political program. Many of them undoubtedly believed that they were expressing the spirit of the Twentieth Congress, and that the party itself would take action in the sense which their writings seemed to demand. There is no mistaking the notes of socialist faith and indeed of Soviet patriotism in the work of Dudintsev and Margarita Aliger, for instance. Their later obstinacy in refusing to "recant" in the face of party pressure was due to hurt resentment against those who misrepresented their intentions and called in doubt their loyalty to the Soviet system. They could not believe that the party would not recognize in them its truest and best supporters.

But the party could not afford to let writers serve its purposes in their own way, let alone suggest what those purposes should be. Undisciplined literature, however loyal its intentions, could only encourage indiscipline in the population and lead to "demagogic" utterances of the sort which the party considered a challenge to its own authority.

AND SO THE WRITERS found themselves forced, unwillingly, into "opposition" not merely to their professional superiors but to the party leadership. At the very least they were guilty, in the official view, of washing the Soviet Union's dirty linen before gloating foreign eyes; of usurping the party's prerogatives in diagnosing and prescribing for the ills of Soviet society; of encouraging demagogy and home-bred revisionism. Khrushchev, at a gathering of party leaders, writers and artists on May 19, 1957, drew a sinister comparison between the literary opposition and those Hungarian writers who had played such an important part in events leading up to the October uprising. Dudintsev and some of his colleagues, to their dismay we can be sure, certainly contributed to the disaffection among university students, both in the autumn of 1956 and later in the spring of 1957. And their example had spread to far corners of the Soviet Union. In both Kazakhstan and the Baltic States, literary oppositions sprang up.

The opposition writers had set out to elaborate in their own way the lessons of the Twentieth Congress. Khrushchev has now, at long last, given his own views as to how literature can best assist his policies. His positive prescriptions go no further than loyalty to party policies, identification of the party with the people, and an optimistic and inspiring, but business-like treatment of reality. It seems probable that he has no wish to bind the arts as tightly as Stalin did. Stalin's personal taste, as well as ideological controls, was to blame for the degradation of Soviet art in the 1930's. If the novel was an inflated slogan, paintings banal posters, and music a tedious succession of sanctimonious marches and plodding hymns, it was in part because Stalin, a provincial, Victorian philistine, fancied himself as an infallible connoisseur. Khrushchev is less interested in the arts and probably less bigoted.

Nonetheless, his intervention will almost certainly have other damaging effects on Soviet literature, besides circumscribing its choice of themes and treatment. He has strengthened the hand of Stalin's literary yes-men, confirmed most

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of them in their posts as literary overseers, and even spared a word of sympathy for their sufferings during the campaign against the Stalin cult. He has also subordinated the troublesome Moscow writers' organization to a new Union of Writers of the RSFSR, dominated by dreary and reliable provincial hacks who now will enjoy (in theory) the same prestige, and (in fact) the same rates of pay and opportunities for publication as their nationally famous colleagues.

"All kinds of lies were sold as hearts," says Kirsanov. So far his words may be prophetic for the future of Soviet literature. But we may doubt the applicability of the line that follows: "And the people swallowed them with great delight."

1. N. S. Khrushchev, "For a Closer Tie Between Literature and Art and the Life of the People," *Kommunist*, No. 12, 1957. Reprinted in Pravda and many other newspapers.
2. *Novy Mir*, No. 9, 1956.
3. V. Dudintsev, *Not By Bread Alone*, first published in *Novy Mir*, Nos. 8, 9 and 10, 1956; also translated and published in Great Britain and the United States.
4. N. Zhdanov, "Journey Home," in *Literaturnaia Moskva*, No. 2, 1957.
5. A. Yashin, "Levers," *op. cit.*
6. Y. Nagibin, "Khazar Decoration," *op. cit.*
7. M. Aliger, "Poems," *Oktyabr*, No. 11, 1956.
8. *Novy Mir*, Nos. 3&4, 1957.
9. *Literaturnaia Moskva*, No. 2, 1957.
10. *Ibid.*
11. See report of a meeting of Communist writers at Rostov on Don in *Literaturnaia Gazeta*, Nov. 22, 1956.

"WE NEED USEFUL HEARTS..."

...They come
as a large commission
with some important mission.
I recognize
the Double-Faced One—
he will never say a superfluous word.
The Indifferent One strides along
so sedately and confidently,
and next to him, moderately sedate,
is his personal assistant.
It is stupid to resist!
They shove their fingers
into the artery.
They come up and feel it
like fabric for trousers.
A short Statement is already drawn up.
—Unsuitable.
Correct.
It is a fact.
For public consumption
such hearts are not needed.
And in general, novelties
are not required
on our market.
We need useful hearts,
like iron locks,
uncomplicated,
convenient,
capable of executing any order:
To blacken? To blacken!
To value? To value!
To annihilate? To annihilate!
To feed? To feed!
To roar? To roar!
To keep silent? To keep silent!
To destroy? To destroy!
To love? To love!
And no cardiograms whatever,
and in the future, for good order—
A penalty of two hundred grams
will be imposed for "seekings!"
The statement is signed
and that's that!
The workers get the order—go home!
Because of this statement
we are helpless.
What now? Go off to our respective streets?
And across the street
my friend
is lying with his pulse not beating.
This is how—
with a stab of a knife
they catch you from behind...
But perhaps we shall revive him again?
But shall we have time, during one day?
....There is one more day in the week,
but the work
is enormous!
Our shop is on the verge of tears.
This is what happened on Friday.
I leave, and on my heels
leave the women laboratory workers,
holding their hearts, as though in them
were gaping wounds.

—From "The Seven Days of the Week," by S. Kirsanov, Novy Mir, September 1956.

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Soviet Literary Criticism: Past and Present

By Victor Erlich

OVER A FORTY-YEAR PERIOD Soviet literary criticism—like other fields of Soviet culture—has been forced along a tortuous course of development, twisted in one direction and then another by successive changes in the Communist cultural "line". The attempts of the party dialecticians to rationalize these shifts have done more to obscure than to clarify the real issue involved. Cutting through the smokescreen of official rhetorics, it seems clear that what has been at stake throughout all the twists and turns in Soviet literary theory is nothing less than the survival of literary criticism as an autonomous activity. For at the heart of all significant critical controversy has been the problem of the relative status of literary **vis-a-vis** ideological values, of the critic's right to discuss and evaluate literature in its own terms rather than in those of social utility or of political orthodoxy.

The degree of candor and explicitness with which this question could be debated has varied from period to period. During the first decade of the Soviet era, when some measure of intellectual freedom still prevailed, **bona fide** discussion of critical principles was not impossible. The tug-of-war between the literary and the crudely "social" emphasis could still assert itself in a free-swinging debate, in which the contenders were now the "formalists" **vs.** the "sociologists," now the "right-wing" Marxist-Leninists **vs.** the "left-wing" Marxist-Leninists.

By 1930, however, genuine methodological controversy had virtually ceased. Literary theorizing became increasingly a matter of intellectual shadow-boxing, of timid exegesis on insipid or ambiguous official pronouncements. The struggle between political expediency and residual literary values was driven underground but not resolved. Thereafter it found expression not in an open clash between well-defined critical positions, but in embarrassing contradictions within official doctrine, in unwitting confusion or deliberate double-talk.

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Basic Precepts and Early Protests

The doctrine which since 1917 has held sway in Russian criticism has combined Marx's economic determinism with Lenin's relentless political instrumentalism. "Marxism-Leninism" has tended all too often to reduce the work of literature to its alleged "sociological equivalent," and to supplant a total critical judgment with a political verdict—an "unmasking" of the writer's "class ideology." In effect, such doctrinaire excesses have been a far cry from the Marx-Engels "philosophy of art" which the Soviet literary theorists have invoked with such reverence. Actually, "philosophy of art" is much too grand a term for a number of casual observations scattered across the writings of the founders of historical materialism. They had neither the time nor the urge to evolve a full-dress theory of artistic creation. But they were undoubtedly interested in literature, and in responding to it showed sound, if somewhat conventional, judgment.

While emphasizing the social relevance of art, Marx and Engels refused to measure it by narrowly ideological yardsticks. They discouraged preaching and over-explicit messages in imagina-

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tive literature and urged strongly that vivid, credible individualized characters would serve the socialist playwright better than abstract rhetorics and mere noble sentiments.[1] "Vividness," "concreteness," "accurate portrayal of life in all its complexity and many-sidedness,"—all these criteria came to be part and parcel of the Soviet critical canon. The party hacks have paid them mere lip-service, but more sensitive Marxists have cited them time and again to bolster the fight against the cruder excesses of politicalized literature and art.

The Formalists

The most vigorous plea for the autonomy of literary values came not from the "rightwing" Marxists, however, but from a heterodox school of criticism, the "Formalists," and constituted the only serious challenge which has ever been made to the hegemony of "Marxism-Leninism" in Russian literary studies.

The term "Formalism" has been bandied about so recklessly in latter-day Soviet propaganda that one is likely to forget its initial meaning. What can be legitimately referred to as "Russian Formalism" is a school in Russian literary scholarship which originated in the years 1915-16; its champions were a number of philologists and students of literature, including B. Eikhenbaum, R. Jakobson, V. Shklovsky, and Yu. Tynyanov. The Formalists viewed literature as a distinct field of human endeavor, as a verbal art rather than a reflection of society or a battleground of ideas. In attempting to delimit literary studies from contiguous fields, such as psychology, sociology, or cultural history, the Formalist theoreticians were quick to focus on "distinguishing features" of literature. "The subject of literary scholarship," said Jakobson in an early study, "is not literature in its totality, but literariness, i.e., that which makes of a given work a work of literature."[2] To the Formalists, "literariness" meant primarily artistic devices peculiar to imaginative writing, techniques whereby the creative writer reshapes his subject-matter, reality, and manipulates his medium, language.

On the basis of these precepts, the adherents of Formalism subjected the "golden age" of Russian literature to a drastic reexamination. Gogol's famous story, "The Overcoat," hailed by the nineteenth-century Russian critics as a deeply moving plea for the "little man," became under the critical eye of B. Eikhenbaum primarily an intricate piece of grotesque stylization. The moral crisis of the young Tolstoi was reinterpreted in esthetic terms as a struggle for a new style, as a recoil from romantic conventions grown stale. In dealing with contemporary literary production in the new Soviet era the Formalist critics showed the same single-minded concern with craftsmanship. They praised the linguistic experiments of the "Futurist" poets, the esthetic and psychological sophistication of the non-conformist novelists. In visual arts they encouraged such trends as Cubism and Constructivism.

Youthful exuberance as well as the initial shrill tenor of Soviet critical controversy impelled the Formalists to overstate their case. In their early studies, Shklovsky and Jakobson played down the links between literature and society and denied the relevance of any considerations other than esthetic. In so doing they provided easy targets for their Marxist-Leninist opponents, who were becoming increasingly concerned over the growing influence of the Formalist school not only in literary criticism but in academic scholarship.

Attacks and Counterattacks

By the mid 1920's a full-dress offensive against Formalism was under way: it was spearheaded by no lesser figures than L. Trotsky and N. Bukharin.

Trotsky's attitude towards Formalism was sharply critical but not altogether hostile. The brilliant Communist chieftain had a field-day punching holes in V. Shklovsky's witty but extravagant raid on sociological criticism. At the same time Trotsky admitted grudgingly that "a certain part of the research done by the Formalists" (concerning problems of style and rhythm) was useful. Treated as an auxiliary device, he argued, Formalism was a legitimate, indeed a rewarding, critical method; raised to the status of a full-fledged theory of literature, it became inadequate, in fact dangerous. He emphatically upheld the monopoly of dialectical materialism as the only legitimate world view and philosophy of history: "Marxism alone can answer the crucial question of why and how a given tendency in art has originated in the given period of history." But he admitted that if in the realm of causal explanation the dialectician had no equals, this in itself did not make him capable of sound esthetic judgment; Marxism could not yield any criteria for evaluating artistic phenomena.[3]

In short, while the cruder practitioners of Marxist criticism saw in literature merely a medium for "registering social phenomena,"[4] Trotsky was aware that artistic creation was "a deflec-

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tion, a transformation of reality, in accordance with the **peculiar laws of art**". "A work of art," he added, "should in the first place be judged by its own law, the law of art."[5] Since Marxists **qua** Marxists were unable to identify these laws, they should not completely disregard whatever assistance they could get from the ideologically alien Formalist writings.

A similar position was taken by N. Bukharin. He too saw some merit in the Formalist explorations of poetic art even while he went beyond Trotsky in minimizing the actual scope of Formalist analyses. If one is to believe Bukharin, all that the Formalists were trying to do was to compile a "catalog" of individual poetic devices. This "analytical job," declared Bukharin, "is wholly acceptable as long as you treat it as spadework preliminary to future critical synthesis," but it is no substitute for such a synthesis.[6]

Trotsky and Bukharin were very broadminded indeed by comparison with some other party stalwarts. P. Kogan, a prolific literary historian who prided himself on never having had "time for the study of literary form," had no use whatever for formalist "spade-work." He saw in the formalists' concern with literary craft a symptom of distasteful "esthetic gourmandise."[7]

Equally vehement was the reaction of A. Lunacharsky, the first Soviet Commissar of Education, an influential critic and publicist. He spoke grimly of "Formalist escapism," and diagnosed the enemy as "the last refuge of the unreconstructed intelligentsia looking furtively toward bourgeois Europe." Proclaiming emotional intensity and spontaneity as ultimate tests of greatness in art, Lunacharsky termed the Formalist preoccupation with artifice a sign of intellectual and moral poverty.[8]

WHILE KOGAN and Lunacharsky were thus labeling Formalism an alien limb in the Soviet body politic, at the opposite pole of the Marxist spectrum an attempt was under way to incorporate Formalist procedures into the scheme of Marxian criticism. A. Tseitlin spoke out boldly against the tendency to reduce literary scholarship to a mere subdivision of social history. "There is no point," he wrote, "in discussing the sociological implications of literary facts, as long as the facts themselves are not established"—hence the importance and timeliness of the Formalist contribution. By focusing on the close analysis of the text, on systematic description of literary facts, Formalism was breaking ground for the truly scientific study of Russian literature.[9]

Tseitlin's was clearly a minority view. Few Soviet Marxist critics were prepared to go along with his sensible caveat that in order to explain a phenomenon, one ought first to find out what it was. In fact, to the more rigid exponents of Marxism-Leninism, the latter question seemed irrelevant, if not illicit. For those who saw the critic's task as one of tracing the literary work back to its "class roots," the problem of the nature of literary creation was bound to be submerged by concern with "underlying social forces." As the critic V. Pertsov put it:

> **I cannot visualize a Marxist raising the question "how is this work of literature constructed?" without this question being immediately superseded by another question: "why is this work of literature constructed this way and not another?"[10]**

The "sociological" analysis of literature gave way in short order to crude label-mongering and to partisan vituperation. A programmatic statement of the doctrinaire Marxists, published in their organ **Na Postu** (On Guard) in 1923, charged that the poetry of Anna Akhmatova, one of modern Russia's foremost lyricists, "organized the reader's psyche toward the clerical-feudal-bourgeois restoration"; that Turgenev was a "slanderer of nihilists"; that Andrei Beli (a brilliant symbolist writer who sought frantically to come to terms with postrevolutionary Russia) was "not only an anti-Soviet element, but an anti-social one as well."[11]

To the spokesmen of the "On Guard" group, such as Vardin, Averbakh, and Lelevich, art was a potent weapon in the class struggle. A 1925 resolution of the group stated in part: "Imaginative literature is one of the last areas in which an implacable class war is taking place between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie for hegemony over intermediate groups."[12] Another statement defined art as an "instrument of emotional infection, a means of organizing the reader's psyche in conformity with the interests of the given class.[13] The logical consequence of such views was a demand that all voices but those of "proletarian" (**i.e.**, orthodox) writers be silenced. If, as Lelevich maintained, a writer always fulfills the unwritten "social command"—that of infecting his audience with the attitudes of his class—the "petty bourgeois" interlopers could not be tolerated; they were liable to poison the trusting Soviet reader with socially alien emotions.

THE THICK-HEADED ORTHODOXY of the "On Guardites" found its most vociferous opponent in A. Voronsky, the editor of the influential literary magazine, **Krasnaia Nov** (Red Virgin Soil) To

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Voronsky art was not primarily a matter of mobilizing and manipulating group emotions. It was a form of cognition, a largely intuitive mode of apprehending reality.[14] As a Marxist, Voronsky had to concede that the way in which the artist perceives the world, the degree to which he is likely to achieve insight into things as they really are, is strongly affected by his social background. But a great writer manages time and again to rise above the limitations of his milieu; often he cannot help seeing and embodying in his work certain truths which run counter to his conscious bias and to the interests of his class. Indeed, said Voronsky, this ability to transcend one's environment is the earmark of truly great art. Going a step further, he asserted that a non-party writer of talent and integrity could be not only esthetically but also ideologically more valuable than a mediocre "proletarian," since the former could provide a more accurate insight into the social situation and thus a safer guide to political action.

The form-conscious Western critic would find much to argue with in Voronsky's literary theorizing and critical practice, with their strong psycho-ideological bent. Moreover his broad-mindedness had its limitations; while he tolerated, indeed encouraged, certain independent writers who sympathized with the October Revolution, he showed little patience with such militant non-conformism as exhibited by the brilliant prose writer E. Zamyatin. Nevertheless, viewed against the background of his era, Voronsky inspires respect because of his steadfast refusal to surrender literary criteria, to disregard the uniqueness of artistic creation. Whatever the rigors of his ideological position, it did not quite succeed in dampening his genuine delight in creativity or dulling his impatience with orthodox mediocrity. No wonder Voronsky's was one of the first heads to roll when the doctrinaires and the zealots whom he had fought so valiantly gained the upper hand in Soviet letters.

From RAPP's Frying Pan into the Fire

Toward the end of the 1920's the methodological debate was rudely interrupted. Formalism, declared to be "false because it was reactionary and reactionary because it was false," was driven from the scene.[15] Marxist-Leninist criticism was whipped into uniformity. Voronsky's philosophy of art stood convicted of such deadly sins as "Bergsonian idealism." Soviet criticism was inexorably moving toward the single esthetic canon of "socialist realism."

The period of 1929-1932 saw the beginning of the end of Soviet criticism as a relatively independent cultural force. Under the aegis of L. Averbakh's ultra-orthodox faction, the so-called RAPP (Russian Association of Proletarian Writers), critics and writers alike were enlisted in the service of the Five-Year-Plan. RAPP's overriding control was made possible through initial regime and party support; so dismal were the results of its "literary shock-brigade" tactics, however, that it was disbanded in 1932, to the accompaniment of much vituperation about "sectarianism" and "ideological sabotage."

At the time many friends of Russian literature heaved a sigh of relief. But their belief that the end of RAPP signified a respite from political interference proved purely illusory. Recent research strongly supports the thesis that the **real** crime of RAPP, as far as the party leadership was concerned, was not excessive narrow-mindedness, utilitarianism, but excessive intransigence, or, if one will, literary vigilante-ism.[16] Apparently what was at issue was not so much the degree of political interference with literature as the mode of control. From this standpoint the shift from the RAPP hegemony to a single, all-embracing Union of Soviet Writers, responsible to and supervised by the party Central Committee, meant the substitution of direct party controls for the rule of a zealous, yet increasingly erratic, coterie.

For a while, the new "line" which came to be known as "socialist realism," adopted in 1932 and proclaimed with much fanfare at the First All-Union Congress of Soviet Writers, seemed to be a victory for sense and sensibility. Some of the statements made at the Congress sounded very promising indeed. In his judicious report on "Poetry, Poetics, and Problems of Poetry in the USSR," Bukharin gently but firmly rebuked the shrillness and slogan-mongering of some Bolshevik versifiers. Poetic "paraphrases of newspaper articles," he argued, were no longer enough. What was needed was a richer, more sophisticated fare which would do justice to the "growing complexity, the heightened tone, the changed dimensions of our social life."[17]

Was the new esthetic doctrine of "socialist realism" thus a vindication of literary values? Scarcely. It is true that the strident call for better craftsmanship encouraged some manifestations of artistic integrity in creative writing and of sensitivity in criticism. But such efforts were ill-fated. When in **The Quiet Don,** for example, Sholokhov portrayed the ethical dilemmas of an "uncommitted" Cossack, Gregori Melekhov, with a degree of candor and complexity, he was casti-

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gated by a number of official critics for failing to make Gregori ultimately "see the light" of Communist infallibility. Shortly afterwards, the Soviet reviewers were waxing rhapsodic over A. Tolstoi's slick and dishonest Civil War novel, **Bread.** That this thinly disguised piece of Stalinist falsification could have been hailed as a triumph of "socialist realism" calls into question the validity and the true meaning of the crucial term of official Soviet esthetics.

Clearly, "socialist realism" is "realism" of a unique sort. According to an authoritative statement by Zhdanov in 1934, Soviet literature cannot be content with merely "reflecting" or "truthfully portraying" reality; it must be **"instrumental in the ideological remolding of the toiling people in the spirit of socialism.**[18] The duality of Zhdanov's criteria of "truthful portrayal" and "ideological remolding" reflects a basic internal contradiction in Soviet literary theory. As soon as "ideological remolding of the toiling people" is translated as "party-mindedness," the precarious character of the definition becomes obvious. It is difficult enough to conceive how conscious promotion of any set of political objectives could be reconciled with a "vivid and many-sided portrayal of life." Such a reconciliation becomes an utter impossibility when the objectives which are to be promoted are those of a totalitarian regime which has a vested interest in, and a physical capacity for, suppressing information about "whole vast tracts of Soviet reality."[19]

To put it differently, the internal contradiction within the official esthetic doctrine could be construed as a tension within the concept of "socialist realism" between the adjective "socialist" and the noun "realism." The latter calls for the portrayal of "life as it really is"; the former points toward "life as it ought to be," or as it supposedly is, according to the extravagant claims of party propaganda.

Latter-Day Dialectics

Recent Soviet criticism has sought to bridge the gap between realism and idealization by means of manipulating the notion of the "typical" for all it is worth. This emphasis has its ultimate source in Engels' often quoted definition of realism as the "accurate portrayal of typical characters under typical circumstances."[20] Georgi Malenkov, in a speech of October 1952 before the Nineteenth CPSU Congress, summarized the prevailing official attitude toward "typicality" as follows:

> **In Marxist-Leninist understanding, the typical by no means signifies some sort of statistical average. Typicalness corresponds to the essence of the given social-historical phenomenon; it is not simply the most widespread, frequently occurring and ordinary phenomenon.**

As if the import of these remarks were not sufficiently clear, Malenkov added disingenuously:

> **The typical is the basic sphere of the manifestation of party-mindedness** [partiinost] **in realistic art. The problem of typicalness is always a political problem.**[21]

This was a significant admission. In effect, what has been played up as "typical" by the Soviet critic often depends not on the actual social relevance of the phenomenon under discussion, but on its status in the official view of reality. Whenever necessary, dialectics, or more exactly, "double-think," has been called upon to explain away the rule as non-typical and to claim typicalness, **i.e.**, a higher order of reality, for the exception.

One of the by-products of the post-Stalin cultural "thaw" has been a somewhat more flexible interpretation of the typical in literature. A representative statement, appearing in the party's theoretical organ **Kommunist** in December 1955, belabored the tendency on the part of some Soviet writers to "varnish our reality," glossing over actual difficulties and shortcomings, and warned sternly against excessive schematism. In a seemingly direct slap at Malenkov's earlier position, the article sharply criticized the "current formulae which . . . construe the typical as the chief expression of party-mindedness in literature, indeed insist that the problem of the typical is always a political problem." Lenin's authority was invoked to bolster a plea for a more differentiated literary characterization, while Engels was quoted in support of the sensible thesis that the "objective meaning" of a literary work can be a far cry from the author's conscious bias.

Did this mean that the principle of "party-mindedness"—and the concomitant tendency to explain away embarrassing realities—had been abandoned? The answer, unhappily, is no: after all its vigorous disclaimers, **Kommunist** went right on to restate Malenkov's distinction between the statistically representative and the typical, albeit in a slightly modified form. "In realistic art," it declared, "the infrequent becomes typical whenever it reflects the seeds [sic'.] of the new," whenever it represents a lawful rather than a fortuitous development.[22] Since at each given moment it is up to the party dialecticians to decide what is lawful and what is fortuitous, the

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party's right to define and impose its own view of "reality" remained basically unchallenged.

The Phases of Post-Stalin Policy

The same pattern of fundamental orthodoxy tempered by occasional ventures toward open-mindedness has characterized literary criticism, along with other fields of Soviet culture, throughout the post-Stalin era. In seesawing motion through various periods, pressures to accelerate the "thaw" of culture—to give freer berth to creative expression and to liberalize the crippling dictates of "socialist realism"—have been countered by retrenchment pressures from the party and its cultural henchmen, reaffirming the basic principle of political control over the arts.

In the initial phase of the "thaw," (1953-54), a number of Soviet writers and critics raised their voices to issue a plea that sincerity be recognized as a **sine qua non** of good literature. Notable among these was V. Pomerantsev, who persuasively argued that "the degree of sincerity, **i.e.**, the spontaneity, of a work . . . must be the main yardstick" of its worth, as **vs.** its political "correctness."[23] Such sentiments were not long voiced with impunity, however. Pomerantsev's position was soon labeled a threat to the still-binding principle of party-mindedness and was the specific target of a number of denunciatory speeches at the Second Congress of Soviet Writers in December 1954. During the year 1955 there were few authoritative articles bearing on literary policy or theory which did not deal harshly with the hapless champions of sincerity, who stood convicted of "philistinism, apoliticality and subjectivism."

Then came the Twentieth CPSU Congress (February 1956), and in its wake a period of ideological relaxation. "Sincerity" and non-conformism were given a new lease on life. A mood of revulsion against bureaucratic controls and stale official rhetorics became increasingly apparent on the literary scene, even finding its way into the critical pronouncements of some of the prominent writers who have been semi-official spokesmen of the regime. In a significant article published in **Novy Mir,** for example, Konstantin Simonov spoke ruefully of the part he had played in the Zhdanovite literary purge, and counseled a broadening of the rigid criteria of "socialist realism," which, he added, "has been compromised by the Halleluia-ism of recent years." In urging that the label "socialist realism" ought to apply to any literary work so long as it was imbued with a "socialist" spirit, Simonov conceded in effect the precariousness of the Soviet critical canon as an **esthetic** yardstick.[24]

Some of the less prominent critics were still more explicit. In decrying the "disastrous consequences of the personality cult in literary criticism," S. Shtut paid tribute to the artistic integrity and courage of Boris Pasternak, and boldly took issue with the doctrinaires' view that advocating "untrammelled freedom of creative personality" represented a regression to bourgeois individualism.[25] Several drama critics—A. Nazarev and V. Granin in **Voprosy filosofii,** A. Kron in **Literaturnaia Moskva**[26]—struck out against obtrusive interference with the Soviet theatre. Kron, for example, blamed the "stagnation" in Soviet drama on three factors—the "ignoring of the objective laws of artistic creation [shades of Leo Trotsky!], the hypertrophy of editing, and the creation of a bureaucratic hierarchy in art."

Such outspoken criticism was under constant counterattack from the doctrinaires, but it was tolerated through most of the year 1956. Once again, however, the trend toward freer and franker self-expression was to shift. The complex forces set in motion by the Twentieth Congress —climaxing in the profoundly shaking events in Hungary and Poland in the fall of 1956—had severe repercussions on the Soviet scene. For the cultural spheres, the pendulum swung back to a full-scale reassertion of party primacy and ideological discipline. Today "party spirit" (**partiinost**) and "principle-mindedness" (**principialnost**) have once again become the chief themes of Soviet criticism. In wordy harangues, the party stalwarts have charged that dissident elements grossly exaggerated the damage done to literature by the "cult of personality," that they overemphasized the dangers of "varnishing" Soviet realities, while complacently ignoring the opposite pitfall of "denigrating our achievements"

The monopoly of "socialist realism" as the only permissible artistic method has been grimly reasserted, and Simonov's argument for a more flexible yardstick demeaned. To make "socialist realism" largely a matter of socialist **Weltanschauung,** argued B. Solovev in **Literaturnaia Gazeta,** is to declare it theoretically compatible with a variety of artistic styles, including "formalism" and "naturalism," which is clearly out of the question.[27]

"Ideological confusion" among Soviet writers and critics apparently was adjudged a serious enough matter to warrant direct interference by the party leadership. In his speeches on literature and art, delivered in May and July 1957, Khrushchev laid down the line in no uncertain terms.[28] He inveighed against the tendency of "some intel-

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ligentsia" to pin the label of "varnisher" **(lakirovshchik)** on those loyal writers who aimed at glorifying the virtues of Soviet society rather than at gloating maliciously over its shortcomings. More importantly, he referred ominously to the misguided champions of creative freedom who, under the guise of a campaign against the cult of personality, sought to challenge the basic tenet of **partiinost.** The principle of party guidance over literature was thus authoritatively reaffirmed, even while bureaucratic abuses and excessive apologetics came in for a measure of criticism.

A Summary View

While the current tightening of ideological screws is a discouraging note, the several fluctuations of party cultural policy in the post-Stalin era require that we take a longer view in summarizing the situation of literary criticism and of Soviet culture in general. If we compare the post-Stalin period as a whole with the era of Stalinism, we must certainly recognize an overall change in the intellectual climate, to the extent that some controversy and flexibility have become possible **within** the bounds of basic orthodoxy.

The example of two specific categories of literary criticism may serve to illustrate this change, indicating both the scope and the limitations of the "thaw" as it has affected Soviet critical practice. The first concerns the treatment accorded foreign authors, and particularly Western literature. Whereas the hysterical xenophobia of the Zhdanov era resulted in the virtual isolation of the Soviet intelligentsia from foreign literary output (except that of loyal party-liners), the post-Stalin regime has adopted a somewhat saner attitude: a number of foreign works have now been judged "permissible" reading, and a special journal, **Inostrannaia Literatura** (Foreign Literature), has been founded to publish and evaluate acceptable output. Judging by its issues, the choice of works to be translated and discussed is still determined far more often by the author's position **vis-a-vis** the Soviet Union than by his literary talents; nevertheless, the recognition that any non-Communist literature at all can have merit represents a significant modification of past policy.

To cite a single example, William Faulkner, a "decadent" reactionary by Stalinist definition—now occasionally appears in print, and it even seems possible to credit him with some "progressive" attitudes. In a rather simple-minded but sympathetic article, which appeared in **Inostrannaia Literatura** in December 1955 (but is still representative), E. Romanova praises this "outstanding prose writer of contemporary America" for his "faith in the strength of the human soul" and his genuine opposition to war.[29]

SIMILARLY, there has been a significant softening in some aspects of the official attitude toward the prerevolutionary Russian cultural heritage. The outstanding example of this has been the recent Dostoevsky revival. In the Stalinist era Dostoevsky was **persona non grata** in the Soviet cultural world. Critics either ignored him completely or bitterly attacked him as an obscurantist—a view which found its crassest expression in a 1948 pamphlet by V. Ermilov and in the vociferous articles of D. Zaslavsky. His works were not reprinted, and some of his major novels, such as **The Possessed** and **The Brothers Karamazov,** became virtually inaccessible.

In the past two years, however, Dostoevsky has been readmitted to the ranks of the favored, in a revival pegged to the seventy-fifth anniversary of his death. **Pravda** has published the news that he rates as "a great Russian writer," and the state publishing house, Goslitizdat, has embarked upon a new edition of his fiction works (several volumes of the edition, including two "ideological" novels, **Crime and Punishment** and **The Raw Youth,** have already appeared). A number of articles in the Soviet press seem to indicate a concerted effort to make Dostoevsky palatable to, and safe for, the Soviet reader.[30] It is now urged that, in spite of his ideological weaknesses, Dostoevsky was a great literary artist, a "writer of immense talent."[31] It is further maintained that fundamentally Dostoevsky's heart was on the right side: he felt deeply for the downtrodden, he had no use for capitalist civilization, he mercilessly exposed the pitfalls of bourgeois individualism and the degrading impact of money. Unfortunately, this line of reasoning continues, Dostoevsky failed to understand that the nature of the evils he decried was social rather than moral or metaphysical; his attempts at a positive ideology were futile and even harmful, and his portrayal of the nineteenth-century Russian revolutionary movement in **The Possessed** slanderous. In the critics' view it is no accident that this, dubbed Dostoevsky's most reactionary novel, is also artistically his weakest.

However strained this analysis, the present-day Soviet attitude toward Dostoevsky is a distinct improvement over the censure of Stalinist days. Under the new "dispensation" Dostoevsky's masterpieces are at least being made available to the

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Russian reading public. Moreover, the new emphasis on Dostoevsky's greatness as a **writer** helps to focus attention on the importance of literary as vs. political criteria. Yet the principal grounds on which Dostoevsky is being readmitted to the Soviet literary Pantheon are ideological rather than esthetic. In undertaking to make him ideologically acceptable, the party-line critics have demonstrated their stock techniques of dealing with an "embarrassing" master—among them, partial distortion of the writer's message (exemplified by gross over-emphasis of the anti-capitalist character of Dostoevsky's critique of individualism); fatherly chiding (**e.g.**, condescending remarks concerning Dostoevsky's "confusion"); and outright doctrinaire inanity (**Pravda** notwithstanding, **The Possessed** is far from a "weak" novel). It is noteworthy, too, that virtually all of the recent articles on Dostoevsky make precisely the same points in their analyses, down to the "insight" that **The Possessed** was an artistic failure. In short, the rediscovery of Dostoevsky has all the earmarks of a carefully-blueprinted party line, albeit a somewhat more "liberal" one.

Some Remarks by the Foremost Soviet Critic, N. Khrushchev

On party spirit and folk content in literature and art:

Party spirit and folk content cannot be set off against each other. The strength of Soviet socialist society lies in the unity of the Communist Party and people. The Communist Party's policy, expressing the people's fundamental interests, is the vital basis of the Soviet social and state system. Therefore, it would be a great mistake to think that in our Soviet conditions it is possible to serve the people without actively carrying out the Communist Party's policy. . . . He who wants to be with the people will always be with the party.

On freedom of the artist:

For anyone who faithfully serves his people, the question whether or not he is free in his creative work simply does not exist in a socialist society. . . . For such a creative worker the question of his approach to the facts of reality is clear. He does not have to adapt, to force himself. The truthful presentation of life from positions of Communist Party spirit is the necessity of his soul.

On art and "typicality":

If a writer, painter, sculptor or composer adheres to party positions . . . he will find an abundance of excellent models in the lives of factory workers, collective farmers and intelligentsia, in the lives of individuals and of the collectives of enterprises, collective farms and state farms; contrasting the positive and the negative, he will be able to support the positive and to show it faithfully, in bright colors. But if the author takes no joy in the achievements of his characters, he will search out only the bad, the negative, digging it out of garbage heaps, and will present it as typical of life.

On criticism and self-criticism:

We want consolidation, unity of all the forces of literature and art on a principled basis, not by concessions and by deviations from the principles of Marxism-Leninism. Principled criticism and self-criticism are being developed in the interests of this consolidation. This criticism helps those who have made mistakes to realize and correct those mistakes and to stand more firmly on their feet; it heightens creative activity.

—*From "For a Closer Tie Between Literature and Art and the Life of the People," by N. S. Khrushchev*, Kommunist, *No. 12, August 1957. Translated and reprinted in* The Current Digest of the Soviet Press *(New York), October 9, 1957.*

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To sum up what has been said, with all of the manifest limitations of the "thaw" in Soviet literary criticism, the controversies which have been aired in the course of a vacillating party policy are proof that at least some critics in the Soviet Union have survived the long Stalinist winter of intellectual stagnation, that they still care deeply about literature and are able to discuss it intelligently whenever given a chance. Will this chance be offered, without further crippling restrictions and caveats? Will Soviet critics be allowed to think for themselves? As long as the totalitarian tutelage over literature remains as obstrusive as it is today, the prospects for the development of genuinely free criticism seem poor.

NOTES

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3. Leo Trotsky, *Literature and Revolution*, New York, International Publishers, 1925. See especially pp. 163, 178, 183.
4. V. Friche, *Ocherki* (Notes); quoted by Ilya Gruzdyov, *Utilitarnost i Samotsel*, Petrograd, 1923, p. 45.
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8. A. V. Lunacharsky, "Formalism v iskusstvovedenii" (Formalism in the Study of Art), *Pechat i revoliutsiia*, 1924, No. V, p. 25.
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16. See especially Edward J. Brown, *op. cit.*
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18. *Ibid.*, p. 65. Author's emphasis.
19. Gleb Struve, *Soviet Russia Literature 1917 - 1950*, p. 371.
20. Quoted in G. Lukacs, *op. cit.*
21. *Pravda*, October 6, 1952.
22. "K voprosu o tipicheskom v literature" (On the Problems of the Typical in literature), *Kommunist* (Moscow), December 1955, No. 18, pp. 12-23.
23. Quoted in Vera Alexandrova, "Soviet Literature Since Stalin," *Problems of Communism*, Vol. III, No. 9, (July-August, 1954).
24. No. 12, December 1956.
25. Cf. *Novy Mir*, No. 9, 1956.
26. "K voprosu ob ostavanii dramaturgii i teatra," (Toward the problem of lagging behind in the drama and the theatre), *Voprosy filosofii*, No. 5, 1956. "Zapiski pisatelia" (Notes of a writer), *Literaturnaia Moskva*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1956.
27. *Literaturnaia Gazeta*, May 14, 1957.
28. Cf. "Za tesnuiu sviaz literatury i iskusstva s zhizniu naroda" (For a closer bond between literature and art and the life of the people), *Literaturnaia Gazeta*, August 28, 1957.
29. E. Romanova, "Antivoennye motivy v tvorchestve U. Folknera" (Anti-War Motifs in the Works of W. Faulkner), *Inostrannaia Literatura*, No. 6, December 1955, pp. 170-96.
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31. G. Fridlener, "Obrazy i temy Dostoevskovo" (Images and themes of Dostoevsky), *Zvezda*, February 1956, No. 2, p. 162.

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Literature in Communist China

By Shau Wing Chan

PERHAPS ONE OF THE clearest evidences of the thoroughly totalitarian character of the Chinese Communist regime is to be found in its policies defining the role of literature and the arts in a society ruled by proletarian dictatorship. These policies were first enunciated by Mao Tse-tung at a forum on literature and art held in the former Communist capital of Yenan in May 1942, and they have been enforced without essential change since the 1949 establishment of Communist rule over mainland China, notwithstanding Mao's proclamation in 1956 of the much-publicized "hundred flowers" doctrine.

At the Yenan forum,[1] Mao laid down the party's basic stand in two addresses which, in 1943, were made required reading for all writers and artists belonging to the party, thus assuming the sanctity of official dogma. Following in Lenin's footsteps, he declared that literature and art must fill a strictly utilitarian role: they must belong to and serve a definite class, express a definite political line, and be subordinate to politics. More concretely, in a proletarian dictatorship, they must serve the "masses"—defined by Mao as embracing "workers, peasants, and soldiers"——and must become "a powerful weapon for uniting and educating the people and for crushing and destroying the enemy."[2]

The first prerequisite for the writer, then, is to assimilate the viewpoint of the proletariat. To do this, according to Mao, he must voluntarily "go to the masses", must observe and directly experience their conditions of daily life and their struggle for existence, and must then incorporate this experience in his creative work. He must also acquire a sound knowledge of a "living" Marxism-Leninism—that is, a Marxism directly applicable to the everyday life and struggle of the masses. Finally, he must supplement this doctrinal knowledge with an understanding of the individual conditions, mutual relationships, and psychology of the various classes of society, thus strengthening his capacity to expose the brutality and deception of the "enemy" of the masses and to help eliminate "backward" ideas.

The criteria elaborated by Mao for the judgment of literary works flowed, as a logical corollary, from his basic concept of literature as a political weapon of the class struggle. While not denying that esthetic values have a place in proletarian literature, Mao rejected the idea that artistic standards are "absolute and eternal" and affirmed that they must be based in part, on considerations of "social application." Thus, while the writer must strive to raise the artistic level of his work, he must do this within the limits set by the existing cultural level of the masses.

Furthermore, according to Mao, the "form" of literature—to which artistic standards apply—is secondary to its "content," which must be judged by political standards. A proletarian literature, he declared, must be a "revolutionary" literature; its content must be such as to promote the unity of the masses, encourage them to accomplish their tasks with one heart and one mind, and stimulate progress; and there can be no place in it for any writing that is "anti-national, anti-scientific, anti-masses, and anti-Communistic in viewpoint."

Implementation of Literary Policy

Such, in brief outline, were the key ideas on literature and art set forth in Mao's Yenan lectures in 1942. Consequently, when the Commu-

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nists completed their conquest of the mainland in 1949, they were already equipped with a literary policy which now needed to be implemented on a national scale, embracing the whole literary life of the country and all writers, Communist and non-Communist. Censorship and publishing controls afforded the party a direct means of barring from public print all literature regarded as falling in the categories outlawed by Mao. At the same time, an all-embracing organizational network was established to facilitate constant party surveillance, direction and control of literary activity. As early as July 1949, even before the installation of the "People's Republic," steps were taken to form the "All-China Federation of Literary and Art Circles," which later spawned a number of subdivisional organizations including the "All-China Association of Writers," the principal organization in the literary field. The Writers' Association, in turn, organized its own local branches down to the district level, thus forming a gigantic structure under highly centralized party and state control.

One of the Chinese Communists' principal methodological weapons for re-educating non-party writers as well as for stifling deviationism on the part of Communist writers has been "ideological remolding" through the dual processes of "criticism" and "self-criticism." Criticism involves the holding of group "struggle" meetings at which the participants point out one another's "wrong thinking" or ideological deficiencies. Self-criticism is a much more exacting process requiring a full written confession by the principal of past errors in his private life, his mental training and development, and his occupational activities. If his first confession is considered inadequate, he is obliged to repeat the process until he produces one that satisfies the party.

Communist writers had already been subjected to an intensive "ideological remolding" campaign in the wake of Mao's Yenan lectures, but the first nationwide movement of this kind affecting non-party writers and other intellectuals was launched at Mao's direction in September 1951, two years after the establishment of the Communist regime. Though aimed particularly at college and university professors, it was extended to all intellectual groups and, by the end of 1951, had engulfed the literary profession.[3] The party, using the All-China Federation of Literary and Art Circles as its instrument, virtually compelled all writers to engage in the study of Marxism-Leninism and the works of Stalin and Mao, and to remold their ideological thinking through criticism and self-criticism. This vast "brain-washing" campaign continued during 1952 and was noticeably effective in pressuring the writers into submission to the party line.

The Chinese Communists have also used the more drastic weapon of the purge as a means of enforcing literary orthodoxy. Immediately after the 1942 Yenan forum, a purge campaign was set in motion against the veteran Communist writer, Wang Shih-wei, for writing some essays which painted a dark picture of conditions in the Communist capital and exposed, in particular, the apathy, hypocrisy, and privileged life of the higher level party cadres.[4] For this offense against "socialist realism," Wang was publicly condemned by the party as a Trotskyite and a violator of Mao's precepts on the subordination of literature to politics. He was spared from further punishment, but the disgrace was enough to blight his literary career.

The party, in 1948, took similar but much more severe action against another leftist writer, Hsiao Chun, then editor of a cultural newspaper (**Wen Hua Pao**) in Communist-occupied Manchuria. Hsiao dared to print articles critical of Soviet behavior in Manchuria and deploring the violence of the Communist land reform program, for which he was found guilty of harboring a bourgeois viewpoint of "egoistic individualism" and sentenced to a three-year period of "reform through labor" in the Fushun coal mines.[5]

Literary Purges of 1954-55

These early disciplinary actions were but a foretaste of the series of larger and more carefully organized literary purge campaigns staged in Communist China during 1954-55. The first of the campaigns, launched in the latter part of 1954, was directed against Yu Ping-po, a distinguished non-Communist scholar of Chinese literature, using as a pretext certain articles Yu had written for Communist publications commenting on the 18th-century novel, **Dream of the Red Chamber,** from the standpoint of the new ideology of "People's China." Though he had expressed the same ideas in a 1952 article without any unfavorable reaction from the party, Yu was now violently attacked in the Communist press as an ally of the "capitalist viewpoint" of the "Hu Shih clique". The campaign terminated only when Yu, after protracted hearings staged by the Federation of Literary and Art Circles and the Association of Writers, "voluntarily" admitted his ideological errors and promised to reform.[6]

Before it ended in December 1954, the campaign against Yu touched off another party-instigated drive, this time aimed at Feng Hsueh-

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feng, Communist vice-chairman of the Association of Writers and chief editor of **Wen-i Pao** (Literary and Art Gazette), the organ of the Federation of Literary and Art Circles. Feng had committed the blunder of praising Yu's 1952 commentary on the **Dream of the Red Chamber** and had further compromised himself in September 1954 by appending a rather slighting editorial note to an article by two young party writers criticizing Yu's ideological approach. The result was an attack on Feng in the official party organ, **Jen-min jih-pao** (October 28, 1954), which gave the signal for a merciless campaign of denunciation. Though found guilty on numerous counts, including revolt against the principles of Marxism-Leninism, disobedience to party orders, and dictatorial conduct as chief editor of **Wen-i Pao**, Feng—after repenting—was dealt with leniently, merely losing his post as chief editor in a general reorganization of the **Wen-i Pao** staff.[7]

The literary purges reached their culmination in the campaign against Hu Feng, which continued throughout the first half of 1955.[8] A leftist writer of considerable reputation, Hu had been friendly toward the Communists since the mid-1930's and, after the establishment of the new regime, had been given a minor post in the Federation of Literary and Art Circles. He and a few supporters, however, soon were at odds with the party's attempts to dominate all literary activity. During the "ideological remolding" drive of 1951-52, a preliminary attack had been levelled at him in the party press, but the all-out purge campaign began in December 1954 as a direct result of Hu's courageous criticisms of the party's cultural leaders and policies during the hearings against Yu Ping-po and Feng Hsueh-feng. The party leaders, long jealous of Hu's influence in leftist literary circles, quickly seized the opportunity to destroy him. Concerted denunciations of Hu and his "clique" flooded the major party newspapers and periodicals for six months.[9] Finally, the accused were found guilty of "bourgeois idealism," of disseminating "reactionary" literary theories under a cloak of Marxism-Leninism, "slandering and repudiating" the cultural policies of the Communist Party, and falsely pretending for twenty years to support the party and the revolution. In this case, however, the penalty was extreme, for Hu's arrest and impending trial as a "counterrevolutionary" were announced at the National People's Congress in July 1955.[10] Though the trial outcome was not revealed, it appears certain that he suffered the death sentence.

The New Literature

Thus, while the leaders of Communist China have departed in other significant respects from Soviet theory and practice, they have closely followed the example of the Soviet "Big Brother" in their treatment of literature and the arts. They seek to make these the servants of politics and to force writers and artists, by organizational controls and ideological pressure, to become mere propaganda instruments of the state. What sort of literature, then, has "socialist realism" produced in Communist China? Its "politicized" nature emerges most clearly, perhaps, when one examines some of the dominant themes of the new literature, as exemplified in various representative works.

One of the regime's foremost tasks after it won ruling power was to make the peasantry more class conscious in order to promote the class struggle in rural China. Condemnation of the old landlords consequently became a major theme for popular plays, poetry, and novels, in which the landlords were universally pictured as diabolically wicked, devoid of all human feeling, and seeking only to exploit the downtrodden peasant tillers of their land. The writers sought to exaggerate the social incompatibility between the landowners and peasants, and hailed the Communists as the deliverers of the peasants from exploitation.

A characteristic treatment of this theme is found in the widely acclaimed play **Pai-mao-nu** (The White-haired Woman), the composite work of several authors, which won a Stalin Prize in 1951.[11] The heroine, a young peasant girl named Yang Hsi-erh, is seduced and debauched by an evil landlord, whose cruel exploitation has already driven her father to suicide. She manages to escape and takes up her abode in a hidden cave where she gives birth to the landlord's child. Her once beautiful black hair turned white by suffering, she keeps herself and her child alive by stealing back to her village at night and taking the food offerings left on the altar of the local temple. The villagers glimpse but do not recognize her; they refer to her with awe as "the white-haired fairy" and keep on leaving food for her. At last the Communists, who have come to the village, unravel the mystery and call the peasants together to stage a mass trial of the landlord, Huang, who is duly punished for his crimes. At the trial the local party leader proclaims:

> **The old society forced human beings to live as ghosts,**

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But the new society has transformed ghosts into human beings,
And brought salvation to many of our good, long-suffering sisters.

The play ends as all the players triumphantly sing:

Huang-Shih-jen, at last your head is bowed and you are trembling!
Your feudalism of a thousand years has been uprooted;
Your ten thousand year-old chains are smashed to pieces.
We who have long suffered begin a new life today.

The same theme has often been treated in another popular literary form, the narrative poem. Typical of this genre is Li Chi's **Wang Kuei yu Li Hsiang-hsiang** (Wang Kuei and Li Hsiang-hsiang), which relates the persecution of a young peasant and his betrothed by a venal landlord.[12] The landlord, desiring to make the girl his concubine, plots the murder of the young peasant, but the Communists come in time to save the couple and liberate them from the oppression of the landlord, whose lands are confiscated and parceled out to the poor peasants of the village. Other examples, varying only in details of plot, are found in Chao Shu-li's **Li Yu-ts'ai pan-hua** (Rhymes of Li Yu-ts'ai) and **Kan-ch'e chuan** (Story of a Cart Driver) by T'ien Chien.[13] T'ien's poem ends on the usual note of jubilation after the Communists have put a stop to the tyranny and exactions of a rapacious landlord, who among other things has brutally forced a young peasant girl, Lan-ni, into marriage. Rescued from her unhappy state, she rejoices:

I am thankful to Chairman Mao, I am thankful to everyone
For saving me, Lan-ni, so that I can live again as human being...
Now that I no longer live in a feudal world, I want to go to school again,
To work in the fields, and to lead the life of a girl.

Land Reform and Nationalist Evils

The picturization of the landlords as a ruthless and wicked exploiting class was an essential part of the whole land reform struggle, which dominated the first two years of the Communist regime. The struggle itself has been the theme of a number of works by Communist authors, many of whom were virtually required to go into the rural areas and take an active part in local land reform campaigns so that they might depict them according to the principles of "socialist realism." These works picture the struggle in all its stages, starting from the preparatory work of the party cadres in organizing the peasants and stirring up their enthusiasm, and reaching its climax in a grand "victory" celebration after the landlords have been sentenced in mass public trials and their lands and property redistributed among the landless peasants.

The writers invariably seek to stress the indispensable guiding role of the party at the same time that they paint the struggle as a spontaneous movement emanating from and actuated by the peasants themselves. Among the best known works on the land reform theme is the 1951 Stalin Prize-winning novel **T'ai-yang chao tsai sang-kan ho shang** (The Sun Shines Over the Sangkan River),[14] by the veteran Communist authoress Chiang Ping-chih (better known as Ting Ling), who now is in disgrace as the alleged leader of an "anti-party" group of writers. Another is Chou Li-po's novel **Pao-feng tsou-yu** (The Hurricane), written—by the author's own admission—expressly to extol the "great leadership" of the party in the land reform struggle and to encourage the "revolutionary masses" throughout the country.[15]

The wicked lawlessness of the old landlord class is but one of the "evils" of the Nationalist regime which Chinese Communist writers have been encouraged to contrast against the "happier" conditions of the new "People's China." A different sort of evil furnishes the theme of an earlier Communist literary work, the play **Hsieh-lei ch'ou** (Bloody Tear Vengeance) by Ma Chien-ling.[16] This tells the story of an unfortunate peasant who decides to flee from Nationalist oppression after his son is dragooned into military service. While he and his family are making their way toward the Communist-held areas, Nationalist soldiers rape and kill the daughter-in-law, and the peasant's own wife commits suicide from grief and despair. The peasant and his young grandson alone survive to reach a Communist village, where they are warmly welcomed and helped to begin a new life. The son then turns up in the Communist area as a Nationalist Army secret agent ordered to poison the drinking wells and commit other acts of sabotage. One of his assignments nearly causes him to kill his own father, whom he recognizes only in the nick of time and from whom he learns of the fate of his mother and wife. Swearing vengeance, he returns to his army unit which soon prepares to launch a surprise attack against the Communists. Ordered to guide the Nationalist force into Communist territory, the young man manages to kill the

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commander before the attack and then persuades his comrades to surrender to the Communists. Exhorting them to seize the opportunity to end their forced servitude to the Kuomintang, he declares:

> **Brothers, I have just returned from the border areas. The soldiers of the Communist Eighth Route Army are the best of people. All the refugees who have fled to the border areas have food and clothing. . . . Brothers, what are we doing now? Have we no conscience left? The Kuomintang has duped us, so that we are no longer like human beings.**

The young man's eloquence prevails, and the Nationalist soldiers go over to the Communists who magnanimously accept their confessions of past mistakes and welcome them as comrades.

All for the Masses

It is, of course, **de rigueur** for contemporary Chinese authors to contrast the greedy self-interest, dishonesty, and disregard for the public welfare of the old Nationalist officialdom with the supposed selfless sincerity, honesty and public-mindedness of their Communist successors. The veteran writer Shu Ch'ing-ch'un (better known as Lao She), who won international renown for his 1927 novel **Rickshaw Boy**, has treated this theme in a play entitled **Lung-hsu kou** (Dragon-beard Ditch).[17] The setting of the play is a slum district in the outer city of Peking. Through it runs a foul-smelling ditch, which, despite the forcible collection of "health improvement" taxes from the poverty-stricken inhabitants, has been allowed by the Nationalist authorities to accumulate such filth that it becomes a public health menace. Then comes the advent of the "democratic" Communist regime, which promptly takes steps to clean up the ditch and cover it over with a modern paved road. As the play ends, the inhabitants are preparing to celebrate this gala event by a public demonstration, and one participant joyfully voices his gratitude to the new regime:

> **Our good government loves us poor people**
> **And enables us to live a new and wholesome life;**
> **It has improved the ditch and built a new paved road,**
> **So that we may walk erect, with a proud stride.**
> **We, the laboring masses, will forge ahead with a single mind,**
> **Striving to put forth an even greater united effort**
> **So that our country will prosper and our people will live in peace.**

It is not surprising that pure love stories have all but vanished from the new "people's literature" of Communist China just as they did from Soviet literature. To be sure, the principles of socialist realism do not bar the novelist or poet from treating of love, but they do require that the love motif be merely incidental to a theme which is socially or politically useful from the Communist standpoint. It was, for example, considered not only useful but essential from the standpoint of remolding Chinese society to break down the traditionally authoritarian family system, which stood in the way of the regime's goals; and since one of the foundations of this system was the custom of "arranged marriages," the proscription of this "feudal" practice was among the Communists' first acts.

Writers were consequently encouraged to turn out works condemning the old system and championing the right of young people to love and marry whom they will, free of parental interference. Chao Shu-li's short story **Hsiao Erh-hei chieh-chun** (The Marriage of Hsiao Ehr-hei) is representative of this type of "love story" with a dominant social purpose.[18] Its principals are a young peasant boy and girl, whose wish to marry is hindered by their parents' insistence upon other marriage partners. The despairing couple take their problem to the Communist authorities, who sternly admonish the parents for their "pigheadedness" and warn them that they can no longer oppose their children's marriage under the new party-decreed marriage law.

Of course, Chinese Communist literature also has its epics glorifying supreme loyalty to the party. One of these is the "musical" play **Liu Hu-lan**, chiefly the work of Wei Feng and Liu Lien-ch'ih.[19] The play harks back to the period of Communist-Nationalist hostilities and takes its title from the name of its heroine, a teen-age girl Communist. When the Nationalist troops attack her village, she aids the Communist defenders but is taken prisoner and subjected to torture by her captors in an attempt to extract information concerning the Communist forces. She steadfastly refuses even when forced to choose between betrayal of her comrades and decapitation, and goes courageously to her death shouting, "Long live the Communist Party! Long live Chairman Mao!" In the end the Communists, thanks to Liu Hu-lan's act of self-sacrifice, crush the Nationalist troops and retake the village.

Praise of the Soviet Union also is an ubiquitous note not merely in the political writings of the press but in every form of contemporary Chinese literature. Characters in novels are con-

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stantly lauding the Soviet example, like the captain of a Communist land reform team in Chou Li-po's **The Hurricane**, who declares, "We'll use horses and then machines to cultivate our land as they do in our Big Brother country, the Soviet Union." Others have been "inspired" to sing their praises in verse form, prominent among them being the present chairman of the Federation of Literary and Art Circles (and former Vice Premier), Kuo Mo-jo, who composed this "poetic" exhortation to the workers of Communist China:

The Soviet Union, Big Brother No. 1, is good beyond compare;
Our own China, Big Brother No. 2, must imitate him without fail.[20]

The Stagnation of Literature

In the light of this cross-section of Chinese Communist literature, it is evident that the fruit of the rigid application of Mao's Yenan policies has been a body of writing that is generally drab and colorless in its uniformity, lacking in creative imagination and individuality, and marred by a constant preoccupation with ideological themes. Another apparent consequence was a decline in literary activity after 1949, for in December 1951 Hu Ch'iao-mu, deputy chief of the Propaganda Department of the CPC Central Committee, complained of the paucity and poor quality of literary production, blaming this not on the impact of party controls, but on neglect of Mao's teachings, laxity of effort, and persistent "bourgeois" tendencies among the writers.[21] Chou Yang, also speaking for the party cultural leadership, echoed Hu's complaint and called for greater ideological regimentation and party guidance of the literary profession.[22]

The subsequent "ideological remolding" campaign and the 1954-55 purges of literary figures, however, still failed to stir the writers out of their lethargy. In the spring of 1956, fresh complaints appeared in party organs to the effect that literary work was not keeping pace with the "tempo of socialist transformation,"[23] and that many writers, instead of showing progress, were not even maintaining their past levels of achievement.[24]

In view of these admissions, it seems reasonable to construe Mao's enunciation of the much-publicized slogan, "Let the hundred flowers bloom, and diverse schools of thought contend," as signifying belated recognition of the stifling effects of the regime's hitherto rigid cultural controls, and as a gesture of conciliation and relaxation designed to overcome the lack of enthusiasm among Chinese writers and intellectuals. Mao's original formulation of the "new policy" (at a Supreme State Conference on May 2, 1956) was not made public, but soon thereafter various cultural spokesmen for the regime began explaining it in a series of published statements.

In the first of these statements, Lu Ting-yi, chief of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee, declared that the "hundred flowers" policy was intended to mobilize "all active elements to give their best to enrich Chinese literature and art."[25] Toward this end, the party meant to encourage "freedom of independent thinking . . . freedom of debate, freedom of creative work . . . and to criticize, freedom to express one's opinion, and freedom to adhere to or reserve one's opinion." In another surprising passage, Lu made what sounded like a flat repudiation of the hallowed precepts of "socialist realism" governing the choice of literary themes:

The themes of literature and art should be very broad. The subjects of literary and art works may include not only contemporary and historical things, but also fairies and talking animals which are non-existent in the world. . . . Consequently, the laying down of puritanical rules in regard to subject matter would only lead to the suffocation of literary and art work and the emergence of formalism and lowly taste. It can bring no benefit, but only harm.

Other passages of Lu's speech, however, virtually cancelled out these hopeful indications of a real change in policy. The "freedoms" he had enumerated were to be enjoyed only by "the people" and not by "counterrevolutionaries"—which means, in fact, that anyone exercising his supposed freedom to criticize to an extent considered inimical to the party can promptly be transferred from the first to the second category. Further, Lu reaffirmed that literature and art are weapons of the class struggle, that idealism, subjectivism, and individualism must remain targets of attack, and that Marxism-Leninism represents the "highest form of human wisdom" and "the truth fit for application anywhere in the world." Finally, he qualified his promise of greater leeway in choice of themes by declaring that writers still will be expected to "sing the praises of the new society and of positive characters as a matter of course."

In view of the ambivalence of the official explanations, it was not surprising that the "hundred flowers" policy brought forth no significant response from the writers in the direction of exercising their supposed new freedoms. The situation thus continued unchanged until the launching, in May 1957, of the CPC's first major

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cheng-feng (rectification) movement to be held since that carried out at Yenan in 1942.

Shortlived Flowers

When the party leaders announced the impending rectification drive at the end of April, they deferred to the new spirit of the "hundred flowers" policy in inviting all "democratic" groups and organizations to join with the Communists in frank and open criticism of deficiencies in the party's working methods, particularly the three "evils" of "bureaucratism, sectarianism, and subjectivism." The announcement gave assurances that the method of "large 'struggle' meetings" would be avoided, and that the movement would be carried out "as gently as a breeze or a fine rain."[26]

Despite these pledges, barely a month had passed before the movement to cleanse the party suddenly became, instead, one to crush the party's critics. Signalling the change, an editorial in the central party organ, **Jen-min jih-jao** (June 8, 1957) charged that "certain people" had taken advantage of the rectification movement to launch a "bourgeois rightist" conspiracy aiming at the overthrow of Communist Party leadership and the "great cause of socialism." The ensuing months saw the unfolding of a vast and spectacular "anti-rightist" campaign extending into every area of activity and including among its victims not only leaders of the fellow-traveling "democratic" political parties, but also university professors, newspaper editors, literary figures, and businessmen. Those who had responded to the party's invitation to criticize its shortcomings were accused of conducting "anti-party" activities designed to undermine the "democratic foundations of the state," of willfully opposing Marxism-Leninism, neglecting to serve the people, and reviving "bourgeois capitalistic" trends of thought.

独立王国女王陛下　　米　谷　画　沙　雪　诗

[illegible]

Portrait of a Recalcitrant Writer

The heavy-handed fashion in which party authorities "satirize" writers accused of "anti-party" activities is illustrated by this cartoon of Ting Ling, author of **The Sun Shines over Sangkan River,** for which she received the Stalin Prize for Literature before her fall from grace. Various captions refer to her ostensible vanity and egoism, and the poem underneath reads: The Sun shines over Sangkan River/ But it does not penetrate her heart./ She wears a "book" over her head/ and under its protection she dances with the devils.

—*From* Hsin Kuan Cha *(New Observer), Peiping, October 16, 1957.*

Though difficult to pin down exactly, the number of casualties among the writers was considerable and included some prominent names in Chinese Communist literature. Between June and mid-September, the Association of Writers held 27 anti-rightist "struggle" meetings, singling out as its central targets of attack Ting Ling and Ch'en Chi-hsia (formerly on the editorial staff of **Wen-i Pao**), who were alleged to be the ringleaders of "anti-party" activities among the writers. Feng Hsueh-feng, who already had figured as one of the principals in the 1954-55 literary purges, and the poet Ai Ch'ing were among the other well-known Communist writers accused of complicity in the conspiracy.[27]

The voluminous testimony put forward during the "struggle" meetings against the "Ting-Ch'en clique" produced conspicuously little concrete proof of the "anti-party" activity and "bourgeois individualist ideology" of which the principals were accused. It was typical of the flimsiness of the evidence that Ting Ling's accusers were obliged to hark back to an article she had published in Yenan in 1942 as "proof" of her deviation from orthodoxy; and the same was true in the case of Feng Hsueh-feng. Nevertheless, with the example of Hu Feng's unhappy fate in mind,

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most of the accused writers, including Ai Ch'ing, Ch'en Chi-hsia, and Feng Hsueh-feng, yielded to the concerted pressure, confessed their "guilt," and promised to reform. There has as yet been no indication whether or how the condemned writers will be punished.

Whatever the outcome, the developments of the "anti-rightist" campaign have stamped out any illusions that Mao's "hundred flowers" policy means, or was ever intended to mean, a real "thaw" of the Chinese Communists' controls over literature and intellectual activity in general. Indeed, Lu Ting-yi, speaking before the Association of Writers at its September 16-17 sessions winding up the "anti-rightist" hearings, reaffirmed Mao's literary doctrines of 1942 in these unequivocal words:

> **It has always been the policy of the party that politics should lead literature and the arts, that literature and the arts should be led by the party and should serve the masses of workers, peasants and soldiers. Therefore, literary and art workers should learn Marxism and be closely united with the workers, peasants, and soldiers. . . . We regard revolutionary literary and art work as an indispensable part of the revolutionary enterprise as a whole. But from Wang Shih-wei to Hu Feng, Feng Hsueh-feng, Ting Ling, Chiang Feng and others, all [the "rightists"] have advocated the supremacy of literature and the arts and thought that politics should be made secondary to them . . . or that literature and the arts should be an independent kingdom by themselves. . . . That is an anti-party, anti-people, anti-socialist line of literature and the arts.**[28]

But even as Lu reaffirmed the old policies, he made an unwitting, yet significant admission of their long-range ineffectiveness. "It is inevitable," he said, "that part of the intellectuals **brought up in a socialist society** will degenerate into intellectuals with bourgeois ideology." Indeed, if veteran Communists like Ting Ling have rebelled against rigid party controls, it is obvious that these controls are gradually alienating all Chinese writers and intellectuals, and that Communist China is courting an eventual crisis which no Marx, Lenin or Mao Tse-tung can help her avert.

NOTES

The Yenan forum was convened as part of the CPC's first *cheng-feng* (rectification) movement. For a discussion of the movement and English translations of some of the source documents, see C. Brandt, B. Schwartz, J. K. Fairbank, *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism*, Harvard University Press, 1952, pp. 372-419.

2. For translated extracts from Mao's two addresses, see *ibid.*, pp. 408-19.
3. For materials on this movement, see *Current Background*, published by U.S. Consulate General, Hong Kong, Nos. 169, 182, 213.
4. Yang I-fan, *The Case of Hu Feng*, Union Research Institute, Hong Kong, 1956, pp. 1-5.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 5-10.
6. For details, see *Current Background*, Nos. 315; 355; Chao Ts'ung, "Yu Ping-po and the *Dream of the Red Chamber*," *Tsu-kuo chou-k'an* (China Weekly), Hong Kong, No. 103, December 1954, pp. 9-13.
7. For details, see Chao Chung, *"The Communist Program for Literature and Art in China*, Union Research Institute, Hong Kong, 1955, pp. 8-25; Yang, *op. cit.*, pp. 15-20; also, a partial record of the hearings against Feng, published in *Wen-I Pao*, No. 22, 1954, pp. 3-22.
8. General reference are: *Current Background*, No. 350; Chao, *op. cit.*, pp. 85-91; Yang, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-169.
9. These criticisms were collected and republished in five volumes by the Writers Publishing Society, Peiping, in 1955, under the title (translated), *Collected Critical Essays on Hu Feng's Ideas on Literature.*
10. Speech by Shen Yen-ping, July 23, 1955. *Cf. Current Background*, No. 350, pp. 1-2.
11. The principal authors were Ho Ching-chih and T'ing I. People's Literature, Peiping, 1952.
12. New Democracy Publishers, Hong Kong, 1949.
13. Cited work by Chao Shu-li was published in English in a collection entitled, *Rhymes of Li Yu-ts'ai and Other Stories*, Foreign Languages Press, Peiping, 1954. T'ien Chien's poem published by New China Bookstore, Shanghai. 1947.
14. Published in English by Foreign Languages Press, Peiping, 1954.
15. Cf. Liu Shou-sung, *A Draft History of China's New Literature* (translated title), Peiping, 1956, Vol. II, p. 253.
16. New China Bookstore, Peiping, 1945.
17. Morning Light Publishing Company, Shanghai, 1952.
18. *Rhymes of Li Yu-ts'ai, op. cit.*
19. New China Bookstore, Peiping, 1949.
20. In *Hsin-hua sung* (Encomium to the New China), People's Literature, Peiping, 1953, p. 62.
21. Hu Ch'iao-mu, "Why Literary and Art Workers Must Reform Their Ideology," *"Wen-i Pao*, Vol. V, No. 4 (December 1951), p. 7.
22. *Ibid.*, pp. 10-13.
23. Shu Ch'ing-ch'un, writing in *Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien* (China Youth), No. 5, March 1956.
24. Statement by Shen Yen-ping, *Survey of China Mainland Press* (U.S. Consulate General, Hong Kong) No. 1252, March 21, 1956, p. 7.
25. Lu's speech was made late in May and published in *Jen-min jih-pao*, June 13, 1957. English translation in *Current Background*, No. 406, August 15, 1956.
26. New China News Agency report, April 30, 1957.
27. Ai Ch'ing's poems include several eulogizing the Soviet Union, for example "Dedication" and "The October Red Square" (translated titles), published in a 1956 collection entitled, *Ch'un-t'ien* (People's Literature, Peiping).
28. *Survey of China Mainland Press*, No. 1629.

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Hungary's Defiant Intellectuals

By Paul Landy

HOW MUCH THE OCTOBER 1956 uprising in Hungary owed its inspiration and motive force to the country's intellectuals has long since been acknowledged by its suppressors as well as by its friends. Gyula Kallai, Minister of Culture in the Kadar government and member of the Politburo of the renamed "Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party," explicitly recognized this debt in an article published on August 4, 1957 in the official party organ, **Nepszabadsag:**

> **It is an indisputable fact that some intellectuals and, moreover, certain intellectual groups—above all, many writers and journalists—played a leading role in the ideological leadership and preparation of the counterrevolution. The spiritual weapons of the counterrevolution were forged, of course, not in the factories or in the agricultural cooperatives, but—in full accord with Radio Free Europe and other enemy broadcasting stations—in the Writers and Journalists' Union and the Petoefi circle, not by unknown "men in the street" but by the Tibor Derys, Gyula Hays, Tibor Tardoses and their ilk.**

Accordingly, it is not surprising that the intellectuals of Hungary, during the past year, have borne the brunt of a coordinated, frontal assault the like of which has never before been directed at the intelligentsia of any country, not even during the Great Purge in Stalinist Russia. Yet, despite all the measures taken by the regime, the intellectuals have steadfastly refused to repudiate their demands of the revolutionary period and have even continued to reiterate some of these demands; nor has the Kadar government been able to force, bribe or woo them into collaborating with it.

Mr. Landy is a Hungarian editor and writer who fled Hungary after the collapse of the October Revolution. His article "Hungary Since the Revolution" (Problems of Communism, September-October 1957, has been reprinted in various countries, and has been widely acclaimed as one of the most thorough reports on the policies of the Kadar regime.

The Road to Revolution

Long before their campaign for liberalization touched off the events of October 23, 1956, the actions of Hungary's intellectuals had gone far toward destroying the harmful notion that all writers and journalists in Communist countries are servile hacks. They were the first, from 1953 on, to see through the spurious values and empty promises of the regime, the first to voice their dissatisfaction, and the first to resist—by passive rejection initially but later by active opposition—the political pretensions of the Communist rulers of Hungary. Their groping quest for humanism and a better life found increasingly vocal expression in the famous organ (now outlawed) of the Writers' Union, **Irodalmi Ujsag,** every issue of which sold out within a few hours. It was mainly in the pages of this courageous weekly that the intellectuals prepared the ground, politically and psychologically, for the October rising—by poems like Laszlo Benjamin's "Poem to a Minister", which was a sarcastic challenge, quite obviously meant for the then Minister of Culture Jozsef Darvas, to write instead of preaching how to write; by brilliant satires like Gyula Hay's "Why I Do Not Like the Kucs Era," devastatingly mocking the party bureaucracy; by political fantasies like Tibor Tardos' "Seawater Is Salty," which depicted in Orwellian colors an imaginary

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government persuading a servile people that seawater was lemonade.

After Imre Nagy was deposed from the premiership for the first time in March 1955, this same group of writers dared to speak out against even the party dictator, Matyas Rakosi, himself. In November of the same year, at a meeting of the Writers' Union, they put forward a joint memorandum protesting against the political and cultural policies of the party leadership. Their action was promptly condemned by the Central Committee of the party in a resolution which held them guilty of a "frontal attack against the party and state leadership." The resolution specifically denounced Stalin Prize novelist Tamas Aczel, poet Zoltan Zelk. Gyula Hay, and Tibor Meray as the principal "instigators of this unpardonable petit-bourgeois conspiracy."[1]

The writers, however, did not surrender. They continued to pull down, little by little, the whole structure of illusions built up—partly by themselves—during the years of Stalinism, and their demands won steadily increasing popular support. The ferment reached a new peak at the end of June 1956. Seizing the occasion of a debate on the press held within the Petoefi circle, Tibor Tardos, Tibor Dery, Tibor Meray and other speakers challenged Rakosi and his Stalinist associates, demanded the rehabilitation of Laszlo Rajk (executed in 1949 as a Titoist), and demanded not just a tactical shift of emphasis but a basic overhauling of party policy. The leaders of this new outburst, Dery and Tardos, were fortunate to suffer nothing worse than expulsion from the party. Shortly thereafter, in fact, Rakosi urged at a Politburo meeting that action be taken to arrest 400 prominent writers, journalists and other members of the Petoefi circle. In the ensuing showdown for control of the party, however, Rakosi was defeated and obliged to resign "for health reasons."

Following the downfall of the long-dreaded dictator in mid-July, the intellectuals asserted themselves more vehemently than ever, expanding their demands to include the prompt rehabilitation of ex-Premier Nagy. A straw in the wind was the action taken by the Congress of the Writers' Union on September 17, when it elected a new "liberal" leadership by the first completely secret balloting since 1947.

Standard Bearers of Revolt

The part played by the intellectuals in the October revolt itself is now common knowledge. They strove desperately to achieve a peaceful solution of the October 23 crisis, pleading with the party leaders not to permit the security forces to fire upon the populace. After this plea was disregarded and the revolt began, they were the first to speak over the shortlived Free Kossuth Radio, and on November 2 **Irodalmi Ujsag** came out with an issue—fated to be its last—in which every leading Hungarian writer joined in hailing the revolution. Dery appealed for self-discipline and moderation in these unforgettable last lines:

> **The revolution has triumphed, but if we do not give it time to gain strength, it may again be defeated. Or it may be stolen by those waiting for the chance to do so. Let us stand together; we have but one country and one life. If my words carry any weight, let us be united, let us not fight one another. Let us trust in the power and the decency of the people. No more blood must be shed! Honor to the dead!**

It is ironic, in retrospect, to think that Dery's appeal may have helped to save the lives of many of the very men who one year later confirmed his sentence to prison as a leading figure in the "counterrevolution."

Even after Soviet armed might had crushed the revolution in blood, the intellectuals did not give up fighting to salvage some of its gains. They tried to negotiate with Kadar with a view to winning him over to a moderate policy and a compromise agreement with Nagy, then a refugee in the Yugoslav Legation in Budapest. Kadar, however, turned his back, seeking only to gain time in which to reorganize the party's apparatus of repression preparatory to a full return to reaction. When President of the Writers' Union Peter Veres, Gyula Hay and the poet Gyula Illyes tried to call personally on Kadar late in November, he refused even to receive them.

What may be termed the phase of active resistance came to a close with the famous manifesto issued by the Writers' Union on December 22, 1956, bearing the signatures of all but six of its members. It defiantly declared:

> **The Soviet Government made a historic mistake when it stained with blood the water of the fountain which burst out from the depths into the open on October 23.[2]**

The Aftermath of October

In writing of the intellectuals since the collapse of the October revolution, it is helpful to distinguish first between three main groups. The first is made up of those numerous writers, journalists and others who sought refuge and freedom in the West between November 1956 and February

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1957. The long roster includes many distinguished names: Tamas Aczel, novelist and winner of both the Stalin and Kossuth Prizes, who was the first to dare attack the dreaded AVO in Print; Paul Ignotus, political essayist, arrested upon his return to Hungary from England in 1949 and imprisoned for six years; Gyoergi Paloczi-Horvath, prominent journalist and former editor of **Irodalmi Ujsag,** who spent five years in prison under Rakosi; the famous poet Gyoergi Faludy, veteran of five years in the AVO's Recsk concentration camp; Tibor Meray, journalist and playwright, Kossuth Prize winner, formerly on the editorial board of the party newspaper **Szabad Nep;** Miklos Molnar, once cultural editor of the same paper and later editor of **Irodalmi Ujsag,** who on October 30 published the first refutation of **Pravda's** slanders against the revolution; Peter Kende, former foreign editor of **Szabad Nep;** Gyoergi Ember, formerly a leading member of the Budapest Radio news staff; Gyoergi Sebestyen, cultural editor of **Magyar Nemzet;** and Istvan Vajda, journalist and scriptwriter. Besides many lesser known writers, journalists and young poets, the list also includes the popular humorists, Albert Vajda and Denes Kovacs; actors, singers and, last but not least, 7,000 students. From the ranks of this group has sprung the League of Hungarian Writers in Exile, which publishes several Hungarian-language newspapers seeking to keep alive the cause of Hungary's freedom.

It is with the other two groups, embracing the intellectuals remaining in Hungary, that the present article is primarily concerned. The more numerous of the two includes those who pursued a silent, passive course of non-collaboration toward the Kadar regime until September 1957, but who then compromised with it to a limited extent in the hope of winning clemency for their arrested comrades awaiting trial as "counterrevolutionaries." To the third group belong the intransigeants who have borne the brunt of Kadar's vengeance but stood firm. For these men of outstanding personal courage and integrity, who were among the foremost standard bearers of the revolution, passive silence was not enough. They initiated the attempt to deter Kadar from turning the clock back, but when it became evident that this was his intention, they refused to fall in line and sought to keep alive the smoldering embers of resistance.

The Return to Terror

The Kadar regime was barely a month old when it took its first measures of reprisal against the intellectuals. The first to be arrested were journalists, among them Miklos Gimes, a former editor of **Szabad Nep** and close friend of deposed premier Nagy, and Gyula Obersovszky, editor of the revolutionary youth organ **Igazsag.** Scores of other journalists were temporarily placed in "protective custody" but released after short periods. Also arrested was the talented young playwright, Jozsef Gali.

These initial acts of warning, however, failed to discourage continuing intellectual resistance. Official spokesman declared that the regime's patience was at an end, and on January 17 the Ministry of Interior ordered suspension of the activities of the Writers' Union, following this up two days later by similar action against the Journalists' Union. The government's justification of these moves was that the two organizations had "carried on activities inimical to the interests of the Hungarian People's Republic." The suspensions were followed, on January 25, by the disclosure in the Communist press of the arrests of seven outstanding writers and journalists—Gyula Hay, Zoltan Zelk, Tibor Tardos, Domokos Varga, Lengyel Balazs, Sandor Novobaczky, and Pal Loecsei. Kadar attempted a short while later to justify the arrests on the ground that:

> **The Hay and Zelk elements terrorized even the honest writers in the Writers' Union. We held back for weeks because we thought that, although they had done a great wrong to the people, they would . . . sober up. We waited in vain.**[3]

Such action, directed not at non-party intellectuals but at men all of whom were, or had been, sincere Communists, was without precedent, even in the days of Rakosi. Hay, a party member for thirty of his 57 years, ranked as one of the most highly regarded playwrights of Eastern Europe, and had been elected vice-president of the Writers' Union in September 1956. Zelk, 52, was also a longtime Communist and a Kossuth Prize winner in poetry. For some years, however, he had voiced growing disillusionment with the party and, at a meeting of the Petoefi circle a few weeks before the October revolution, had declared, "I know now that I gave up my principles, the pure faith of my young years, when I believed that a true cause may be served without honesty, without morals, and without regard for national traditions. I know now that this is impossible."[4] Tardos, 39, Novobaczky, 35, and Loecsei were all outstanding Communist journalists, the last two having served on the editorial board of **Szabad Nep.** Tardos, as previously mentioned, had been expelled from the party just before Rakosi's downfall in July 1956. Novobaczky had also joined

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the party's critics, daring to write, in **Irodalmi Ujsag**, that "Communists are not different from other people; in fact, other people—even if not Communists—may be more honest and worthwhile."[5]

All-Out Offensive

Three months after the January arrests, the regime took further action to crush persistent intellectual resistance. On April 21 the previous suspension of the Writers' Union was changed to a permanent ban on the ground that "investigations proved the existence of an active group which tried, within the framework of the Union, to launch attacks against the present regime."[6] The same day the government announced the arrest of 63-year old Tibor Dery for "suspected anti-state activities." Perhaps Hungary's greatest living novelist, Dery had been among the original founders of the Hungarian Communist Party, had spent years in exile, and later had suffered imprisonment during the prewar Horthy regime. But, during the period of Stalinist rule, his faith in the party began to waver like that of many other Communist intellectuals,[7] and by mid-1955 he had ranged himself with the writers demanding greater freedom. Between the collapse of the October revolution and his arrest in April, he resisted every pressure exerted to force him to collaborate with the Kadar regime.

Imprisonment, too, failed to make the arrested writers come to terms. Evidence of their defiant attitude came to light in April when a delegation led by the Hungarian composer, Zoltan Kodaly, presented a plea for their liberation to First Deputy Premier Ferenc Muennich. Trembling with anger, Muennich is reported to have produced a letter written in prison by Zoltan Zelk and containing the declaration that "October was a glorious national uprising and not a foreign-inspired counterrevolution."[8] Muennich asserted that the letter proved that Zelk was incorrigible.

April also witnessed further arrests and the first trials of imprisoned intellectuals. A lower tribunal sentenced Obersovszky and Gali to prison terms of three years and one year respectively. Two months later the Supreme Court changed both these sentences to the death penalty, but in the face of worldwide protests the regime finally commuted the sentences to life imprisonment for Obersovszky and 15 years for Gali.

There was no let-up of the anti-intellectual terror in May and June. Istvan Eoersi, one of Hungary's ablest young poets, was sentenced to five years' imprisonment; Gabor Foeldes, a talented theatrical director, was sentenced to death. Two popular actors, Ivan Darvas and Miklos Szakats, were among the victims of new arrests. The poet Gyula Illyes, following two days of "interrogation" by the security police, suffered a nervous breakdown which sent him to a mental hospital. Laszlo Kardas, writer and former director of the Asociation of Hungarian Colleges, attempted suicide in prison. In June, the well-known actor Imre Sos and his wife, followed by theatrical director Jozsef Matrai, took their own lives in fear of the spreading terror.

Despite the regime's ruthless tactics, however, there were still evidences of unyielding resistance. The directors of the Magvetoe publishing firm, for example, were dismissed because they persisted in publishing Eoersi's poems even after his arrest, as well as other "counterrevolutionary pieces." When copies of the newly-created Kadarist cultural organ, **Elet es Irodalom** (Life and Literature), were sent to subscribers of the defunct **Irodalmi Ujsag**, 90 percent of them sent the copies back; and the new journal was bitterly nicknamed Zhalal Es Denuncialas, meaning 'death and denunciation.' Many journalists quit their jobs and went to work as factory hands rather than be obliged to hail the "achievements" of the Kadar government. The smuggling out to the West of Imre Nagy's "Testament" and of a memorandum written by Istvan Bibo, one of the members of Nagy's shortlived government (placed under arrest by the Kadar regime last May), gave added evidence of the unsubdued spirit of intellectual defiance.

It is in this context that one must interpret the declaration signed by 171 Hungarian writers, poets and playwrights and published in the official party organ **Nepszabadsag** on September 5, protesting against the scheduled final United Nations debate on Hungary. There is no denying that this action enabled the Kadar regime to claim a measure of intellectual support at a time when it was badly in need of such support; but did it really reflect any genuine change of heart among the intellectuals and a breach in their hitherto united front against the regime? The author's conviction is that it did not. In his opinion, two principal factors influenced the signers of the declaration—many of whom had thus far taken great personal risks in voicing their opposition to Kadar's reactionary policies. First, the signers evidently had been led to believe that the regime, as a **quid pro quo** for their support of the protest against the UN, was prepared to grant some concessions, including the release of some of the imprisoned writers. A second factor was undoubtedly the feeling of many intellectuals that the UN

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had failed to offer the Hungarian people anything more than ineffectual moral support.

Although the declaration contained statements supporting the Kadarist line concerning Western designs of "fascist counterrevolution" and even concerning the Soviet intervention, it also contained the significant assertion that "some of us may have, even now, serious reservations regarding questions of domestic policy and the work of the masters of socialist construction." Even the regime did not appear inclined to construe the declaration as signifying a real change of heart, for **Nepszabadsag** flatly declared on September 29:

> **He who thinks that this declaration marks a change in the ideological thinking of these writers is entirely mistaken. They differentiate themselves from the counterrevolution; however, ideologically, that is only a first step and not more.**

Subsequent developments, moreover, proved that the signers of the declaration had either been guilty of naivete, or outfoxed, insofar as the regime's intentions to relax the pressure on the intellectuals were concerned. In the same article quoted above, **Nepszabadsag** reiterated charges that the Writers' Union had instigated strikes and continued "armed struggle" against the regime after November 4, 1956; that it was still endeavoring to incite resistance and block the regime's efforts to restore order at the end of December. It added:

The Persistence of "Counterrevolution"

The difficulties encountered by the Kadar regime in its attempt to regiment Hungarian writers is illustrated by its reaction to a recently published novelette by Laszlo Toth, called "Prisoners on Leave." The novelette, which appeared in the October 1957 issue of the literary monthly *Kortars*, deals with prisoners who were released from their jail in an unspecified town during the Hungarian uprising in the fall of 1956. Incensed by its "counterrevolutionary" connotations, the party-line writer, Ferenc Nemeth, published an abusive "review" in the December 4th issue of the pseudo-literary weekly *Magyarorszag*, accusing Toth of writing a tendentious, false, and distorted story which portrayed the fighters as a group of "sympathetic and innocent political prisoners," and their guards (*i.e.*, the AVH), as "rough and bestial" characters. Understandably, Nemeth was also highly displeased with Toth's insistence on calling the "counterrevolution" a "revolution." He concluded his diatribe with the following characteristic lines:

> **In conclusion, I demand, in the name of socialism,[!] that we prevent the rebirth of** Irodalmi Ujsag [**the revolutionary organ of Hungarian writers**] **by every means.** Kortars **does not serve a good cause when it publishes such works. The past has forewarned us. Let us not permit it to return.**

Apparently the editors of *Magyarorszag* did not consider Nemeth's strictures adequate, for they appended some editorial remarks of their own. The following passage is typical:

> **The revolver waving, the brutal jailor commands in German and Russian: 'Eins, zwei, raz, dva!" This guard, who gives his orders both in German and Russian, was obviously invented by the author. Why precisely such an invention? The answer is clear. He obviously intended to convey the impression that the brutal jailor was the product of both German fascism and Russian education—or, in other words, by this stratagem the author equates German fascism with Soviet education.***

And the editors conclude:

> **This novelette points to the fact that not only is revisionism the chief danger in Hungary, but that counterrevolutionary agitation also remains a real threat.**

Finally, to drive the lesson home, the editors saw fit to publish, directly below Nemeth's article, a curious and ominous "poem" by one Gyorgy Szilagyi, entitled "Comment on a Conviction":

> **My father spent three years in Vac†**
> **After nineteen nineteen**
> **In punishment**
> **For an eight line poem.**
>
> **If we were not humanitarians**
> **And were not fighting for a better age**
> **We too, as in Horthy's days,**
> **Would give three years for every eight lines.**

It remains to be seen whether this implicit and obscene threat will be carried out in practice.

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* *The incidence of former fascist jailers in the Hungarian political police is discussed by Paul Ignotus in "The AVH: Symbol of Terror",* Problems of Communism, *No. 5, (September-October), 1597.*

† *Vac—a town in Hungary containing a large prison used both by Horthyites and Communists.*

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Even in March and April, manuscripts had to be sent to the paper mills because they might have encouraged the beaten counterrevolution. Some poets even then demanded that their counterrevolutionary poems be included in publishing their works. Even in some new novels that were published, one could find nationalist and other remarks distorting the truth.

Thus, within only a few weeks after the writers had signed the September declaration, they were again under vehement attack. In October, a Budapest People's Court sentenced four more young writers to prison terms ranging from one to three years. They were: Zoltan Molnar, 33-year old novelist; Domokos Varga, formerly on the editorial staff of **Irodalmi Ujsag**, who with Eoersi had represented the writers on the short-lived Central Workers' Council; Gyula Fekete, playwright; and Aron Tobias, formerly associated with the publishing firm of the Writers' Union.

The persecution of the writers finally reached its climax in the November trial **in camera** of Tibor Dery, Gyula Hay, Zoltan Zelk, and Tibor Tardos. On November 13, the Budapest People's Court sentenced Dery to nine years' imprisonment for "having attempted to overthrow the People's Democratic regime," and Hay to six years as Dery's "accomplice." Zelk and Tardos were convicted of the lesser charge of "inciting against the People's Democratic regime," and received sentences of three and one-and-a-half years, respectively.

The fact that the regime did not dare to stage the trial in open court was, in itself, clear evidence that the defendants, though physically broken, were not ready to go down on their knees and confess their guilt. In fact, Dery, ill from the effects of seven months' imprisonment, is reported to have told the court that, were October to happen again, he would choose exactly the same course. Zelk is reported to have repudiated a previously-signed confession because he had been forced to write it under "pressure." [9]

Thus, like many others also in prison for refusing to surrender, the four writers remained faithful to these lines of a poem by Zelk, published in the May 5, 1956, issue of **Irodalmi Ujsag**:

I am a human being, I live like a human being.
How can I be brave?
I fear only that I may be worthless;
Of this I am more afraid than death.

NOTES

1. Text of CC resolution published in *Irodalmi Ujsag*, December 10, 1955.
2. The text of the December 22 Manifesto was reproduced in a special issue of *Irodalmi Ujsag* published March 15, 1957 by the League of Hungarian Writers in Exile.
3. *Nepszabadsag*, February 4, 1957.
4. Reported by United Press, October 31, 1957.
5. *Irodalmi Ujsag*, October 6, 1956.
6. Budapest Radio (Home Service), April 21, 1957.
7. The first signs of Dery's disillusionment appeared in two monumental novels painting a realistic picture of the pre-war communist movement, "Unfinished Sentence" and "Answer" (titles translated), published in 1946 and 1952 respectively. Both works were bitterly attacked in the communist press.
8. Reported in *The Sunday Times* (London), June 23, 1957.
9. Reported in *Die Presse* (Vienna), November 7, 1957.

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Man and System: Two Studies

The Doctor

Mark G. Field:
Doctor and Patient in Russia,
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1957,

Reviewed by Leon Herman

MR. FIELD'S detailed, well-documented and readable survey of the medical profession in the USSR is, in its own right, a valuable contribution to general understanding of contemporary Soviet society. It serves, at the same time, to re-emphasize the high quality of the professional studies of the Soviet system being sponsored by the Russian Research Center of Harvard University, with which the author is associated. His book marks the 29th study prepared under the auspices of this distinguished and highly active organization.

Since Mr. Field's title might conceivably suggest a topic somewhat too technical for the competence or interest of the general reader, it should be said at the outset that this is not a technical study of Soviet medicine addressed primarily to members of the medical profession. Rather, it is a well-trained sociologist's report, in non-technical prose, of the results of an exhaustive investigation into the state of medical practitioners and services under the peculiar social and political conditions prevailing in the USSR. The author's investigation led him far afield, including first a tour of field work among Soviet expatriates in Europe and the United States and, more recently, a trip to the Soviet Union, which together enabled him to amass a wealth of data based on the testimony of individuals from all walks of life and who had direct experience with the Soviet system of medical service either as patients or as doctors.

Most readers of this book will be grateful to Mr. Field, as the reviewer is, for providing the historical setting in which the Soviet medical services developed, and without which our understanding of many of the unique features in Soviet medical practice would surely be incomplete and out of focus. One of the problems that engrossed Mr. Field—and he succeeds in transmitting this deep interest to the reader—is how a time-honored profession distinguished for its devotion to public service and possessing a high capacity for self-regulation has been deprived of its independence, broken in its self-esteem, and reduced to the status of a minor arm of the bureaucracy. Today, it finds itself hemmed in by a narrow and rigid system of political controls, charged with the task of dispensing a specialized service under State tutelage and subject to elaborate rules prescribed by the central administrative authorities.

For some fifty years prior to the Bolshevik seizure of power, Mr. Field reminds us, Russian society boasted a medical fraternity which, though small, governed itself by the same high ethical standards which characterized this profession through the Western world. Its members possessed a deep sense of dedication to the advancement of medical science as their own contribution toward the goal of liberating their fellow-countrymen from oppression and backwardness, especially in the rural regions of the country, which were neglected by the Tsarist regime much as they still are neglected today under Soviet rule.

Motivated like so many young Russians of that period by the urge to protest against the lethargy of the Tsarist bureaucracy, the physicians of pre-Soviet Russia went "to the people," shared their hardships, and tried to bring them the benefits of modern scientific technique. In the process, they built up an effective network of rural health centers which provided the basis for the system of medical service later developed, expanded and

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Mr. Herman is an American economist and student of Soviet society. His "Soviet Economic Policy Since Stalin" appeared in issue No. 1 (January-February), 1956, of this journal.

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adapted to its own operational needs by the Soviet regime:

It did not take the new Soviet rulers long to discover that the organized medical profession, which had supported the democratic provisional government, would not lend itself easily to domination for the political benefit of the regime. Early in 1918, the professional organization of the liberal-minded doctors, the Medical-Sanitary Council, was dissolved as "counterrevolutionary" and replaced by a new organization of "Bolshevik" physicians completely subordinate to the regime and stripped of all power to resist the will of the political leadership. The latter organization (Soviet of Medical Collegia) was later transformed into the Commissariat of Health. This was followed by a drive to purge "class enemies" from the medical profession, which marked the unleashing of a reign of suspicion and denunciation. Many physicians were driven from active practice, many others emigrated abroad, and still others were liquidated. Many of the more fortunate had to wait for years before they were considered "rehabilitated" and therefore fit to resume their profession in a "workers' state."

With the independent elements driven from the profession, the Soviet regime found it easier to achieve its aim of converting the medical service into an adjunct of the industrial production apparatus. The drastic steps which were taken in the process of building up the control mechanism are described by Mr. Field in carefully documented detail. The medical faculties were taken out of the universities and transformed into vocational institutes under the control of the Health Commissariat.

New graduates were trained for the specific purpose of staffing the new industrial and construction projects springing up under the five-year plans. Since they were educated at State expense, the official argument ran, they were completely at the disposal of the Health Commissariat for assignment wherever it chose. The flow of talent into the profession, however, was soon affected by the low salaries fixed by the Commissariat, which were well under those paid to technical personnel directly engaged in the production process—lower, in fact, than the pay of many categories of skilled workers. The ranks of the medical profession began to be filled more and more by women, as men were attracted into the professions where the salary scales were higher by reason of their higher position in the official scale of priorities. The result is that women now make up 75 percent of the country's total number of doctors.

Mr. Field shows further that the facilities placed at the disposal of the Soviet doctor and the allocation of his time are such that his services cannot be made available to all. He functions in an environment where, as a general rule, only that portion of the population considered useful from the viewpoint of the state is provided with systematic medical care. Thus, he works primarily with people employed in enterprises considered important enough to deserve medical installations. Even there, he is limited to providing only such medical aid as is necessary to sustain the processes of production, and no more. He is required to regard his patients as productive instruments and to help maintain them as such. He is reminded by all the elements in his surroundings, physical as well as human, that his main responsibility is not to the patient but to the all-powerful state which manipulates doctor and patient alike and prescribes all the rules governing their relationship.

Hence, the author sees one of the Soviet doctor's chief functions as that of an expert qualified to advise the agencies of the government on the individual worker's fitness to perform his duty. In Soviet society, where economic incentives in industry are not uniformly strong, the incidence of malingering and absenteeism tends to run quite high. At the same time, it is a system based on coercion, and the penalties for such "crimes" are severe. The only way to escape the penalties imposed for absence from work is to obtain a physician's certificate. It therefore becomes the frequent duty of the doctor to distinguish between genuine and feigned incapacity for work. His loyalties are often divided by reason of his being a member of the bureaucracy and at the same time a physician with a natural instinct to be concerned for the welfare of his patient.

The state, however, has its safeguards against too lenient or humane performance of the doctor's duties. He must constantly be on guard against **agents provocateurs** bent on enticing him into an illegal act which they can report to the authorities. As one doctor expressed it, "Every patient could be an agent. The crying woman may be one, who knows?" Despite these hazards, according to Mr. Field, the Soviet doctor succeeds, by and large, in softening somewhat the impact of the multifarious pressures of the regime, the harsh totalitarian controls, and the low priorities accorded to the life and health of the individual citizen. Thus, he serves to reduce discontent and disloyalty among the masses of the population.

Mr. Field's analysis of the Soviet medical structure brings out another signifanct feature, namely that it is elaborately organized into separate compartments to assure that the privileged classes

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get preferred treatment. In the first place, while the total number of registered doctors is large, and the output of new graduates steadily on the increase, their distribution is extremely uneven, with the rural population invariably under-supplied. The USSR as a whole reportedly has 16 doctors per 1,000 inhabitants. However, enormous areas continue to function with less than half this ratio. The ratio declines sharply as the distance from Moscow increases, with the eastern regions generally lowest. Thus, while Moscow counts 60 doctors per 1,000 inhabitants, and Leningrad 41, Kurgan province in Siberia, for example, has only seven per 1,000, and the Belgorod region, six per 1,000.

So large is the void in the rural areas, in fact, that the regime has found it necessary to retain the institution of the **feldsher,** that indestructible offspring of the army medical corps, for service in the countryside. To this day, it would seem the collective farmers and the rural population in general receive most, if not all, of their initial medical attention from **feldshers.** This leads the author to conclude that, after forty years of systematic expansion of its medical services, the Soviet Union still has two parallel networks of medical facilities, "one for the city population staffed by physicians, and one for the peasantry staffed mainly by **feldshers."**

But the better facilities provided for the urban areas does not mean that they are equally accessible to all individual citizens. Mr. Field establishes that, in part, income determines the quality of medical service an individual can obtain. Soviet doctors are permitted to engage in private practice during their off-duty hours, but since the taxes levied on such earnings are extremely high, they must necessarily charge high fees to make it worthwhile. Naturally, only the best-known and most successful doctors can demand such high fees, which means, in effect, that only the unusually well-to-do among the Soviet citizenry can afford this superior quality of medical care.

The higher incomes of the upper strata are, however, only one of the keys to better service. In addition, the state uses the benefits represented by better medical facilities and the services of more qualified physicians to reward loyalty as well as to manipulate the deployment of the labor force in accordance with the state's changing needs. The practical effect of this system is to place each individual in a certain "medical category" according to his position in the social hierarchy. The bulk of the urban population belongs to the category served by the "general network" of medical facilities maintained by the Health Ministry. The elite of Soviet society fare much better: for their benefit the state maintains a special "closed network" of facilities with many gradations of comfort and luxury, determined by the rank of the patient in the hierarchy of privilege. In the polyclinics or hospitals of the "closed network," which are surrounded by extreme secrecy, one former patient told Mr. Field, "everything was better, from the doctors to the instruments and the food." In both of the basic medical networks, service is provided by the state free of cost. There is little doubt, however, that the lavish use of medical personnel and facilities in the "closed network" preempts the choice talent and reduces the overall supply of services available for the general mass of the population.

The emergence of this differential system of medical service lends weight to Mr. Field's opinion that, in this area too, Soviet rule has brought Russia around full cycle. While its form may be different, the whole spirit and practice of the Soviet health service are now quite as class-ridden as in Tsarist Russia. Of the Tsarist system, a public-minded physician of the period, Dr. Mickiewicz, once said that "it was based on the opinion that the peasants and the poor suffered only from 'simple' ailments and did not need the assistance of scientific medicine. The **feldsher** was good enough for them, while the qualified physician was intended only for the blue-blooded aristocracy." While the high party bureaucrat of today may find it inexpedient to defend the present system in such frank terms, he nevertheless assigns the **feldsher** and the unwilling, inexperienced young graduates to treat the village sick, reserving the best-qualified specialists for staffing the hospitals of his own "closed network."

The reviewer must admit to some disappointment that Mr. Field does not provide more information than he does bearing directly upon the quality of medical care received by the average Soviet citizen. Undoubtedly, the author felt that this was a matter better left to qualified experts in the field of medicine rather than sociology, but still the factor of quality must have entered into his judgment that the promise of qualified medical care for all citizens, specifically stated in the Soviet constitution, remains a "macabre farce." In the reviewer's opinion, therefore, what is already an impressive and illuminating piece of scholarship might have been given still better balance and perspective if Mr. Field had traced the observable change, over the years, in the quality and effectiveness of the Soviet medical services.

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The Industrial Manager

Joseph S. Berliner:
Factory and Manager in the USSR,
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1957.

Reviewed by F. Seton

"HOW MUCH IS two and two?" was the test question a Soviet factory director is said to have put to candidates for the post of chief accountant. The successful applicant was the one to reply: "How much do you need, Comrade Director?" The story is apocryphal, of course, but it illustrates how woefully inadequate the "right" answer in theory is apt to be as a key to understanding practical economics—certainly to comprehending the complicated **pax in bello** which reigns in Soviet industry. Soviet textbooks are no help toward this end; in expounding on the socialist economy, they ignore "what is" and deal exclusively with "what should be," feeding us the formal rules and norms which are supposed to be the official guidelines of behavior for economic officials. In the Western experience of central planning such blueprints have often stood revealed as scarcely more than the warp of economic management, through which the shuttle of individual initiative has had to cut or thread its devious way to establish a workable pattern of economic activity. Professor Berliner's study is rooted in the unspoken assumption that human nature and initiative are broadly the same everywhere, and that they are crucial in creating and vitalizing the fabric of any economic system. Probing beyond the blueprint of the textbooks, he penetrates into the crucial interstices of the Soviet industrial system to see how men actually make it work.

The author was fortunate in having at his disposal a unique and authoritative source of information in the shape of former Soviet citizens living as displaced persons in Germany.[1] He has made the most of his opportunity, and the candor and thoroughness of the reports which he evoked is a credit to questioner and respondents alike. Use has also been made of the vast episodic material furnished in press reports of individual transgressions and scandals involving economic officials—cases generally serious enough to indicate widespread toleration of less flagrant forms of the same violations. Finally, the author has drawn on systematic studies of the Soviet managerial system, both Western and Russian. Nothing, however, could quite equal in value his opportunity to go directly to those with personal experience and ask them the straightforward question: "What was it like to be a Soviet manager?"

The replies he got focussed sharply on the immediate propelling force behind Soviet managerial action—the criteria of success in the system and the nature and condition of the rewards. Devoting three chapters to this topic, Professor Berliner states that the most powerful single factor influencing managers is the "basic premium," a monetary bonus awarded for overfulfilment of the monthly production target, ranging from 20 to 100 percent of the manager's fixed salary and rising sharply with every percentage point by which the target is exceeded.

To prevent over-concentration on output at the expense of other desiderata such as quality improvement, labor-saving, cost reduction, **etc.**, the earning of the basic premium is made conditional on certain minimum standards in these respects (notably in the matter of cost reduction), and subsidiary premia may be awarded for specific achievement in such areas. But the far greater reward of the basic premium places it permanently in the forefront of managerial attention and creates that near-obsession with quantitative tar-

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get-beating which is so characteristic of the Soviet industrial climate.

A high rate of output can, of course, be achieved through competence and honest effort. But these are not the only means by which high premia may be earned. The manager can reach his goal in other ways: he may induce the planning authorities to set his target well below capacity; he may simulate a level of performance which has not in fact been reached; or he may attempt, to achieve the assigned target by obtaining, through agents, resources to which he is not entitled.

In the chapters devoted to the first of these devices Professor Berliner describes the perpetual game of cat-and-mouse whereby the manager seeks to conceal existing capacity and inventories and to accumulate unneeded "hoards" of production materials as an aid in future manipulations. The planning authority, aware of this maneuver, reacts by setting targets with a "clearance" over what is practicable on the evidence presented, and the stage is set for the type of "carrot planning" familiar from British wartime experience.[2]

The emphasis on target-chasing creates conflicting pulls for the manager: torn between the lure of immediate premia and the danger of jacking up his future targets by too blatant a disclosure of capacity, he must strike a balance which falls short of his potentialities and allows him to keep as many resources as possible immobilized under his control. Chronically padded orders for supplies and the congestion of the Soviet economy with wrongly located inventories are among the most obvious consequences of this game.

Even greater ingenuity is evident in the various methods managers have devised to "stimulate" high output. In factories where more than one item is produced, the commonest device is to juggle the relative output of various items, overproducing those which tend most to inflate the total production figure. (Depending on whether targets are fixed in terms of physical units, weight, or monetary value, the tendency is to concentrate respectively on items which are (a) easiest to produce in volume; (b) heaviest, (c) highest-priced in relation to their cost to the enterprise.) To the extent that this tends to boost the most material-intensive lines of production, it reinforces the incentive to hold inflated stocks of component parts or production materials.

Other methods of simulation, such as debasing quality, tampering with the accounting period, debiting excessive wage costs to repair accounts, and downright falsification of returns, are dissected by the author with great care and amused sympathy.

None of these defensive measures would be open to the manager if he could not count on the connivance of various control organs, and on the general atmosphere of solidarity which has grown up among all those involved in the task of surmounting the inefficiencies of an over-rigid economic system. The gentle art of "blat"—the exchange of favors transgressing formal laws but not professional ethics—may not be entirely unknown in the West, but it counts for so much more in Soviet industry that it has earned this special label of its own and has bred virtually a corps of experts **(tolkachi)** in its practice. The emerging picture is one of a competent and hard-working elite, forced to evolve a complicated code of informal behavior in a running struggle to transmute the almost inhuman pressures from above into a system which allows dissipation of the stresses and strains at least to the point of bearability. In offering this reflex-like resistance to excessive demands, the managers tend to make the system more workable from the technical as well as from the human point of view, somewhat like providing essential lubrication for an engine with dangerously overheated bearings.

The picture of industrial management is rounded out in a chapter on post-Stalin reforms and a final twelve pages of lucid and well-balanced summary. The author is somewhat skeptical concerning the effectiveness of recent changes. He asserts that the essentials of the system have not been altered, and will not be until pre-established targets cease to serve as benchmarks of success, or until managers can somehow be persuaded that present achievement will not aggravate future demands. Perhaps his view is on the stringent side; at any rate it is conceivable that substantial change (for better or for worse) might spring from reforms which do not meet these tests. Yet certainly he is right in tracing the origin of most of the failings described to the perpetual vise of high targets and stringent supply conditions in which the Soviet manager is caught.

More than any other study of the subject, Berliner's book helps to answer the question "How does the Soviet system actually work?" There is, however, an all-important supplementary question: "What gives the Soviet industrial economy its vigor and allows its comparative success in the pursuit of its chosen tasks?"—for however we may judge the nature of these tasks, the order of priorities imposed by the regime, or the grievous human costs involved, the achievements of the system can hardly be doubted.

Berliner goes some way toward answering this question too, chiefly by making us understand the **un**-planned elements of flexibility, resourcefulness, and energy which the very harshness and

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rigidity of the system induces in its industrial managers as the price of their personal survival. But a great deal remains to be explained. Perhaps the essence of the matter could only be brought into focus by a systematic comparison of the Soviet pattern of incentives and sanctions with those which are operative in other economies. It might then be found, for instance, that the rewards of risk and enterprise **when measured against the penalties of economic failure or inertia** are stronger in the Soviet economy than in the West, however much we may have been accustomed to assuming the contrary. Whether or not this is so, the book under review performs an inestimable service in providing the kind of material without which such vital questions could never be answered. It does so in a careful, searching, yet lively manner; and in this reviewer's opinion, it deserves to become a classic in the interpretation of one vital aspect of that notoriously obscure and elusive object of investigation—Soviet reality.

1. Interrogations of these emigres were conducted as a special project of the Russian Research Center, Harvard University. Several valuable studies on the Soviet system have resulted, including an overall summary of findings by R. A. Bauer, A. Inkeles, and C. Kluckhohn, *How the Soviet System Works* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1956), reviewed in the September-October 1957 issue of this journal.
2. See, for example, Ely Devons, *Planning in Practice* (Cambridge University Press, 1950), p. 28 ff.

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IN FORTHCOMING ISSUES

Soviet Ideology and Politics—A Symposium *by R. N. Carew Hunt, Richard Lowenthal, Samuel L. Sharp, and J. L. H. Keep*
Science in the Soviet State, *by Conway Zirkle*
Birth Control in Communist China, *by Stuart E. Kirby*
The Polish Economy—Problems and Prospects, *by Leon Lewins*
Gomulka and the Peasants, *by Jan Przybyla*
Poland's Angry and Un-Angry Young Men, *by George Sherman*

ALSO: Reviews of books on Soviet education (*by Norton Dodge*), Marxism (*by Bertram D. Wolfe*), Myron Rush's *The Rise of Khrushchev* (*by Daniel Bell*), and Alexander Dallin's *German Rule in Russia, 1941-45* (*by Hans Kohn*).

TO OUR READERS: *Due to production and shipping difficulties this issue of* Problems of Communism *has been unfortunately delayed. We hope to be back on schedule for the March-April issue.*

THE EDITORS

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